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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
In den letzten drei Jahrzehnten, hat Indonesien eine immense Ausweitung der 
Palmölindustrie erlebt. Diese Entwicklung hat zwar zu wirtschaftlichem Wachstum und 
der ländlichen Entwicklung beigetragen aber die rapide Ausweitung der 
Palmölplantagen ging zumeist mit der Rodung des indonesischen Regenwaldes einher. 
Dies hat sowohl negative Auswirkungen auf die Umwelt, als auch auf die Ureinwohner, 
die als kleinbäuerliche Subsistenzbauern stark vom Regenwald abhängig sind. Ihre 
Lebensgrundlage wird durch die Ausweitung der Palmölplantagen bedroht. Die 
indonesische Regierung ermutigt daher diese kleinbäuerlichen Subsistenzfarmer, die in 
den Gegenden der Palmölplantagen leben, in die Palmölindustrie einzusteigen, indem 
sie den Vertragsanbau („Contract farming“) fördert. Auf der einen Seite ist dieser 
Versuch erfolgreich, da viele Kleinbauern ihr Land in Palmölplantagen umgewandelt 
haben, welche potentiell attraktive Renditen bieten. Auf der anderen Seite erreichen 
diese Kleinbauern oft nicht die Produktivität von großen Palmölfirmen, die moderne 
Technologien mit großen Mengen an Düngemitteln und Pestiziden verwenden. 
Hierdurch profitieren die Kleinbauern oft weniger von den Gewinnen in der 
Palmölindustrie als die großen Palmölfirmen. Diese Situation hat zu einer Erhöhung der 
Ungleichheit und manchmal auch zu sozialen Konflikten geführt. Die Einführung von 
Vertragsanbaumodellen ist eine Strategie der Regierung, die Beteiligung von 
Kleinbauern an den Gewinnen in der Palmölindustrie zu erhöhen und die Armut in den 
ländlichen Gebieten zu reduzieren. Allerdings birgt solch ein Vertrag das Problem von 
einer asymmetrischen Informationsverteilung woraus sich die Gefahr des Moral Hazard 
mit Bezug auf Effizienz und Fairness ergeben kann. Hieraus resultiert die Frage des 
Armut reduzierenden Effekts von solchen Vertragsanbaumodellen. Zudem ist die 
Palmölproduktion mit bestimmten Risiken wie Preisschwankungen und Krankheiten der 
Ölpalme verbunden. Während einige Studien aufzeigen, dass Vertragsanbau eine 
effektive Methode des Risikomanagements ist, ist die Rolle von Schocks und Risiken in 
der kleinbäuerlichen Palmölproduktion noch wenig untersucht worden. 
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es zu einem besseren Verständnis über den Einfluss von 
Vertragsanbau in der Palmölindustrie in Indonesien auf den Wohlstand von Kleinbauern 
beizutragen. 
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Es gibt drei spezielle Zielsetzungen, die in drei separaten Essays bearbeitet werden: 
(1) Zu bewerten, ob und in welchem Ausmaß die Armen von Vertragsanbau 
profitieren, 
(2) das Ausmaß der Vulnerabilität unter Palmöl Kleinbauern zu ermitteln und zu 
bewerten, ob Vertragsanbau eine effektive Methode ist die Vulnerabilität zu 
verringern und 
(3) die Beziehung zwischen einer subjektiven Risikoeinschätzung, der 
Risikoeinstellung und dem Entscheidungsverhalten von Palmöl Kleinbauern zu 
untersuchen. 
Die empirische Basis dieser Studie ist eine Haushaltsbefragung von 300 Palmöl 
Kleinbauern in der Provinz Jambi (Sumatra), eine der größten Palmöl produzierenden 
Provinzen Indonesiens. 
Um den Einfluss von Vertragsanbau auf den Wohlstand von Kleinbauern zu bewerten, 
beginnt die Analyse mit einem Vergleich der Eigenschaften von Vertragsanbau-
Kleinbauern und Kleinbauern ohne Vertragsanbauverträgen. Die Analyse zeigt, dass 
Vertragsanbau-Kleinbauern im Vergleich zu Kleinbauern ohne Vertag eine signifikant 
größere Landfläche besitzen und signifikant mehr Einkommen haben. Des Weiteren 
verwenden Vertragsanbau-Kleinbauern mehr Inputs und erzielen daher auch höhere 
Ernten. Um für versteckte Verzerrungen zu kontrollieren, wurde der Einfluss von 
Vertragsanbau auf das Einkommen mit einem zwei Stufen Treatment Effekt Model 
geschätzt. In der ersten Stufe wurde die Teilnahmeentscheidung mit Hilfe eines Probit 
Models geschätzt und die inverse Mills Ratio wurde in der zweiten Stufe als Regressor 
in das Einkommensmodell eingefügt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Teilnahme am 
Vertragsanbau signifikant von dem Haushaltstyp (Haushalt mit Migrationsorientierung 
oder eingeborener Haushalt), dem Alter des Haushaltsvorstandes, der Größe der 
Palmöllandfläche und der Zeit seit Plantagengründung beeinflusst wird. Kontrolliert 
man für versteckte Verzerrungen, kann der positive Effekt von der Teilnahme am 
Vertragsanbau bestätigt werden. Eine weitere Schätzung zeigt allerdings, dass 
Kleinbauern mit einem geringeren Konsumlevel von solchen Verträgen benachteiligt 
sind. Eine mögliche Erklärung für den Ausschluss der Armen ist, dass Kredit- und 
Managementbedingungen oft die finanziellen und technischen Kapazitäten der Armen 
übersteigen. Von den Ergebnissen können daher die folgenden Empfehlungen für 
Politiker abgeleitet werden; wenn Vertragsanbau mehr pro-poor, also zugunsten der 
Armen, sein soll, dann ist Überarbeitung der existierenden Vertragsbedingungen nötig. 
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Um das Risiko zukünftig in Armut zu fallen zu berücksichtigen, wird in dem zweiten 
Essay das Konzept der Vulnerabilität angewendet. Die Analyse beginnt mit einer 
deskriptiven Beschreibung der Schocks, die Kleinbauern erlebt haben. Die Ergebnisse 
zeigen, dass Vertrags-Kleinbauern häufiger von Palmöl Schocks berichten als 
Kleinbauern ohne Vertrag, da erstere abhängiger von Palmöl sind. Im Durchschnitt trägt 
Palmöl für Vertrags-Kleinbauern zu 60 Prozent und für Kleinbauern ohne Vertrag zu 30 
Prozent zum Haushaltseinkommen bei. Die Teilnahme am Vertragsanbau und die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit einen Schock zu erleben, wurde simultan mit einen Bivariaten 
Probit Model geschätzt, um Endogenität zu kontrollieren. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
Preisschocks durch die Teilnahme am Vertragsanbau reduziert werden können; dies ist 
allerdings nicht der Fall für Produktionsschocks. Dies suggeriert, dass der Preisanreiz 
des Vertragsanbaus effektiv ist während die technische Assistenz, die Palmölfirmen den 
Kleinbauern als Teil des Vertrages anbieten, weniger effektiv ist. In diesem Essay wird 
Vulnerabilität mit Hilfe des Asset basierten Vulnerabilitätskonzepts untersucht. 
Hierdurch können vier Armutstypologien unterschieden werden: (i) strukturell 
chronisch arm, (ii) strukturell schwankend arm, (iii) stochastisch schwankend arm und 
(iv) nicht arm. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass rund 40 Prozent der Kleinbauern als 
stochastisch schwankend arm eingestuft werden können. Dies bedeutet, dass diese 
Kleinbauern zum Befragungszeitpunkt nicht arm sind aber im Falle eines zukünftigen 
Schocks in Armut fallen könnten. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie soll den Politikern 
signalisieren, dass es nicht ausreichend ist den Einfluss der Palmölentwicklung auf das 
Einkommenswachstum zu betrachten, sondern dass zukünftige Risiken berücksichtigt 
und adäquate Systeme der sozialen Sicherung für die Gemeinden in den 
Palmölgegenden entwickelt werden müssen. 
In diesem Essay wird auch betrachtet, wie effektiv Vertragsanbau die Vulnerabilität 
reduzieren kann. Ein einfacher arithmetischer Mittelwerts Vergleich zeigt, dass 
Vertrags-Kleinbauern eine signifikant kleinere Wahrscheinlichkeit in Armut zu fallen 
aufweisen als Kleinbauern ohne Vertrag. Um für das Problem der Selektionsverzerrung 
zu kontrollieren, wurde die Methode des Propensity Score-Matchings angewendet. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Teilnahme am Vertragsanbau die Vulnerabilität nicht 
signifikant verringert. Ein Hauptgrund ist hierfür, dass hauptsächlich Haushalte mit 
einer größeren Vermögensausstattung am Vertragsanbau teilnehmen. Dieser Essay 
bestätigt daher die Ergebnisse des ersten; nämlich, dass eine Überarbeitung der 
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existierenden Vertragsbedingungen notwendig ist, um armen Haushalten die Teilnahme 
zu ermöglichen.  
Der dritte Essay untersucht, ob die subjektive Risikoeinschätzung und die 
Risikoeinstellung der Kleinbauern ihre zukünftigen Investitionspläne beeinflusst. Um 
für unbeobachtbare Heterogenität zu kontorollieren, werden die subjektive 
Risikoeinschätzung und die zukünftigen Investitionspläne simultan mit einem 
Multivariaten Probit Model geschätzt. Dieses Model erlaubt die Koexistenz von zwei 
Portfolio Auswahlmöglichkeiten, nämlich die Möglichkeit zukünftig in Palmöl Betriebe 
oder in Nicht-Palmöl Betriebe zu investieren. Die Risiken, denen Kleinbauern 
ausgesetzt sind, können in drei Gruppen unterteilt werden: Palmöl Preisrisiken, Palmöl 
Produktionsrisiken und Risiken für Nicht-Palmöl Betriebe. Die Kleinbauern wurden 
nach der subjektiven Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit für jede dieser Risiken befragt. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die subjektive Risikoeinschätzung für alle Risiken von 
dazugehörigen Schockerlebnissen in der Vergangenheit beeinflusst wird. Eine andere 
wichtige Determinante ist die Vermögensausstattung. Genauer gesagt, Kleinbauern mit 
einer größerer Palmöllandfläche neigen dazu größere Risiken in der Palmölproduktion 
zu erwarten während Kleinbauern mit größeren Gummibaumlandflächen, 
Viehbeständen oder Vermögensgegenständen von Nicht-Palmöl Betrieben weniger 
pessimistisch sind. Die Ergebnisse des Investitionsmodels zeigen, dass der Plan in 
Palmöl zu investieren von negativen Erwartungen in Bezug auf Nicht-Palmöl Betriebe 
und von einer geringen Risikoaversion beeinflusst wird und daher unabhängig von der 
Risikoerwartungen in Bezug auf Palmöl zu sein scheint. Dementsprechend erhöht sich 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit in Nicht-Palmöl Betriebe zu investieren mit der Erwartung einen 
Palmölschock in der Zukunft zu erleben und ist allerdings unabhängig von der 
Risikoeinstellung. Da die Entscheidung für zukünftige Investitionsentscheidungen von 
der subjektiven Risikoeinschätzung beeinflusst wird, scheint die Tauglichkeit der 
Entscheidung, ob zukünftig in Palmöl Betriebe oder in Nicht-Palmöl Betriebe investiert 
wird, von der Qualität der subjektiven Risikoeinschätzung abzuhängen, d.h. ob die 
subjektiven Erwartungen mit der Realität übereinstimmen. Es wird Politikern daher 
empfohlen, die Kleinbauern zu unterstützen die Qualität ihrer subjektiven Erwartungen 
zu erhöhen, indem ihnen zum Beispiel akkurate und adäquate Informationen über 
Chancen und Risiken in der Palmöl- und Nicht-Palmölindustrie bereitgestellt werden.  
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Zusammenfassend zeigt die Doktorarbeit, dass Vertragsanbau in der Palmölindustrie 
den Kleinbauern Chancen eröffnet hat, ein höheres Einkommen zu erwirtschaften, aber 
auch dass die Armen oft nicht profitieren und der Großteil der Kleinbauern mit 
Armutsrisiken konfrontiert ist, welche nicht durch den Vertragsanbau reduziert werden 
können. Die Doktorarbeit unterstreicht daher die Notwendigkeit die existierenden 
Vertragsbedingungen zu überarbeiten, um mehr pro-poor zu werden und Risiken bei 
dem Design von armutsreduzierenden Maßnahmen zu berücksichtigen. Als nächster 
Schritt wird empfohlen, dass Umweltexternalitäten bei der Untersuchung der 
Vulnerabilität von Palmöl Kleinbauern berücksichtigt werden sollen.  
 
Stichwörter: Vertragsanbau, Palmöl, Kleinbauern, Armut, Vulnerabilität, Risiken, 
Schocks 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Indonesia has experienced a rapid oil palm expansion during the past three decades. 
This has contributed to economic growth and rural development. However, the rapid 
expansion of oil palm plantations was at the expense of rainforest areas. This raised 
concerns over the impact of this development on indigenous communities and the 
environment. Often oil palm plantations have replaced forest areas where forest-
dependent communities live. Thus, their livelihoods as smallholder subsistence farmer 
became threatened. The government of Indonesia has encouraged smallholder farmers 
in the oil palm plantation areas to participate in the oil palm industry by promoting 
contractual arrangements with oil palm companies. On the one hand, this attempt has 
been successful. Many smallholders converted their land into oil palm plantations which 
offered attractive returns. On the other hand, subsistence smallholder farmers were often 
not in a position to achieve the productivity levels of the oil palm companies that 
applied modern technologies with high levels of fertilizers and pesticides. This has 
created a gap between the companies and the surrounding communities in the benefit 
shares of oil palm development. Therefore, inequality has increased and sometimes 
social conflicts have emerged. The implementation of contract farming schemes was the 
government’s strategy to increase participation of smallholders in oil palm development 
in order to reduce poverty in rural areas. However, contract farming may suffer from 
asymmetric information and therefore moral hazard can emerges with regards to 
efficiency and fairness.  This raises the question of the poverty reduction effect of such 
schemes. Furthermore the nature of oil palm has exposed smallholders to certain risks 
such as price volatility and diseases outbreak. While some studies suggest that contract 
farming can be an effective tool of risk management, the role of shocks and the poverty 
risks which are faced by oil palm smallholders demand further investigation. 
The objective of this thesis is to improve the understanding of the effects of contract 
farming in the oil palm industry in Indonesia on smallholders’ wellbeing. There are 
three specific research objectives which are addressed in three separate papers: (1) To 
assess if and to what extent the poor benefit from contract farming. (2) To assess the 
degree of vulnerability to poverty among oil palm smallholders and if contract farming 
is an effective measure to reduce vulnerability to poverty. (3) To investigate the 
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relationship between subjective risk expectation, risk attitude and decision making 
behavior among oil palm smallholders. The empirical base of this study is a household 
survey of 300 oil palm smallholders in the province of Jambi (Sumatra), one of the 
major oil palm producing provinces in Indonesia.  
In assessing the impact of contract farming on the households’ well-being, the analyses 
commences with a comparison of the characteristics of contract and non-contract 
smallholders. It was shown that contract smallholders have a significantly higher land 
size and income than non-contract smallholders. Moreover, contract smallholders apply 
higher inputs and therefore generate higher yields than non-contract smallholders. In 
order to control for hidden bias, the effect of contract participation on the households’ 
income was estimated by a two steps treatment effect model. First, the participation 
decision was estimated by probit models and the inverse Mills ratio was calculated 
which was included in the second step as a regressor in the income model. The results 
show that contract participation is significantly associated with the type of household (a 
migrant or indigenous household), age of household head, size of oil palm plot, and the 
time of plantation establishment. After controlling for a hidden bias, the positive income 
effect of contract participation can be confirmed. However, a further investigation for 
the equity effect shows that poor smallholders are discriminated to benefit from such 
contract. One of the possible reasons for the exclusion of the poor is that loan conditions 
and management requirements are often beyond their financial and technical capacity. 
The results therefore convey the following message for policy makers; if they want 
contract farming to be more pro-poor a review of existing contractual schemes is 
necessary.  
In order to take into account the risk of falling into poverty in the future, the concept of 
vulnerability to poverty is applied in the second paper. The analyses commences with a 
description of shocks experienced by smallholders. The results show that oil palm 
shocks are more extensively reported by contract smallholders than non-contract 
smallholders as the former are more dependent on oil palm. On average, oil palm 
contributes over 60 percent of household income of contract smallholders while it is 
only 30 percent for the non-contract smallholders. The contract participation and the 
likelihood of experiencing a shock are simultaneously estimated by using bivariate 
probit models in order to control for endogeneity. The results show that price shocks 
can be reduced by participation; however this is not the case for production shocks. This 
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suggests that the price incentive offered by the contract works effectively while the 
technical assistance that oil palm companies offer to smallholders as part of the contract 
is less effective. In the paper vulnerability to poverty is assessed by applying the asset 
based vulnerability concept. Based on the assessment, four poverty typologies are 
established, namely structural chronic, structural transient, stochastic transient and non-
poor. The results suggest that about 40 percent of smallholders are classified as 
stochastically transient poor who are non-poor but could fall into poverty in the 
presence of shocks. Results of this study signal to policy makers that it is not enough to 
consider the effects of oil palm development on income growth but there is a need to 
take into account the future risks and develop appropriate social protection schemes for 
the communities in oil palm areas.   
The paper also assesses the effectiveness of contract farming in reducing vulnerability 
to poverty. A simple mean comparison shows that contract smallholders are 
significantly less vulnerable than non-contract smallholders. In order to control for the 
selection bias a propensity score matching analysis was applied. The results show that 
contract participation does not significantly reduce vulnerability to poverty. The major 
reason is that mostly households with higher asset endowments participate in contract 
farming. Hence, the paper confirms the results of the first paper that there is a need to 
review the contract schemes conditions for asset poor households to participate.  
The third paper examines whether subjective risk expectations and risk attitude 
influence the future plan of investments among oil palm smallholders in Indonesia. In 
order to control for unobservable heterogeneity, subjective risk expectations and the 
future plan of investment are simultaneously estimated by a multivariate probit model. 
Such model also allows the coexistence of two portfolio choices in the future plan, 
namely oil palm and non-oil palm enterprises. Risks which smallholders are confronted 
with can be classified into three major groups, namely oil palm price risk, oil palm 
production risk and non-oil palm business risk. Respondents are asked to subjectively 
assess their expectation towards each risk group, i.e. whether they expect to suffer from 
a certain risk in the future. Results show that the subjective expectation towards all risks 
is driven by corresponding shock experience in the past. Other important determinants 
are asset endowments. More precisely, smallholders with larger oil palm plots tend to 
expect larger risks in oil palm production while those with larger rubber plots, livestock 
and non-farm business assets tend to be less pessimistic. The results of the investment 
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plan model show that a plan for oil palm investment tends to be encouraged by 
pessimism in the non-oil palm enterprises and low risk aversion and seems to be 
independent of risk expectations in oil palm business itself. Accordingly, the likelihood 
to plan a non-oil palm investment increases with the expectation of experiencing an oil 
palm production shock in the future but is independent of risk aversion. As the future 
plan of investment seems to be driven by subjective risk expectations, the suitability of 
the portfolio choice depends on the quality of expectations, i.e. whether subjective 
expectations match the reality in the future. Hence, it is recommended to policy makers 
to assist smallholders in improving the quality of their risk expectations by for example 
supplying accurate and adequate information regarding prospects and risks of oil palm 
as well as non-oil palm enterprises.  
In summary, this thesis shows that while contract farming in the oil palm industry has 
opened opportunities for smallholders to increase their income, the poor often fail to 
benefit and the majority of smallholders are still confronted with poverty risks which 
cannot be reduced by the contract schemes. Thus, this thesis underlines the need for 
reviewing the contract farming schemes in order to be more pro-poor and taking into 
account risks in designing poverty reduction policies. As a further step, it is 
recommended to take into account environmental externalities in assessing vulnerability 
of oil palm smallholders. 
 
Keywords: contract farming, oil palm, smallholders, poverty, vulnerability to poverty, 
risks, shocks 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background 
In the last three decades, the growing role of contract farming has attracted the interest 
of policy makers and researchers (e.g. Glover 1983; Glover 1987; Minot 1986; Glover 
and Kusterer 1990; da Silva 2005; Setboonsarng 2008). Contract farming especially in 
developing countries has been discussed controversially. On the one hand, it can govern 
linkages between agri-business companies and smallholders and thereby increase 
productivity of smallholders and reduce production and marketing risks through the 
provision of inputs, credits, technical assistance and guaranteed markets (Key and 
Runsten 1999). If properly implemented, contract farming schemes can be an important 
component of rural development policies and foster the integration of smallholders into 
the national economy (Glover 1987). On the other hand, there is the danger that contract 
farming is a means of exploiting cheap labor and transferring production risks to 
smallholders. Contract terms may be exploitative and smallholders may have to accept 
due to weak bargaining power (e.g. Setboonsarng 2008; Eaton and Sheperd 2001). 
Another concern is the exclusion of small and marginal farmers since companies prefer 
to work with the larger and more advanced producers (Little and Watts 1994). In this 
way, inequality in rural areas can increase.  
Research on contract farming has been carried out for different commodities in many 
countries. Prominent examples are Simmon et al. (2005) for corn, rice, and broilers in 
Indonesia, Cai et al. (2002) for rice in Cambodia, Key and Runsten (1999) for frozen 
vegetable industry in Mexico, Singh (2002) with vegetable crops in India, Miyata et al. 
(2009) with apple and green union in China, and Porter and Howard (1997) who 
evaluated various contract schemes in Nigeria and South Africa. 
The oil palm industry in Indonesia is a typical case where contract farming has been 
promoted by the government as a part of rural development policies. Contract farming 
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has facilitated the expansion of oil palm under smallholder farming from only 3 
thousand ha in 1979 to about 3 million ha in 2010 (Ministry of Agriculture 2011).  
In line with the literature on contract farming in general, recent studies in oil palm in 
Indonesia showed mixed results. On the one hand, income security to smallholders can 
be provided (Sheil et al. 2009). Education and health infrastructures for local 
communities surrounding the plantations are also facilitated by oil palm companies (Zen 
et al. 2005). On the other hand, contract schemes were criticized for the lack of clarity 
in land tenure, unfavorable contractual schemes, the lack of contractual compliance by 
the oil palm companies (Rist et al. 2010) and the lack of transparency in price 
determination (Maryadi et al. 2007).  
There are several questions that remain with regards to contract farming in the oil palm 
industry in Indonesia. A major question is the poverty reduction impact of existing 
contract schemes. While the significant contribution of oil palm to household welfare 
and poverty alleviation was pointed out by some studies (e.g. Barlow et al. 2003; Zen et 
al. 2005; Susila 2004; the World Bank 2011), most of those studies did not clearly 
distinguish between the impact of the contractual arrangements and the impact of the 
introduction of oil palm plantations as such. 
Another limitation of previous studies is that they applied the concept of static poverty 
analysis. The decrease in the poverty headcount has been labeled as a success story of 
the oil palm contract farming scheme. However, since oil palm generates not only 
higher return but also higher risks, a dynamic measure of poverty analysis that takes 
into account shocks and risks can improve our understanding of the pros and cons of 
contract farming.  
A third research gap is the limited understanding of the decision making behavior oil 
palm smallholders; hence a more comprehensive study is needed. Especially the role of 
shocks experienced and risks expected as an influencing factor for long term decision 
making behavior needs to be studied in order to develop policy recommendations that 
are effective for sustainable rural development. 
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1.2. Research objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to provide a better understanding of the impact of 
contract farming between smallholders and oil palm companies in Indonesia on the 
well-being of the rural population. The overall objective is being addressed in three 
specific research objectives as follows.  
The first specific objective is to assess the impact of contract farming in the oil palm 
industry on smallholders’ well-being and to examine whether and to what extent the 
poor benefited from contract farming. The rationale of this objective is that while 
contractual arrangements between agro-industry corporations and smallholders are 
promoted by the government as a part of rural development and poverty reduction 
policies there are good reasons to assume that the implementation of such arrangements 
differ with regards to efficiency and fairness. This has increased the concern over their 
impact on smallholders’ well-being and poverty reduction.  
The second specific objective is to assess vulnerability to poverty among oil palm 
smallholders as well as the effectiveness of contract farming in reducing the 
vulnerability. Using this concept it can be found out whether a smallholder that is 
currently not poor could fall into poverty in future because of shocks. By means of a 
forward looking concept taking into account shocks or risks in a poverty analysis the 
true prospect of oil palm smallholders’ well-being can be captured. 
The third objective is to better understand the relationship between subjective risk 
expectations, risk attitude and behavior towards risk, as revealed in the investment plans 
of oil palm smallholders. Having a better understanding on risk behavior could benefit 
policy makers in order to offer customized investment advices and design risk 
management policies which are in line with the realities of oil palm plantation schemes 
of the smallholders. As the smallholders are confronted with a risky replanting decision 
a comparison with other alternatives is needed. 
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1.3. Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is organized in eight chapters. An overview of oil palm development and 
smallholding production in Indonesia is presented as an in-depth problem analysis in 
chapter two. Chapter two provides the base information required for the analyses 
presented in the next chapters. Relevant secondary data from official statistical sources 
that show the world market trends for palm oil, the contribution of oil palm for the 
Indonesian economy, and the production and the area of oil palm in Indonesia are 
described. This is completed with a narrative of oil palm development policies in 
Indonesia. A discussion of the contractual arrangements between oil palm companies 
and smallholders is presented accompanied with some observations in the study area. 
Previous studies on contract farming in the oil palm industry are also elaborated.  
In chapter three, study area and data collection methodology is presented. This chapter 
describes the reasons for choosing Jambi province as the study area and the sampling 
procedure applied in the primary data collection for about 300 smallholders.  
Chapter four describes a case study of oil palm community in a site where oil palm 
contract farming just commenced for few years. The livelihoods, well-being and 
poverty of households in this site are discussed. The socio economic conditions of this 
site are compared to those of another site where oil palm contract farming has been 
established for a long time. This chapter lays a scene for advanced empirical analyses 
presented in the next chapters. 
Chapter five addresses the question whether contract farming in the oil palm industry in 
Indonesia is pro-poor. In the theoretical background contract farming is viewed from the 
perspective of a classic principal agent problem. Analyses presented in this chapter 
commence with a comparison of some characteristics between contract and non-contract 
smallholders. This is followed by an investigation for the determinants of contract 
participation and thereafter, the impact of contract farming on household income is 
assessed. A two steps treatment effects model taking into account unobservable factors 
is applied. Finally, the equity effect among smallholders based on the consumption 
poverty line is investigated. This chapter is based on the paper of “Is contract farming in 
the Indonesian oil palm industry pro-poor” published in Journal of Southeast Asian 
Economies, Vol.30, No. 1 (April 2013).  
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In chapter six, an assessment of vulnerability to poverty among oil palm smallholders is 
presented. This chapter also investigates the effectiveness of contract farming in 
reducing particular shocks and the vulnerability to poverty. Shocks analyzed here are 
classified into four major shocks, namely price shocks, production shocks, health and 
demographic shocks and other economic shocks. A comparison of experienced shocks 
and their magnitudes including perceived severity, potential income loss, and extra 
expenditure between contract and non-contract smallholders is presented. Taking into 
account endogeneity, bivariate probit models are employed to analyze the effect of 
contract participation on the likelihood of each experienced shock. The vulnerability to 
poverty is estimated by applying asset based approach in cross sectional data which was 
first introduced by Chiwaula et al. (2011). Based on the analysis, four poverty 
typologies, namely chronically poor, structurally transient poor, stochastically transient 
poor and non-poor are defined in order to delineate the structure of poverty of oil palm 
smallholder households. In the last part of the analysis, the effect of contract 
participation on vulnerability to poverty is evaluated by applying a propensity score 
matching model to take into account the selection bias. This chapter is based on the 
paper of “Contract farming and vulnerability to poverty among oil palm smallholders in 
Indonesia” which is invited to be resubmitted to Journal of Development Studies in 
2013. 
Chapter seven analyzes whether subjective risk expectations and risk attitude influence 
the decision making behavior with regards to the choices of planned investments. The 
analysis starts with a description of shocks experienced by smallholders and the risks 
they expect in the future together with a description of portfolio choices namely 
investments in oil palm and non-oil palm enterprises. A multivariate probit model is 
employed to simultaneously estimate the determinants of risk expectations and the 
portfolio choice of investment in order to deal with unobservable individual 
heterogeneity. This chapter based on the paper of “Subjective risk expectations and 
future plan of investment among oil palm smallholders” submitted to Journal of Risk 
Research in 2013.  
Chapter eight submits a synthesis of the research by summarizing the results and 
drawing conclusion. In addition, recommendations for future research and policy design 
are given.  
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CHAPTER 2 
OIL PALM DEVELOPMENT AND SMALLHOLDERS IN INDONESIA 
 
 
This chapter provides insights on oil palm development and the role of smallholders in 
oil palm production in Indonesia. The chapter commences with a description of the 
nature of oil palm in order to better understand risks exposed by the crop. This is 
followed by a discussion of the global demand for palm oil in the vegetable oil market. 
Next the contribution of oil palm for Indonesian economy is presented together with a 
narrative of oil palm development and policies in the country. Included is a discussion 
on the pros and cons of the socio-economic impacts of oil palm development on local 
communities. This is followed by a discussion of contract farming between 
smallholders and oil palm companies including two cases of contract schemes in the 
study area. Finally, previous studies on oil palm contract farming are described. The 
analysis presented in this chapter mainly relies on secondary data from official 
statistical sources and the literature. Some casual observations are also added.  
2.1. The nature of oil palm  
Oil palm has some specific characteristics that may expose smallholders to certain risks. 
The price of palm oil in the global market is volatile as shown by Figure 2.1. During the 
Asian financial crisis between end of 1997 and 1998 the price of palm oil rose but then 
declined until 2000. The global food crisis in 2008 and the growing demand for plant 
oils from India and China led to an increase in the price up to three fold between 2001 
and 2008. Thereafter the price declined due to oversupply and climbed again in early 
2009. While overall the trend of price is positive and oil palm seems to be a prospective 
business, the price volatility can expose smallholders to an adverse risk that lead to 
prominent income shortfall.  
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Figure 2.1. The price of palm oil between 1997 and 2012 
Source: Adapted from www.indexmundi.com  
 
Oil palm cannot be combined with other crops in later stages of tree age. It is a 
monoculture and therefore is at risk to pest attacks and diseases outbreaks. Oil palm 
plantations are also vulnerable to fires especially in peat land areas.  
Oil palms have a life span of 25 years and the life cycle is characterized by the 
following phases. First, the immature phase or gestation period normally takes three or 
four years after planting. Afterwards, the trees begin flowering and producing little 
fruits up to the fifth year. Enough yields and positive cash flows can be produced 
between six to eight years while peak yields can be reached between 10 to 18 years of 
age. Thereafter, the yields are constant and gradually decline. After 25 years the trees 
would not be economically feasible and therefore should be replanted.  
The crop is commonly harvested twice to three times a month. Once harvested, fruit 
deteriorates rapidly and must be processed within 48 hours. Beyond that period, the 
fruits may contain very high free fat acid that cannot be tolerated and lead to price 
reduction or rejection of the fruits.   
2.2. The global demand for palm oil 
Palm oil is one of major plant oils and which is the most widely produced and traded in 
the world. In 2011 the palm oil production reached 48 million tons while the export 
volume of palm oil attained 60 percent of total export volume of vegetable oil (USDA 
2012). The significant role of palm oil in the vegetable oil market are often associated 
with the advantage of oil palm on productivity and production cost (Sheil et al. 2009). 
Compared to other oil crops, oil palm is at least five times more productive in terms of 
yield per hectare (The World Bank 2011). Oil palm is also cheaper than other crops to 
produce biodiesel (Hardter et al. 1997). 
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Palm oil is widely used for food and non-food applications. About 80 percent of the 
current palm oil production is consumed in the form of food such as cooking oil, 
margarine and an ingredient in packaged food. The rests are used for non-food 
applications including soaps, detergents, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals.  
In recent years the demand for palm oil is also growing with the global trend for biofuel 
usage. For example, China and EU have targeted biofuel blending mandates for 15 
percent and 10 percent respectively by 2020 (FAO 2008). In order to satisfy such 
prospective demands, Sheil et al. (2009) estimated that an additional 5 million ha of oil 
palm plantation is needed.  
 
2.3. The development of palm oil production in Indonesia  
The growing global demand for palm oil has driven the rapid expansion of oil palm 
plantations in Indonesia from merely 295 thousand hectares in 1980 to almost 8 million 
hectares in 2010 (BPS 2011). Indonesia is the largest producer of palm oil in the world. 
It produced about 25.9 million metric ton in 2011 which was half of global palm oil 
production (USDA 2012). About half of the plantation area in 2010 is covered with of 
immature and young trees with less than ten years of age (BPS 2011). Based on such 
structure of plantation age, production may increase by 1.5 to 2 million tons a year over 
the next decade (USDA 2010). About 80 percent of national production is in Sumatra. 
In recent years oil palm has also expanded in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. 
Oil palm is an important economic sector which generated export earnings about US $ 
10.4 billion, contributed about 4.5 percent of GDP and employed over 3 million people 
in 2009 (USDA 2010). Some studies also claim that oil palm has contributed to poverty 
reduction in rural areas (The World Bank 2011; Susila 2004). 
In the sixties oil palm plantations were under state control (Perseroan Terbatas 
Perkebunan) with an area of less than 200 000 ha. Since the early eighties the 
government stimulated the development of private estates and smallholder plantations 
through contract farming. Under the contract scheme so-called PIR/NES (Perkebunan 
Inti Rakyat or Nucleus Estate and Smallholder Scheme), private agribusiness companies 
established integrated oil palm plantations for their own (called as Nucleus) and also for 
smallholders (called as Plasma) on a credit basis. Since the PIR/NES scheme 
commenced, smallholder’s plantations have further expanded from 3 thousand hectares 
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in 1979 to 824 thousand hectares in 1997. The  smallholder plantations spread mostly in 
Riau, South Sumatra, North Sumatra, Jambi and West Kalimantan (Vermeulen and 
Goad 2006). 
In the mid-80s, as a response to the growing global demand for palm oil, about 5.5 
million hectares areas largely covered by forests were reserved by the government to be 
converted into oil palm plantations. In order to increase national oil palm production 
concessions were also offered to the private sector. The government has subsidized the 
oil palm expansion mainly with cheap credits. As a result, the oil palm plantation area 
extensively expanded from about 600,000 hectares in 1985 to almost 2.8 million 
hectares in 1998 (BPS 2011). During financial crisis and instable political environment 
between 1998 and 2002 the oil palm development has slowed down. 
Thereafter, economic and political reforms in Indonesia led to “pro oil palm” policies. 
In order to accelerate economic growth and crisis recovery the government endeavored 
to boost oil palm production through allocation of large land tracts to oil palm 
development, decentralization of land use licensing to provincial level, subsidized credit 
of plantation establishment for smallholders famers, and creating a favorable 
environment for foreign investment. As a result, during the first decade after the crisis 
the mature oil palm area rapidly expanded by 250 thousand ha annually while the palm 
oil production increased by 17 percent per year. In 2010 the allocation of oil palm area 
was 50 % for private corporations, 42 % for smallholders and the remainder for state 
companies (BPS 2011). 
2.4. Socio-economic effects of oil palm expansion 
The rapid oil palm expansion raises the question of its socio-economic effects on 
surrounding communities since most oil palm plantations are established on forested 
areas where forest dependent communities have lived since centuries. While the 
establishment of oil palm plantations offers new sources of income they are at the same 
time a threat to the indigenous communities who relied on natural resources as a source 
of livelihood (Sheil et al. 2006; Belcher et al. 2004).  
Some studies emphasize the contribution of oil palm to household income. For example, 
Hardter et al. (1997) in a study in West Sumatra found that incomes of oil palm 
smallholders could be seven times higher than those of neighbors that engaged in 
traditional crops. In a study in Riau and South Sumatera, Susila (2004) showed that oil 
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palm generated on average 11 million IDR a year and contributed 60 percent of total 
household income. In another study in Jambi, Feintrenie et al. (2010) found that 
smallholders tend to convert large portions of their land into oil palm plantations. By 
applying land use profitability analysis, Feintrenie et al. (2010) showed that oil palm 
generates higher return to land and labor than rubber agro-forests and rice. Oil palm has 
been used by the government as a major vehicle of rural socio-economic improvement 
(Zen et al. 2005). In the context of poverty reduction, Susila (2004) reported that the 
poverty headcount of oil palm community was less than 10 percent while the Gini 
coefficient was around 0.36 that indicated fairly egalitarian income distribution. Poverty 
reduction effects of oil palm were also pointed out by the World Bank (2011). 
Furthermore, the World Bank (2011) showed that the poverty-reduction effects of oil 
palm production by smallholders are greater for districts where poor households are 
concentrated in agriculture.  
On the other hand, several authors reported negative impact of oil palm project on rural 
communities including incidents of human right violation, land grabbing and ecosystem 
destruction (Marti 2008; Colchester and Jiwan 2006). While many smallholders 
benefited from the high returns of oil palm, the realization of benefits mainly depends 
on the roles played by district authorities and cooperatives (Rist et al. 2010)  
Furthermore, Rist et al. (2010) pointed out some potential conflicts frequently emerging 
in oil palm plantation development, namely the lack of clarity of the contracts signed 
between companies and smallholders, weak local government, the failure of the 
companies to meet either contractual or perceived obligations, and the lack of clarity 
over land tenure. Vermeulen and Goad (2006) reported that in 2000 every oil palm 
company in Sumatra had land disputes with local communities.  
How much local communities can benefit from oil palm development depend on how 
much their rights on land ownership are recognized and how fair negotiations between 
companies and the communities are. Sheil et al. (2009) indicated that in order to more 
easily handle potential tenure conflicts companies tend to establish oil palm plantation 
on forested lands and peat lands rather than cleared areas. Forested lands are commonly 
claimed by only one or few villages; hence the negotiations become relatively simple by 
convincing key leaders in the villages to relinquish their land and accept some financial 
compensation. On the contrary, in deforested areas many individuals may move into an 
area and claim ownership so that the negotiations become more complicated. Marti 
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(2008) found that in many cases such negotiation process occurred under unequal 
bargaining power and lack of transparency.  
The mixed results of those studies above suggest that the socio-economic impacts of oil 
palm expansion may depend on the involvement of smallholders and the role that they 
play in such development. 
2.5. Contractual arrangements between smallholders and oil palm companies 
Small farmers usually face two major constraints to engage in oil palm farming. First, 
establishing oil palm plantations, especially on forested land needs a start-up cost in 
order to conduct several activities such as land clearing, road building, planting, and 
maintenance for early years, which is often beyond the financial capacity of 
smallholders. Second, the gestation period of oil palms do not allow smallholders to 
generate a positive cash flow until the fifth year after planting.  
Until 1978 oil palm development was engaged only by large scale companies either 
state or private corporations. Smallholders were firstly involved in oil palm production 
in 1979 when contract farming between agroindustry corporations and smallholders was 
augmented by the government. Through contract farming schemes the companies 
established integrated oil palm plots for smallholders on a credit basis and the 
smallholders were obliged to sell their oil palm fruits to the companies. In order to 
support the smallholders, subsidized credit were provided by the government. This 
measure has promoted the rapid expansion of oil palm smallholding area from just 3 
thousand ha in 1979 to more than 3 million ha in 2010 and therefore positioned 
smallholders as a major player that owned about 40 percent of total oil palm plantations 
in Indonesia (MoA 2011). As a comparison, the expansion of oil palm plantations of 
smallholding estates, private estates and state farms is presented in Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2. Oil palm plantation area covered by smallholding, state estate and private 
estate 
Source: Adapted from MoA (2011) 
 
Some smallholders prefer to become independent or non-contract smallholders. They 
are not restricted to produce in certain ways and are also free to seek the highest price in 
the spot market. Although they face larger barriers to enter the oil palm business they 
enjoy market opportunities from an overcapacity of processing facilities. Recently, there 
are many open markets for fresh fruit bunches in Indonesia due to the rapid proliferation 
of palm oil processing facilities.  
Smallholders’ plantations generally produce lower yields than large-scale plantations 
(Sheil et al. 2006). Some factors behind this are the use of uncertified seeds, incorrect 
planting techniques, incorrect agronomy management, and insufficient use of the proper 
type of fertilizer. Among those factors, the last factor is usually the largest constraint. 
Oil palm requires a lot of fertilizer, up to 950 kg per hectare and year, which makes 
fertilizer to be the major material cost with about 80 percent of annual operational costs 
(Pafenfus 2001).  
Becoming either a contract smallholder or a non-contract smallholder is a choice that 
promotes benefits and risks. The relative benefits and risks of each choice are outlined 
in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Summary of relative benefits and risks of contract smallholder and 
independent smallholder in oil palm production 
 Contract smallholder Non-contract smallholder 
Benefits  Guaranteed market access  
 Easier access to inputs and 
credit 
 Easier access to new 
technologies in order to 
increase productivity 
 Free to seek the highest prices  
 Flexible to shift labor and 
other inputs between oil palm 
and other crops depending on 
prices 
 
Risks  Promotes dependency on a 
single crop  
 Lost opportunity in case of 
price hike in spot market 
 Less flexibility in land use 
and labor allocation 
 
 Risk that the mill will not buy 
the fresh fruit 
 Low access to credit and 
technology 
 Often viewed as unreliable 
product by the mill and 
therefore the fruits were 
bought at the lower price  
Source: Adapted from Vermeulen and Goad (2006) 
 
The contract allocates the distribution of risks among parties and therefore potentially 
reduces and introduces risks for smallholders. On the one hand, investment risks in 
plantation establishment and maintenance during gestation period can be transferred to 
the companies. On the other hand, smallholders bear the production risks although such 
risks might be reduced by the provision of technical assistance. Since contract farming 
links smallholders to a monoculture cropping system as well as an international 
commodity market, they are simultaneously exposed to higher risks including diseases 
outbreak and price volatility. Another concern is that the production requirement under 
the contract may encourage smallholders to specialize further in oil palm leading to high 
exposure to certain shocks. 
Contract farming in the oil palm sector may have a number of problems differing from 
classic vertically integrated contract schemes in other agricultural sectors such as fresh 
fruit and vegetables. First, in most cases there is no detailed written contract except for 
credit repayment. The implementation of the contract relies on informal norms and trust 
among parties. Second, price determination is based closely on current market price 
while in some other sectors contract farmers may be protected from market fluctuations. 
Third, the company is commonly not only a processor (mill) but also a producer that has 
its own plantation. In an abundance harvest situation, this position may encourage the 
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company to prioritize its own fruits than those of the smallholders in order to deal with 
the 48 hours restriction of processing. Fourth, there is lack of clarity on the land tenure 
status that often overlaps among government, company, community and individuals.  
Since commenced in 1979 up to now various contract farming schemes in the oil palm 
industry have been applied in Indonesia. The two major contract schemes are Nucleus 
Estate Smallholders (NES)/ Perkebunan Inti Rakyat (PIR) and KKPA (Koperasi Kredit 
Primer Anggota, which literally translates as Members’ Primary Credit Co-operative). 
Following, those schemes accompanied with related observations in the study area are 
described.  
The NES/PIR scheme was applied between 1978 and 2001 with financial support from 
the World Bank. Under this scheme, companies developed oil palm plots for 
smallholders in a Plasma area around their own plantation called a Nucleus. About 900 
thousand ha of oil palm smallholdings were established under this scheme (Zen et al. 
2005).  
The scheme was often integrated into the resettlement/transmigration program that 
resettled people from high densely populated islands to less populated islands in order 
to achieve a more balanced demographic development, and therefore called also PIR 
TRANS. Such scheme was widely applied in transmigration areas, for example in 
Village of Rawa Jaya and Mentawak Baru in Jambi province where the study took 
place. In the early eighties, people, mainly from Java, were resettled to these locations. 
Under the transmigration program, each participant was facilitated by the government 
with 0.25 ha land for settlement and two allocated lands for staple food oriented 
agriculture that consisted of 1 ha cleared plot and 2.25 ha forested land. However, the 
implementation of the program in these villages was unsuccessful mainly due to lack of 
inputs, difficulties in marketing agricultural products, and inappropriate farming 
systems. Therefore, in the early nineties the government substituted the food crop 
oriented policy with contract farming for oil palm that involved the private sector.  
Through contract farming a company offered smallholders to establish oil palm plots on 
their two ha forested land called plasma plots on credit basis. The plasma plots were 
fully controlled by the company during gestation period and afterwards taken over by 
the smallholders. During the gestation period, the smallholders suffered from low 
income but could compensate this by employment in the company’s plantation. 
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In 1995 the government introduced a new scheme, namely KKPA as a general rural 
microfinance program. Under this scheme, cooperatives and farmer groups play a key 
role to coordinate smallholders in accessing and repaying credit installments. The 
village of Dusun Baru, which is included in this study, is a good example where the 
scheme was applied. In this village, the scheme aims to share oil palm benefits with 
indigenous people who lost their lands.  
Some customary and individual lands of the indigenous people overlapped with the 
allocated lands of migrants and concession lands of the company that have been covered 
by oil palm plantation. In dealing with such disputes, the scheme assumed that the 
indigenous smallholders have relinquished their lands that varied from 2 to 10 ha to the 
company, and therefore they were compensated with 2 ha of well-established oil palm 
plots by the company. However, the scheme still obliged them to repay credit for the 
establishment and management cost.  
The scheme also arranged that oil palm plots are controlled by the nucleus for the whole 
life span of oil palms. Smallholders can monitor all agronomy treatments and harvesting 
through the farmer group or the cooperative. They also can conduct those activities as 
paid laborers. The company hereby deducts production costs including costs of credit 
from the oil palm revenues and pays the remains to the smallholders. This study found 
that average net revenue left for smallholders was less than a half of the gross sales.  
Differing from PIR TRANS, the debt under KKPA scheme puts burden on farmer group 
rather than individual smallholder. Hence, a smallholder should keep repaying until all 
debt of the farmer group has been fully repaid even if his individual debt actually has 
been completely repaid. 
2.6. Previous studies on the impact of contract farming in the oil palm industry 
Studies on the impact of contractual arrangement between large scale oil palm 
plantations and smallholders are diverse. A study by Daswir and Djafar (1988) in 
Province of Riau showed that the income of contract smallholders from oil palm and 
food crop in location with six years oil palm was 60 percent lower than the target of the 
government. Using data from the Province of South Sumatra, Salman and Wahyono 
(1998) found that on average the income of contract smallholders was just sufficient to 
cover subsistence needs and therefore more than 18 percent of them abandoned the land. 
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Nevertheless, a study by Girsang et al.(1995) in the province of North Sumatra and 
Riau revealed that NES/ PIR projects made a significant contribution to economic 
growth, indicated by the output multiplier that is higher than two and positive impact on 
farmers’ income. Winoto et al. (1997) also reported a similar result for some NES in 
West Sumatra, Riau, South Sumatra, and West Kalimantan. A study by Susila (2004) in 
the District of Kampar (Riau) and District of Musi Banyuasin (South Sumatra) 
empirically demonstrated a significant contribution of NES oil palm in poverty 
alleviation indicated by the higher of NES participant’s income than regional poverty 
line. Zen et al. (2005) showed that contract smallholders get higher productivity, higher 
factory gate price and higher net returns than independent smallholders but pay higher 
total costs.  
On the other hand, Marti (2008) and Colchester and Jiwan (2006) reported that 
contractual arrangements trapped smallholders into a high debt for plantation 
establishment which had resulted in labor exploitation. Some reports pointed out the 
lack of transparency in determining price (Maryadi et al. 2004) and grading quality of 
oil palm fruits (Colchester and Jiwan 2006). In several cases, contract smallholders 
complained for receiving less productive plots, too far away plots, less planted palms 
and less technical support than promised (Marti et al. 2008; Colchester and Jiwan 
2006).  
For comparison, a study in Ghana and in the Philippines by Huddleston (2006) found 
that oil palm cultivation has the propensity to reward contract smallholders with 
increasing income and a better access to information, technology, knowledge, capital 
and credit, market, input, and other services. Another study in India by Owolarafe and 
Arumughan (2007) revealed that oil palm farmers made profit from the scheme of 
contractual arrangement but experienced major problems of pest infestation, water 
stress and lack of fund. 
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2.7. Summary 
The rising demand for palm oil has fostered the rapid expansion of oil palm plantation 
area in Indonesia. To date the area is ten times of what is was 30 years ago. In spite of 
its significant contribution on economic growth, such rapid development has led to 
concerns over its impact on surrounding local communities. Inequality and social 
conflict often emerge between the communities and oil palm companies. The 
involvement of the communities on oil palm development was believed by the 
government as an effective way to improve their well-being and rural development. 
The attempt of the government to increase participation of smallholders on oil palm 
production through contract farming has been successful. Smallholding has been rapidly 
growing and becoming a major player in oil palm production. This raises a question of 
to what extent the well-being of smallholders can be improved since at the same time 
they also are exposed to a number of risks. While some studies on oil palm contract 
farming have been carried out, robust empirical evidence that take into account risks is 
still sparse. Hence, this opens a discussion for a further investigation of contract 
farming, risks, and poverty among oil palm smallholders.  
 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
STUDY AREA AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
 
This chapter describes the study area and data collection methodology applied in order 
to generate the empirical basis of this study. Following is a description of the study area, 
sampling procedure, survey instrument, and implementation of data collection.  
3.1. Study area 
This study was conducted in Jambi province, Indonesia. The province is situated in the 
middle of Sumatra Island covering about 53,000 km2 (see Figure 3.1 for a map of study 
area). The topography of the province is dominated by plain areas positioned between 3 
and 87 meters above sea level. Jambi has tropical climate with rainfall ranging from 
2000 mm to 3000 mm per year while the average temperature is at 27°C (BPS Jambi 
2011).  All those conditions are much favorable for growing oil palm.  
In 2010 Jambi province had a total population of about 3 million with the majority 
living in rural areas. The population consists of several local ethnic groups, namely 
Malay, Javanese, Batak, Minangkabau and Kubu or Suku Anak Dalam who is 
considered as the earliest inhabitant in Jambi (BPS Jambi 2011).. Such multicultural 
population was formed by the transmigration project in the past that resettled many 
people from Java and Bali to this province. It is noted that the participants of this project 
were later encouraged by the government to participate in oil palm production under 
contract farming schemes.  
The economy of Jambi is driven by the agricultural sector. In 2010 agriculture 
contributed the largest share on the Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP) (30 
percent), followed by mining (18 percent), trade (14.5 percent), manufacturing industry 
(11 percent), services (9.5 percent), transportation and communication (6.5 percent), 
and construction (4.5 percent). The agricultural sector was also able to absorb more than 
a half of working people (BPS Jambi 2011).  
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The province recently enjoyed high economic growth that reached about 8.5 percent in 
2011 (BPS Jambi 2012). However, some development problems still remain. The 
poverty headcount tends to decline but there is an increasing in the poverty gap and the 
poverty severity index (BPS Jambi 2012). This indicates that while some of the poor 
can escape from the poverty, the rest of the poor may become poorer. Another concern 
is about adverse environmental impact arising from mismanagement of natural 
resources. As a consequence of increasing forest loss, in which many forested areas 
were replaced by oil palm, some areas in Jambi suffer flood disasters almost every year.  
In order to address the research objectives posted in chapter 1 and to represent the 
nature of the oil palm industry in Indonesia, Jambi province was selected for this 
research based on four criteria, namely (1) the relative importance of the province in the 
national oil palm production, (2) the relative importance of oil palm in the regional 
economic development, (3) the relative importance of smallholding in the regional oil 
palm production, and (4) the widespread of oil palm contract farming. Among 21 
provinces producing oil palm in Indonesia, Jambi was the fifth largest producer that 
contributed 1.3 million tons or about 7 percent of national production in 2010. Jambi 
was also one of the provinces with the most rapid oil palm expansion that attained 
eleven-fold in the last two decades. In this province oil palm plays a significant role for 
economic growth and development. This sector contributed about 12 percent of the 
GDRP and absorbed at least 168 thousand households, positioned oil palm as the 
second most engaged crop by farmers after rubber (BoA 2009). In Jambi oil palms 
covered over 490 thousand ha area which is also the second largest area for estate crops 
after rubber (BPS Jambi 2011). In this province smallholders contributed 60 percent of 
regional oil palm production while private and state estates just contributed 34 percent 
and 6 percent respectively (BPS Jambi 2011). It is noted that about 60 percent of those 
smallholders were involved under contractual arrangements with oil palm agribusiness 
corporations either private or state companies (MoA 2011).  
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Figure 3.1. Map of study area 
Source: Adapted after permission from www.esri.com  
 
3.2. Sampling 
A multi-stage sampling procedure was applied to select plantation sites, villages and 
households sequentially. First, two plantation sites where oil palm private companies 
made contractual arrangements with surrounding smallholders were selected. The sites 
are situated in two different districts, namely Muaro Jambi and Merangin (see the map 
of study area in Figure 3.1). Among other districts, Muaro Jambi and Merangin had the 
largest numbers of oil palm smallholders about 38 thousand and 42 thousand 
households respectively in 2008 (BoA 2009). The two sites were selected to capture the 
conditions of oil palm smallholders in terms of development phase and the contractual 
arrangements between smallholders and oil palm companies. 
The first site is situated in Kumpeh, Muaro Jambi district, about 20 km from the 
provincial capital. In this site a private oil palm company operates over 8000 ha 
plantation with a processing capacity of 30 tons per hour. This site includes only one 
village, namely Arang-arang since the company recently has made contractual 
arrangements with the village. Almost all households in the village are involved under 
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the contract. The oil palm plantations in this village mostly consisted of young and 
immature trees. Data of this site will be employed to present a case study in chapter 4.  
The second site is located in Hitam Ulu, Merangin district, about 200 km west of Jambi 
City. This site is a group of villages surrounding large oil palm plantations controlled by 
a private company. Most villages were formed by migrant households from Java 
resettled here by the government under the transmigration program. In a separate place 
several villages have existed previously, formed by indigenous people. Since the early 
nineties the company has set up gradually over 15 thousands hectares oil palm 
plantation in total and installed an oil palm mill with a processing capacity of 60 tons 
per hour. Currently the plantations consist of trees with varied ages dominated by 
mature plantations. From the 15 thousand ha, only about 5 thousand ha are owned by 
the company while the larger rests are owned by about 6800 smallholders. The 
smallholders’ parts were established by the company under contractual arrangements in 
order to meet the need of the mill. Data of this site are used for econometric analyses in 
order to address the three main research objectives.  
At the Merangin site three villages were selected from 11 villages surrounding 
plantation based on three criteria, namely (1) representing varied distances from villages 
to the nucleus mill, (2) capturing indigenous and migrant villages, and (3) the 
willingness of village heads to co-operate. The names of selected villages are Rawa 
Jaya, Dusun Baru and Mentawak Baru. The distance between each village and the 
company’s mill is about 10 km, 20 km and 50 km respectively. The former and the 
latest represent villages dominated by migrants from Java while the second represents 
indigenous village.  
In the next stage of sampling procedure, 300 oil palm smallholders were randomly 
selected from the lists provided by each village head proportionally based on village 
population. The survey was conducted in 2010. During the course of data collection, 9 
respondents had to be dropped from the original list due to different reasons including 
that they had moved out of the village, had died, or had no oil palm plot anymore. 
Finally, 291 households remain in the sample consisting of 46 households in the Muaro 
Jambi site and 245 households in the Merangin site. In the former, all sample 
households are contract smallholders while in the later our sample consists of 126 
contract smallholders and 119 non-contract smallholders. 
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3.3. Survey instrument 
In order to address the objectives of the study comprehensively, a structured 
questionnaire (see Appendix1) was designed to collect data especially on the following 
aspects: (1) household characteristics, (2) experienced shocks and expected risks, (3) 
land, (4) household incomes, (5) household consumption, (6) household assets (7) 
investment plan, and (8) participation on the oil palm contract farming. All information 
asked in the questionnaire referred to the period of 1st January to 31st December 2009. 
For shock and risk, however, the experiences during the past five years and the 
expectations of the next five years were also asked.  
Basic household characteristics included household composition, age, education, and 
health of all household members was elaborated. A specific module for shocks was 
created to explore bad events experienced in the past, the perceived severity and the 
magnitude including amount of income loss, extra expenditure, and asset loss due to 
such shocks. Corresponding coping strategies were also investigated. In a separate page, 
potential risks were elaborated by asking the respondents their expectation on some 
negative events that may occur in the future.  
In the land section, the respondents were asked to list land plots owned and to describe 
the corresponding size, actual use, tenure status, and distance to the homestead and the 
company’s mill (particularly for oil palm plot). In addition, the type of crops planted in 
each plot, the planting year, the harvesting period and the production were also 
explored.  
In order to be able to compute household incomes, data were collected from various 
income generating activities including agriculture, livestock, natural resource extraction, 
wage employment, and non-farm business or self-employment. There are also specific 
sections that look into production, sales and costs including input and hired labor in oil 
palm.  
Data on household consumption were collected mainly of food and non-food 
expenditures, including consumption of own production on each on-farm and non-farm 
activities and the expense for severe sickness in separate modules. Household assets 
                                                            
1 This questionnaire is modified from the household survey questionnaire of Vulnerability in Southeast 
Asia (DFG Research Unit FOR 756) with some additional sections on contract farming, oil palm 
production and investment plan  
24 Chapter 3 
 
including both productive and non-productive assets were comprehensively investigated 
in a specific module. This was complemented by land and livestock asset in the other 
modules.  
In order to investigate investment plans, the respondents were asked whether they plan a 
new investment in the near future and in what kinds of business. The final section of the 
questionnaire explores participation of oil palm smallholders in contract farming and 
types of contractual arrangement applied. Constraints experienced during past five years 
and expected in the next five years by smallholders are also investigated. 
3.4. Implementation of data collection procedure 
The data collection procedure was applied in the following steps. First, the pre-survey 
was conducted by the author from November to December 2009 in the two sites in order 
to understand the field situation. During the pre-survey the company’s administrators, 
the village heads, the informal leaders and the cooperative heads were interviewed in 
order to better understand the conditions in the area and to be able to more precisely 
define the research problem. The output of the pre-survey is twofold. First, general 
information was collected on the historical background of oil palm contract farming 
applied in the area, the contract terms, the total size of oil palm plantation owned by the 
company and the smallholders respectively, the contract problems from both sides, and 
the characteristics of villages surrounding the plantation including village size, the 
number of oil palm households, the distance to the company’s mill, the infrastructure 
facilities, and the ethnic or origin composition in the study sites. Such information was 
employed to decide which villages were representative to be selected in the survey and 
what relevant issues should be addressed in the survey instrument. Second, the lists of 
oil palm smallholders were gathered from each of the village heads. The lists were 
employed as a basis for applying random sampling procedure in household level. 
As a second step, pre-testing of the questionnaire was conducted by the author with 
interviewing some oil palm households excluding the sample households. This 
procedure is employed to evaluate and to improve the questionnaire by eliminating, 
rephrasing and adding questions in order to achieve effective interview.  
In a third step enumerators were recruited and trained before commencing the 
household survey. Four enumerators were selected from ten students and fresh 
graduates from Faculty of Agriculture of Jambi University that applied for this position 
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and were recommended by the Dean. All selected enumerators had their educational 
background in either agricultural economics or agriculture and had experience in 
conducting research surveys. Two days enumerator training was conducted in order to 
provide an understanding of the objectives, the procedures and the instrument of the 
survey. In addition, a basic concept of contract farming and some results of the pre-
survey were also briefly presented to give the enumerators a first insight on the field 
situation. Before starting the formal survey the enumerators also performed a pre-testing 
of questionnaire, to detect remaining weakness on the questionnaire and to become 
more familiar with the interview. Thus, a minor revision was made and some difficulties 
in the interview technique were discussed.  
Finally, the household survey was carried out from end of January to the beginning of 
March 2010. Considering the relative remoteness of the villages, the team spent the 
nights in the villages and conducted the survey village by village. The time for staying 
in a village varied from five to fifteen days depending on the number of sample 
households. By staying in the village additional observations which facilitated a better 
understanding of the socio-economic conditions in the villages were possible. This is 
useful for the interpretation of the results. The following survey procedure was adopted. 
First, the enumerators visited respondents to explain the survey objectives, persuade for 
cooperation and make an appointment for an interview. Second, the interview normally 
took place on the respondent’s home in order to provide a comfortable atmosphere for a 
respondent to answer the questions. This also allowed the enumerators to directly check 
the situation of household such as household composition and asset endowments. Third, 
the household head was prioritized to be interviewed. In case the household head was 
not available, too old or sick, another adult, well-informed household member was used 
as respondent. About 95 percent of respondents in this survey were household heads 
while the rest were spouse or their offspring. It is noted that during interviews a 
household head was often accompanied by his wife in answering the questions, 
particularly for the section of household expenditures. This was considered to be an 
advantage since in the Jambi culture the wife takes care of the purchase of consumption 
items and therefore she knows better on such information. Fourth, the interview was 
conducted section by section. The enumerators briefly explained all the sections that 
will be asked, introduced the purpose of each section then went into detail. The 
interview normally took about three hours. Therefore, each enumerator interviewed two 
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respondents a day on average. Finally, after completing the interview the enumerators 
thanked and gave a small gift to the respondents for their cooperation.  
3.5. Summary 
This chapter lays out a comprehensive empirical basis for analyses in the study. The 
study took place in two sites, namely Muaro Jambi and Merangin in Jambi province. 
The Muaro Jambi site represents early phase of oil palm development while the 
Merangin site captures the advanced phase. Data of the former are used to construct a 
case study presented in chapter 4 while data of the later are employed to generate 
econometric analyses presented in chapter 5 to 7.  
Data collected in the study mainly include general household characteristics, 
experienced shocks and expected risks, household incomes, household assets, 
household consumptions, investment plan in the near future, and oil palm production. 
Data for computing household income are detail collected from all income sources 
including agriculture, livestock, natural resource extraction, off-farm employment and 
non-farm self-employment/ business. Such data are employed in chapter 5 to assess the 
impact of contract farming on household income. Chapter 6 uses data on shocks, 
household consumption and household assets as a basis for assessing vulnerability to 
poverty among oil palm smallholders by applying the asset based approach. In chapter 
7, data on risk expectation and investment plan were used to investigate planned 
investments. 
 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
THE WELL-BEING OF OIL PALM SMALLHOLDERS DURING EARLY PHASE 
OF OIL PALM DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF VILLAGE ARANG ARANG 
 
 
This chapter aims to better understand the socio-economic situation of smallholders 
when contract farming just commenced for few years. In this chapter the case of oil 
palm smallholders in the village Arang arang in the Muaro Jambi district is elaborated. 
This will set the scene for a more quantitative empirical analysis of the oil palm 
smallholder conditions in other areas of Jambi province where contract farming has 
been established for a long time already. Hence, this chapter complements more 
balanced pictures of oil palm smallholders in this thesis. In the last part of this chapter, a 
comparison of household well-being between the case at hand and the other site under 
advanced phase plantation is discussed. 
4.1. Introduction 
The well-being of oil palm households and the implementation of oil palm contract 
farming are diverse across plantation phases, natural conditions and locations. (Zen et 
al. 2005; Susila 2004; Sheil et al. 2006). While some literatures pointed out the high 
return of oil palm (e.g. Feintrenie et al. 2010; Hardter et al. 1997), smallholders may not 
earn adequate benefit during early phase of oil palm development. The nature of oil 
palm does not allow a positive cash flow during gestation period that may take four 
years after plantation establishment. In addition, as a monoculture system that mostly 
replaced forested areas, oil palm plantation may threaten old livelihoods of the 
surrounding community that relied on natural resources.  
The situation of smallholders at the village Arang-arang can represent such condition 
and thus will be discussed as a case study. The land in the village was dominated by 
peat soil which was less suitable for traditional agriculture. Prior to the existence of oil 
palm companies the surrounding area was covered by peat swamp forests where major 
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livelihoods of households relied on. Today, those forests were replaced by large scale 
oil palm plantations. As a compensation for the surrounding communities, the 
companies were required by the government to also establish oil palm plantations for 
smallholders under contractual arrangements. However, such establishment just 
commenced in the last five years and has not delivered adequate economic benefits for 
smallholders.  
The case study aims to provide informative analysis of the well-being of smallholders 
living during the early phase of oil palm development and thus could complement more 
balanced picture of oil palm smallholders’ wellbeing in this thesis. This case study 
relies on the small sample data of 46 households that were randomly selected from the 
400 households in the village. 
 
4.2. Contractual arrangements between the companies and village households 
In this section, contractual arrangements between the companies and the surrounding 
communities are described. There are two agribusiness companies, namely PT. NSP and 
PT. MAKIN that established oil palm plantations and made contractual arrangements 
with the communities in the village.  
About 8000 ha of the land was conceded by the government to PT. NSP for establishing 
an oil palm plantation in this village. As a measure to support rural development, the 
government required the company to allocate 20 percent of the conceded land for 
establishing integrated oil palm plots for village households on a credit basis under 
contractual arrangements. Hence, each household was allocated to receive four ha oil 
palm plot. 
Due to budget constraint the company developed oil palm plantations gradually and 
thus established its own plantation first before household plots. The establishment of the 
household plots just commenced in the last few years. Hence, when the company’s 
plantation has already produced full productive capacity, the household plots were still 
in the gestation period and thus have not generated financial benefit yet. In order to 
allow the households for benefiting soon, the contract arranged benefit sharing that 
relied on the total production of the whole plantation including both the company’s and 
the households’ own with the 20:80 proportion for the households and the company 
respectively. Based on the contract scheme, the company was responsible to establish 
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and maintain oil palm plots for households. As a consequence, the company fully 
controlled over households’ plots and directly harvested all oil palm fruits from those 
plots in order to meet the need of its mill. All establishment and production costs were 
charged to households as a debt that directly subtracted from the production share of 
households. Hence, the households received net income at the same amount given 
periodically by the company. Those plots can be taken over by the households after all 
credit installments are completely repaid. However, there was no clear written 
contractual arrangement regarding how long the plots will be controlled by the company 
and how much the total credit should be repaid by the households. The contract also 
suffered lack of clarity in price determination mechanism. 
PT. MAKIN was another oil palm company that existed in this village prior to PT. NSP. 
The company was licensed by the government to establish and operate an oil palm 
plantation in this village in order to support the transmigration project. The project 
aimed to resettle people from high densely populated islands such as Java to less 
populated islands including Sumatra in order to achieve more balanced demographic 
development. In this project the government facilitated each participant household with 
home, one ha land for food crop and two ha land for oil palm. Such facilities were not 
only granted for migrants but also for indigenous households in this village in order to 
reduce potential conflicts among them. The company was required by the government 
to establish oil palm plots for those households on a credit basis under contractual 
arrangements. Based on the contract, the company established and controlled over 
household plots that allows for directly taking all oil palm fruit from those plots. The 
households receive net margin from the company after deducting for credit installment. 
Under this scheme the net margin for households relied solely on the production of their 
own plots. In order to support household living during gestation period, the households 
were involved and paid by the company to work in the oil palm plantation.  
 
Hence, each household on average has six ha oil palm plots under contract schemes 
consisting of four ha oil palm plot under a contract scheme with the former company 
and two ha oil palm plot under another scheme with the later one.  
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4.3. Household characteristics  
This section describes characteristics of households living under early phase oil palm 
development in order to better understand their livelihoods and socio-economic 
condition. Table 4.1 shows some household characteristics in the area. On average 
households consist of five household members, in which about 70 percent of them are 
potential laborers between 15 and 65 years old. About 17 percent of household are 
headed by woman. On average household heads are about 49 years and attained 
education for seven schooling years. Households are dominated by indigenous people 
with 8 percent migrants.  
Agricultural assets among households are diverse. On average, each household mostly 
has about 6 ha oil palm that consists of four ha and two ha oil palm plots allocated and 
controlled by the two companies. The survey found different land allocations across 
households in which households whose any positions at either village committee or 
cooperative received more lands than others whose not. For either rubber or other crop, 
each household has about a half ha on average.  
 
Table 4.1. Household characteristics in village Arang-arang  
Household characteristics Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Household size 4.8 1.9 1 10
Proportion of potential labor 0.71 0.24 0 1
Age of household head (years) 48.9 13.8 27 89
Education of household head (years) 6.9 3.1 0 15
Gender of household head 0.83 0.38 0 1
Origin dummy (1=migrant, 0=indigenous people) 0.09 0.28 0 1
Oil palm area (ha) 6.27 1.78 4 14
Rubber area (ha) 0.46 1.19 0 5
Other crop area (ha) 0.41 0.79 0 4
Livestock (IDR thousands) 747.00 3098.00 0 21000
Source: Oil palm household survey 2010 data  
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4.4. Household well-being 
Households normally diversify incomes into some sources rather than relying on a 
single source. Table 4.2 shows various income sources engaged by households. As 
shown in Table 4.2, there are two specific sources that generate largest incomes, namely 
rubber and non-farm business. However, both sources just were engaged by limited 
households. Off-farm employment seems to be a livelihood that was widely engaged 
and able to produce relatively high income. It is noted that the companies widely 
offered households to work as a labor either in their plantations or in their mill. Among 
other sources, oil palm contributes relatively small income. The facts that most oil 
palms were planted on peat land and still on the young mature period may explain the 
low yield of oil palm..  
Table 4.2. Income generated from various sources in village Arang-Arang, Muaro Jambi 
Income sources Household 
engaged (%) 
Mean 
income 
St. dev Min max 
Oil palm  100 4212 2288 -3269 11942
Rubber  15 26393 21570 5760 60500
Other crops  28 15577 19873 -500 57175
Livestock  43 25 174 -479 400
Fishing 48 3990 5397 -140 18000
Employment 67 22506 13874 6000 63256
Self-employment 26 30477 23718 8350 98400
Total  38836 25760 4661 155956
Source: Oil palm household survey 2010 data  
Figure 4.1 shows the share of each source on total household income. As shown by the 
figure, the contribution of oil palm on total household income is only 15 percent on an 
average. The largest share on household income is off-farm employment (39 percent), 
followed by non-farm business (21 percent). It is noted that most off-farm employment 
is labors in the companies’ plantations while most non-farm business is middleman of 
oil palm fruit.  
 
32 Chapter 4 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Structure of household incomes 
Source: created from oil palm household survey 2010 data  
 
Households can earn net income about IDR 39 million in total a year or IDR 8.6 million 
per capita on average. In Table 4.3, the distribution of per capita household incomes 
which are classified into four classes is presented. The average income places on the 
second highest income class with range from IDR 7 to 10 million. This indicates that 
more than a half of households have per capita income below the average. Such average 
may be overstated by few outliers with extremely high income. We find that there are 
two households that earn more than IDR 20 million per capita. 
  
Table 4.3. Income classes of households in the village Arang arang  
Per capita income (in IDR million) Households (%) Cumulative (%) 
x ≤ 4 15.2 15.2 
4 < x ≤ 7 34.8 50.0 
7 < x ≤ 10 21.7 71.7 
> 10 28.3 100 
Note : x is per capita household income 
Source: Oil palm households survey data 201 
 
Not all incomes were spent by households for consumption. The fluctuate of earnings 
that sometimes was unexpected may encourage households to be careful in spending in 
order to deal with shocks probably faced in the near future. Some households may also 
allocate some parts of their income for saving and investment. There was only IDR 4.2 
million spent for consumption per captia on an average.  
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The structure of household expenditure is presented in Figure 4.2. The largest part of 
routine expenditure which is more than a half is allocated for food. This is followed by 
spending for transportation and communication (about 17 percent) and non-food 
including electricity, cloths, and personal care (15 percent). 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Structure of household expenditures 
Source: created from oil palm household survey 2010 data  
 
In order to better understand socio-economic situation among households, an illustration 
of two households with opposite wealth conditions is presented in Box 4.1 and Box 4.2 
respectively. The former is very poor while the latter is much richer. The contribution of 
oil palm under contract schemes to household income for both households seems to be 
similar and very small. The later household was able to earn higher income from oil 
palm since he did not only rely on the contract schemes but also grow oil palm 
independently. Compared to the net income from oil palm plots under the schemes, the 
oil palm plot managed independently generated much higher net income per hectare. 
Such condition may influence household perception regarding the lack of transparency 
of the companies in oil palm management and production sharing.  
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Box 4.1. The illustration of a poor household 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oil palm households survey data 2010 
 
  
Muri (40 years) was a household head with five members. His education stopped at 
the first year of junior high school due to lack of fund. He had three children who all 
were still below 13 years. The first and second child was still schooling at a junior 
higher school and an elementary school respectively while the latest child has not 
enrolled school yet.  
He engaged in tapping rubber and fishing. In 2009 from 1.5 ha of rubber plot that he 
owned, he was able to produce 720 kg rubber latex and earned IDR 5.7 million while 
from fishing he earned 6.6 million. As other households in the village, he was 
allocated totally six ha oil palm plots by the two companies under contract schemes. 
From the oil palm plots, about IDR 4 million was earned. Hence, total net household 
income that can be earned was about IDR 16 million or IDR 3.3 million per capita. 
Since the earnings fluctuated and sometimes was unexpected, Muri tend to be very 
careful is spending in order to anticipate unexpected shocks in the future. In 2009 the 
household spent for consumption only about IDR 2.4 million per capita in which 
more than a half was allocated for food. This number was lower than national poverty 
line. About 52 percent of monthly expenditure was allocated for food. The rest is 
spent for transportation and communication (25 percent), education (14 percent), and 
non-food items such as electricity and personal goods (9 percent).  
Muri’s family experienced some prominent shocks in 2009. Flood disaster did not 
allow him to go for tapping rubber and fishing for three months and thus he suffered 
income shortfall about 4.8 million. Muri was also infected by Malaria virus that made 
him not able to work for one week.  
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Box 4.2. The illustration of a non-poor household 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oil palm households survey data 2010 
 
 
Saleh (42 years) was a government employee. He lived together with eight other 
household members, namely his wife, two sons, three daughters, one daughter in law, 
and one grandchild. The first son, Sayudin (22 years), has already married and 
worked as employee at the oil palm company’s mill. The first daughter was 20 years 
and unemployed. She finished elementary school but did not continue the study. Each 
of her two sisters (19 years and 12 years) was still studying at a senior high school 
and an elementary school respectively. The second son, Apriansah (18 years) has 
completed education in a junior high school. Currently, he managed a business of 
Saleh’s family in trading oil palm fruits. He bought oil palm fruits from smallholders 
in surrounding villages and sold the fruits to the company with certain margin. In 
order to support this business, Saleh invested a truck for transporting oil palm fruits.  
In 2009 Saleh family earned net household income about IDR 156 million in total or 
IDR 17.3 million per capita. With such income, he became one of the few richest 
households in the village. The largest income contribution came from the business 
managed by Apriansah that generated about IDR 98 million. Her old brother, Sayudin 
that worked as employee at the company’s mill earned salary about IDR 2 million a 
month. As a government employee, Saleh got salary about IDR 1.8 million monthly. 
In addition, after office hours he usually engaged in fishing three times a week and 
thus earned about IDR 1.8 million a year. As other households, Saleh received 
income from oil palm plots under contractual arrangement with the companies about 
IDR 4 million.. However, Saleh also grows oil palm independently in his own 0.25 ha 
land since 2005. On such land, he can produce 7.2 tons of oil palm fruits which can 
contribute net income about IDR 4.5 million a year.  
While Saleh family was able to earn IDR 17.3 million per capita, he just spent about 
IDR 4 million per capita for consumption. The remaining income was accumulated as 
saving and working capital for the family business of oil palm fruit trading. About 51 
percent of routine expenditure was spent for food, 29 percent for non-food items such 
as cloths and electricity, and 20 percent for transportation and communication.  
Continue… 
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Box 4.2. The Illustration of a non-poor household (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oil palm households survey data 2010 
 
The large difference in total net income between the two households as described in 
Box 4.1 and Box 4.2 was contributed by the difference in main income sources. The 
former mainly relied on small rubber plot and fishing while the later relied on non-farm 
business and off-farm employment. The later has much larger asset endowments 
including a truck used to support a family business. The non-farm business, namely 
becoming agent of oil palm fruits allows the later household to generate extremely high 
income. When both households were hit by a covariate shock, namely flood disaster the 
former seems to suffer more while later household can recover from such shock soon 
since it has several and more secure sources of income.   
4.5. Poverty and inequality  
In this section, poverty and income inequality is analyzed. Based on the household 
consumption data three poverty analyses namely the headcount index, the poverty gap 
index and the poverty severity index are applied. The headcount index measures the 
proportion of the population living below poverty line. The poverty gap index measures 
the extent to which individuals fall below the poverty line and thus shows how depth the 
poor suffer below poverty. The poverty severity is the squares of the poverty gaps 
relative to the poverty line. This measure puts more weight on the position of the 
poorest, thus takes into account inequality among the poor. Furthermore, income 
inequality among households is analyzed by Lorenz curve and Gini index. 
In order to make such analyses more meaningful, a comparison of poverty and 
inequality figures between the case study at hand representing an early phase plantation 
Saleh experienced some prominent shocks leading to either income shortfall or extra 
expenditure. Flood disaster experienced in 2009 did not allow him to harvest his oil 
palm for two months, thus he lost potential income around IDR 1.5 million. He also 
lost about IDR 1.8 million due to the severe fall of oil palm price in 2008. In 2009, 
his grandchild was born. In spite of this happiness, following the local culture 
Saleh’s family must spend at least IDR 7.5 million to held cultural ceremony for this 
event. However, all those shocks were soon recovered since the household has 
several sources of income.  
Chapter 4 37 
 
and the other site representing an advanced phase plantation is also presented. Such 
comparison allows comprehensive understanding of poverty and inequality pictures in 
the oil palm communities. In this comparison, all sample households including both 
contract and non-contract smallholders are included in order to take into account 
spillover effect of contract schemes to non-contract smallholders. 
The results of poverty analyses are detail presented in Table 4.4. The results show that 
in the early phase plantation area, poverty incidence still remains 20 percent even if the 
$ 1.25 poverty line is applied. On the contrary, with the same threshold the poverty 
headcount in the advanced phase plantation area is much lower and less than 10 percent. 
If the $ 2 poverty threshold was employed, more than a half of households living in the 
former site fall into poverty. The poverty gap of the former is also much higher than that 
of the later. This indicates that the poor in the former are poorer. Their consumptions 
are very deep below the poverty line and therefore a high cost or effort is required to 
help them out of the poverty. Taking into account inequality among the poor, the 
poverty of the poor in the former is also more severe than that of the later. All those 
indicate that poverty is still a major problem for households in the early phase of oil 
palm development.  
 
Table 4.4. Poverty rates across different poverty lines  
 The early phase  
(Muaro Jambi site) 
The advanced phase  
(Merangin site) 
Poverty line US $ 2 
(PPP) 
US $ 1.25 
(PPP) 
US $ 2 
(PPP) 
US $ 1.25 
(PPP) 
Poverty headcount (%) 56.52 19.57 35.92 6.53 
Poverty gap index (%) 29.25 15.89 23.23 13.77 
Poverty severity index  0.11 0.04 0.07 0.03 
Source: computed from oil palm household survey 2010 data and BPS (2009) 
 
In order to examine the dominance of poverty incidence in the early phase plantation 
over the advanced phase plantation, household consumption distribution of the two sites 
is analyzed. Figure 4.3 shows cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of household 
consumption of the two sites. The consumption distribution of the former is identified 
by the solid line while that of the later is identified by the dash line. Two vertical lines 
in the figure (z1 and z2) represent two different poverty lines, namely the $ 1.25 (PPP) 
and the $ 2 (PPP) respectively. The CDF for any given per capita consumption levels 
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gives the proportion of households who have consumption below that level. Therefore, 
if the consumption level is taken to be the poverty line z, the CDF gives the proportion 
of poor households. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Consumption distribution in the Muaro Jambi site and the Merangin site 
Source: generated from oil palm households survey data 2010 
 
As shown by Figure 4.3, the CDF of consumption in the Muaro Jambi site is 
everywhere above the CDF of consumption in the Merangin site. This indicates that the 
poverty headcount is always higher in the former for any consumption poverty lines. 
This underlines the dominance of poverty headcount in the site where oil palm 
development just commenced over the overall consumption distribution.  
How much poverty can be reduced by the oil palm development in this case is still 
difficult to be assessed since panel data are not available yet. However, the comparison 
with the advanced phase plantation above gives an intuition that oil palm contract 
farming may need a longer time to reduce poverty. 
The oil palm contract schemes in the case at hand just left limited margin for 
households. While the company argued that the peat soil and the young oil palm are the 
reasons behind this problem, many households associated the lack of oil palm benefit 
with the lack of transparency of the company in oil palm production and management. 
This is not surprising since the contract schemes arranged that all household plots were 
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fully controlled by the companies and household just received net margin calculated by 
the companies. 
Furthermore income distributions in the two sites are analyzed and compared to better 
understand inequality among households. In Figure 4.4, Lorenz curves of the two sites 
are presented. The income distribution of the Muaro Jambi site is identified by the solid 
line while that of the Merangin site is identified by the dash line. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Lorenz curve of household income  
Source: generated from oil palm households survey data 2010 
 
The inequality is measured by Gini index computed as the ratio of area between the 
hypothetical 45° line and the curve over the area below the 45° line. The Gini index is 
ranging between 0 and 1 in which the higher the index the higher the inequality is.  
Figure 4.4 shows that the Lorenz curve of income distribution in the Muaro Jambi site 
seems to be more close to the hypothetical 45° line, and thus the Gini index of early 
phase is smaller than that of the Merangin site. The computed Gini index of the former 
is 0.32 while that of the later site is 0.42. This suggests that household incomes are more 
equally distributed in the early phase plantation area than in the advanced phase one.  
The more equal income distribution and the dominance of poverty incidence in the early 
phase plantation area suggest that households seem to have similar condition under 
poverty when oil palm contract farming just commenced. In the other site where oil 
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palm contract farming has been applied for a long time already there was less poverty 
but high inequality. This gives initial intuition that some households may benefit a lot 
but some others may fail to benefit from the contract; thus poverty can be reduced but 
the gap among household may increase.  
4.6. Conclusions  
Based on the case study above, lessons learned regarding socio-economic situations 
during early phase of oil palm development could be derived as following. Oil palm 
production is still low and therefore the contribution of oil palm income to household 
income is also relatively low. In order to survive, households relied on diversified 
livelihoods including fishing, tapping rubber, off-farm employment, and non-farm 
business. The off-farm employment seems to be mostly engaged and able to generate 
relatively high income. It is noted that many households were employed by the 
companies as labors in their plantations and mill.  
The poverty analyses show that while oil palm contract schemes have been applied as a 
part of poverty reduction policies, a quite high poverty incidence still remained in this 
site. The dominance of poverty headcount in this site over the other site under advanced 
phase plantation is highlighted. The poor in this site are poorer and therefore much more 
effort is required to escape them from the poverty. On the other hand, the income of 
households in this site is more equally distributed. All these suggest that smallholders 
have relatively similar conditions under poverty when oil palm development just 
commenced. At the time their livelihoods that relied on natural resource were threaten 
by the existence of large oil palm plantations while the compensation from the oil palm 
contract schemes was still very limited.  
While the young phase plantation and the peat soil condition could be a reason for the 
lack of oil palm benefit received by households, the contractual arrangements may also 
contribute to that problem. The success of the contract scheme in poverty reduction 
mainly depends on the fairness and the transparency of the companies in oil palm 
production and benefit sharing since the companies take over the management of all 
household plots while the households just received net margin from the companies. 
Hence, the contract schemes need to be reviewed and accompanied with a more 
situation specific policy. The contracts need to provide a mechanism in which 
households can access information about the actual costs and benefits in oil palm 
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production. The externalities of the oil palm plantations also need to be precisely 
assessed and taken into account to determine a minimum compensation for households 
in the village. In addition, more effective social protection policies especially in labor 
market intervention and social insurance should be applied in order to generate adequate 
alternative incomes and deal with risks during the gestation period.  
 
 
 
  
42 Chapter 4 
 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 5 
IS CONTRACT FARMING IN THE INDONESIAN OIL PALM INDUSTRY  
PRO-POOR? 1 
 
 
While the previous chapter has shown that smallholders in the advanced phase plantation 
area have much lower poverty incidence than those in the early phase planation area, the 
linkages between such better off, oil palm production and contract farming have not been 
established. Therefore, this chapter addresses that question and further examines whether 
the poor under advanced phase oil palm development can benefit from the contract scheme.  
5.1. Introduction 
Since the late eighties conversion of forest land to oil palm plantations has become an 
explicit policy of the Government of Indonesia (GoI) driven by better prospects in the 
world market for cooking oil, fats and more recently also bio-fuels. This development has 
been augmented by private sector investments by mostly large agro industry corporations. 
In order to make this development pro-poor the government has enforced the participation 
of smallholders in setting up new oil palm plantations. Corporations who want to invest in 
oil palm can obtain access to deforested public land only under the condition to involve the 
surrounding local communities. Agro industry companies have largely complied with these 
requirements. Around 40 percent of total national oil palm area is now either owned by 
smallholder farmers or under contractual arrangements with oil palm corporations (MoA 
2011). In the province of Jambi, which is the study area used for this research, 28 percent of 
the oil palm area is owned by smallholders independently and 37.6 percent is under 
contractual arrangements with corporations (BoA of Jambi 2009).  
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on the paper of: Cahyadi, E.R. and Waibel, H. 2013. Is Contract farming in the 
Indonesian oil palm industry pro-poor? Journal of Southeast Asian Economies, 30 (1), pp. 62-76. It has been 
presented at the International Conference of Agricultural Economists (ICAE) on 18 -24 August 2012 in Foz 
do Iguacu, Brazil. 
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A number of reports and studies have pointed out the benefits of oil palm development for 
smallholders. The sector has absorbed at least 3.7 million laborers (IPOB 2010). By 
comparing intensive plantation cropping in West Sumatra, Hardter et al. (1997) find that oil 
palm smallholders were able to earn seven times higher income than subsistence traditional 
crop farmers. In addition, Feintrenie et al. (2010) demonstrate that oil palm is able to 
generate higher returns to both land and labor than rubber or rice production.  
Pafenfus (2001) identified lack of knowledge, high initial investment and a long pay off 
period as major barriers for smallholders to invest in oil palm production. One way to 
overcome these constraints is through the establishment of contractual arrangements 
between plantation companies and smallholders. Such contracts may include financial 
support for plantation development, quality control, price support and supply obligation 
(Zen et al. 2005; Vermeulen and Goad 2006).  
On the other hand there is a debate in the literature on the pros and cons of contractual 
arrangement that is commonly used as a component of poverty reduction strategies and 
sustainable development (Setboonsarng 2008; Da Silva 2005; Eaton and Shepherd 2001; 
Baumann 2000). Some authors have found positive effects of contract in the oil palm 
industry such as more secure income (e.g. Sheil et al. 2009) and oil palm companies´ social 
responsibility related investments in health and education for local communities (e.g. Zen 
2005). Other studies pointed to unequal benefit sharing (Glover 1984; Glover and Kusterer 
1990; Warning and Key 2002), lack of clarity over land tenure prior to plantation 
development and changing land values, unfavorable contractual schemes, and lack of 
contractual compliance by oil palm companies. (Marti 2008; Colchester and Jiwan 2006; 
Rist et al. 2010) including lack of transparency in determining oil palm price under the 
dominance of companies (Maryadi et al. 2007). Contract farming has also been criticized 
because it can cause increased concentration of land ownership, social differentiation 
among producers and loss of independence for the growers (Echanove and Steffen 2005).  
In other sectors such as rice, vegetables or fruits (Kumar and Kumar 2008; Singh 2002; 
Miyata et al. 2009; Setboornsang et al. 2008; Simmons et al. 2005; Patrick 2004; Chang et 
al. 2006; Sharma 2008; Nagaraj et al. 2008; Echanove and Steffen 2005; Sáenz-Segura 
2006; Key and Runsten 1999), and oil palm in other countries, e.g. Ghana and in the 
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Philippines (Huddleston 2006) studies of contract farming have been carried out. However, 
there is a lack of rigorous, quantitative studies on the impact of contract farming on income 
of smallholders engaged in oil palm and its effects on rural poverty reduction in Indonesia.  
The overall objective of the paper is to investigate the impact of contractual arrangements 
on the well-being of smallholders and its implication for rural poverty reduction in 
Indonesia. 
The paper has four specific objectives: 
1. To understand the difference in characteristics between contract smallholders and 
non-contract smallholders and to identify the specific components of the contractual 
arrangements responsible for the difference. 
2. To identify the factors that explain why smallholders participate in a contract 
scheme with a private oil palm corporation.  
3. To assess the impact of contractual schemes on the household income of 
smallholders.  
4. To examine whether the poor benefited from the contractual arrangement 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two the contractual arrangements currently 
existing in the Indonesian oil palm industry are explained in order to facilitate the 
specification of an appropriate impact model. Next, the analytical framework and the 
methodology of this study are described respectively. This is followed by the data 
collection framework in section five. Section six presents the results, including descriptive 
statistics and a detailed discussion of results of the econometric models. Finally, in section 
seven, conclusions are drawn and policy recommendations are submitted.   
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5.2. Contract farming in the Indonesian oil palm industry 
5.2.1. General overview 
The basic concept of contract farming in the oil palm industry is a co-operation between 
two parties, namely plantation companies (nucleus) and oil palm smallholders (contract 
smallholder) to secure the supply of Fresh Fruit Bunch (FFB) with particular quality 
standard to the nucleus mill. Furthermore, the nucleus provides technical assistance and 
inputs of seed stock, fertilizers and pesticides, on a loan basis, sometimes partially 
subsidized by the government. 
The contractual arrangements commonly involve three parties, i.e. a bank as creditor, the 
nucleus as plantation developer, and the smallholder as borrower. Oil palm cultivation, 
particularly for integrated nucleus plasma plantation in a very large area needs a high 
investment. Several activities such as land clearing, road building, planting, and 
maintenance for early years demand advanced technology, which cannot be handled 
efficiently by individual smallholders. Through this scheme, the nucleus supports all those, 
calculates all raised costs, and subtracts them directly from the revenue after oil palm plot 
yield as credit repayment to the bank. As a consequence, smallholders are required to sell 
their production to the mill of nucleus.  
To illustrate the problem described above we undertake a case study for two typical 
contract schemes, namely PIR TRANS and KKPA. The former, which had started in the 
nineteen eighties, was integrated into the government resettlement program called 
“transmigration” that resettled people from the highly densely populated islands, especially 
from Java, to the less populated islands such as Sumatra and Kalimantan. The KKPA 
scheme was introduced in the nineties with the aim to give cooperatives a more important 
role in intermediating between companies and smallholders. 
Previous studies (e.g. Vermeulen and Goad 2006) identified a number of problems in the 
contract schemes, such as no detailed written contract, no price protection and no clear land 
tenure status. Uncertainty in these contract components was due to the absence of 
government standards. In addition, due to the long gestation period of oil palm plantations 
smallholders face liquidity constraints. Hence, there is a need for alternative sources of 
livelihood to meet consumption needs during the establishment phase of the oil palm 
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plantations. Another disadvantage of the contract arrangements is the long term nature of 
the contracts (25 years) which is based on the expected life span of the plantation. Once a 
decision is made to join the contract the smallholder will be bound by the contract for a 
long period.  
The alternative for a smallholder oil palm producer is to stay independent. Although the 
high initial investment costs is a disincentive to enter the oil palm business and market the 
product, the widespread establishment of independent processing mills have created a new 
market for smallholders (Pafenfus 2001). Obviously some smallholders are willing to take 
up additional price risk.  
5.2.2. Operational Definitions 
It is useful to specify several terms related to contract farming industry used in this paper. 
Relying on the “Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil” (RSPO)2 definition (Vermeulen and 
Goad 2006), smallholders in this study are defined as family-based enterprises producing 
palm oil from less than 50 hectares of land. A contract smallholder is one who has at least 
one oil palm plot planted by the oil palm corporation and cultivated with support measures 
of the oil palm company as specified in the contract. A plot which is under such 
arrangement is called a plasma plot. On the contrary a non-plasma plot is one which is 
planted and cultivated independently. A contract smallholder can have plasma and non-
plasma plots, which is a potential source of conflict and increases transaction costs on part 
of the contracting party. 
These definitions enter our analysis by making comparisons between contract and non-
contract smallholders on the one hand and plasma and non-plasma plots on the other hand.  
 
  
                                                 
2 An international multi-stakeholder organization and certification scheme for sustainable palm oil production. 
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5.3. Theoretical Background 
In this section we analyze contract farming from the perspective of contract theory in order 
to derive the hypotheses of the paper. Contractual arrangements between an oil palm 
corporation and smallholder farmers can be understood as a classic principal agent 
problem. Bargaining power is allocated to the principal who can generate a “take it or leave 
it” situation with one or more agents (Salanie 2005; Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). In the 
case at hand, the oil palm company acts as the principal who sets the contract terms 
according to government regulations. Smallholders can choose to participate in the 
contractual arrangements or operate independently. Two factors that influence the 
conditions of the “principal agent game” are: (a) the plantation management scheme and (b) 
the market situation for fresh fruit oil palm. Under (a) there are two possibilities: (1) the oil 
palm company takes over the management of the smallholder plot and compensates the 
owner for his labor and land or (2) smallholders manage their own plot according to 
contractual arrangements with the company which includes the sales of the oil palm 
produce to the contracting company. Potential conflicts from contractual arrangements arise 
because of asymmetric information (Key and Runsten 1999). Either party must consider the 
existence of hidden characteristics and hidden intentions of the respective other party. The 
oil palm company is unsure about the performance of the smallholder and the latter can be 
faced with non-transparent contractual conditions. Existing power structure and available 
choices will tend to increase the likelihood of the hidden intention problem as shown in 
Figure 5.1. In Figure 5.1 we combine market structure (competition) and management 
arrangements (company managed versus smallholder contracts) to illustrate the principal 
agent problem. In a competitive market situation (1st column) and when the oil palm land is 
managed by the smallholder, there is an incentive for moral hazard by the smallholder who 
may sell parts of the produce outside the contract. Hence the company has to counter that 
with in offering better contractual conditions, which will raise its costs. In case of 
company-managed plots the problem could be adverse selection as it will be less attractive 
for the more advanced smallholders to join the scheme. 
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In the case of no market competition (column 2) the only possibility that exists for a 
smallholder to obtain additional benefits is to undermine the production technology 
requirements of the contracting company. Hence in such situation the company must 
intensify its monitoring activities and put more pressure on smallholders. Therefore it will 
be more difficult for poorer and technologically less advanced smallholder farmers to meet 
the requirement of the scheme.  
In a monopsonistic market situation the power balance is skewed towards the company in 
case of company managed smallholder plots which the risk of exploitation of smallholders 
is high, which has potentially negative effects on the poorer smallholders.  
Market/Management 
Scheme 
Market 
Competition 
No market  
competition 
Oil palm plot managed 
by smallholder  
Moral hazard by 
smallholder 
High monitoring 
cost 
Oil palm plot managed 
by company  
Adverse selection Moral hazard by 
company 
Figure 5.1. Contractual arrangements between an oil palm company and smallholders as 
principal agent problem 
Source: own illustration 
 
The fact that oil palm contract farming between smallholders and companies is the policy 
of the GoI, as explained in section 2 of the paper, does not significantly change the 
institutional conditions. The company is likely to exert some informational advantages with 
regards to technology and management issues including production costs over both the 
government and the smallholders. Hence, based on these theoretical considerations the 
hypothesis could be drawn that “contractual arrangements discriminate against the well-
being of certain types of smallholder farmers.” In the next section the methodology to 
investigate this hypothesis is explained.  
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5.4. Methodology 
In this section we explain the methodology used to answer the four specific objectives as 
stated in section 1. Firstly, descriptive statistics are presented to better understand the 
difference of characteristics between participants and non-participants. This also allows us 
to identify the specific elements of the contractual arrangements that are responsible for the 
difference. Secondly, in order to analyze factors associated to contract participation, the 
participation decision is estimated by a probit model. The general form of the participation 
model is expressed as follows: 
PARTICIP= f(AGE, HSIZE, PPL, EDU, ALAND, STAY, PALM, RUB, OCROP, OFFF, 
PLANTP1, PLANTP2, MIGRANT) (1) 
Participation is the dependent variable formulated as a zero-one variable. Age of household 
head (AGE) is a reflection of the notion that risk aversion may grow with age and therefore 
older people may choose reducing risky investments by joining the contract scheme in oil 
palm. Household size (HSIZE) and labor capacity that is defined as the ratio of working age 
members to all household members (PPL) is included as some authors (e.g. Raynold 2000, 
cited in Echanove and Steffen 2005; Glover 1987) found that contract farming tends to 
exploit unpaid family labor. Educational attainment of household head represented by 
schooling years (EDU) is expected to positively affect participation.  
Furthermore a dummy variable that captures whether a smallholder receives allocated land 
for housing and farming from the government (ALAND) is included. This variable 
represents the arrangements made by the government for participants of the national 
transmigration program that could make them feel obliged to join contract farming. The 
time in years that a household stays in the village (STAY) is included to capture the social 
capital effect of contract participation. As supported by some literatures (e.g. Glover 1984; 
Glover 1987; Key and Runsten 1999) the scale variables, such as the size of oil palm area 
(PALM), the size of rubber area (RUB) and the size of other crop area (OCROP) are also 
likely to affect contract participation in different directions. PALM is expected to have a 
positive sign due to economies of scale while RUB and OCROP may discourage 
participation. Likewise, engagement in off-farm activities (OFFF) is expected to negatively 
affect participation. 
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It is noted that the contract schemes were offered by the nucleus company in two periods of 
time, i.e. 1989 - 1994 and 1995 - 2000. Meanwhile, the condition for a smallholder to join a 
contract scheme is that the plantation must be in an early stage of development and 
therefore potential adopters differ between the two periods. This difference was captured by 
dummy variables of the planting period, i.e. PLANTP1 and PLANTP2, showing the 
respective periods in which the smallholders entered the contract schemes.  
We also include a dummy variable for migrant (MIGRANT) since our sample consists of 
migrants and indigenous or local people. These two groups differ in terms of their cropping 
system. Indigenous people have a long tradition of rubber production while migrants tend 
to be less attached to a specific crop. 
Thirdly, in order to assess the impact of contract farming for household welfare across 
different income categories, we use total net household income3 as outcome variable. The 
impact of participation is estimated by two models, namely an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) model and a two stage treatment effects model. OLS is used to estimate outcome as 
a function of household characteristics, technical parameters of the oil palm plantation and 
a dummy variable for contract participation. The validity of this model depends on the 
assumption that there is no endogeneity problem, which will arise if participation is driven 
by unobservable factors (e.g. risk aversion, entrepreneurial ability, etc.) that affect the 
outcome of the participation decision. A two stage treatment effect model is employed to 
correct for this endogeneity. 
The general form of the income model is stated as follows: 
INCOME= f(AGE, AGE2, HSIZE, PPL, EDU, ALAND, STAY, PALM, RUB, OCROP, 
OPAGE, OPAGE2, OFFF, PARTICIP) (2) 
Total household income (INCOME) as dependent variable is computed as total net revenue 
from any sources of on-farm and off-farm income in 2009. Some of the explanatory 
variables included in the participation model may be also able to explain income, albeit for 
                                                 
3 If contract farming draws labor and land away from other activities, focusing on crop income or the gross 
margins of the contracted crop may overstate the impact on household well-being.  Total household income 
includes all net incomes that were earned from any sources both on farm and off-farm. 
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a different rationale. AGE is included to represent experience in generating income for the 
household. The squared term captures the effect that such ability may decline at older age. 
Potential labor capacity that is expected to positively affect income is captured by HSIZE 
and PPL. EDU is included to capture knowledge that is expected to be positively associated 
with income 
As a variable that captures support of the government for facilitating smallholders with 
productive asset, ALAND is included and expected to have a positive income effect. STAY 
is included to capture social capital, which based on many literatures (e.g. Groot et al. 2006 
and Maluccio et al. 1999), we hypothesize to have a positive income effect. In order to 
reveal the effect of different crops and income sources the variables PALM, RUB, OCROP, 
and OFFF are included. In addition, two technical parameters on oil palm production 
namely oil palm age (OPAGE) and its squared term (OPAGE2) are included to represent 
the time-dependent productivity of the oil palm plantations. Finally, contract participation 
(PARTICIP) is included to measure the effect of contract farming.  
In a formal notation the model can be expressed as: 
Yi = βXi + δIi + μi (3) 
Ii*= αZi + εi (4) 
for Ii= 1 if Ii*>0, otherwise Ii= 0 
where Yi is the outcome, i.e. total household income, Xi are household characteristics and 
technical parameters of oil palm production, Ii is a dummy for contract participation where 
Ii=1 if one participates in the contract and Ii=0 otherwise, and Zi is a vector of variables 
attributable to participation.  
Endogeneity exists if εi in equation (4) is correlated with μi in equation (3). By using a two-
stage procedure and assuming a joint normal error distribution, endogeneneity can be 
corrected. First, participation will be estimated by means of a probit model that allows us to 
calculate the inverse Mills ratio for each observation. Second, this ratio will be included as 
a regressor in the income model. 
As identifying variables in treatment effect regression we use PLANTP1, PLANTP2 and 
MIGRANT, which are expected to affect participation but not necessarily income.  
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Fourthly, we examine whether the contract is poverty sensitive by incorporating a poverty 
variable into the model. We classify our sample into two groups, namely poor and non-poor 
households based on per capita household consumption with a threshold of the $ 2 
international poverty line at 2005 PPP. The two critical questions addressed in this analysis 
are: (i) whether poor smallholders are discriminated by contract conditions to join the 
contract and (ii) whether poor smallholders significantly benefit if they join the contract 
scheme. 
The first question is examined by introducing a poverty dummy (POOR) in the 
participation model (the first stage of treatment effect model). We assign a value of 1 for 
poor household, and zero otherwise. We expect that a poor smallholder is less likely to 
participate in the contract.  
The second question is examined by including POOR and an interaction dummy variable 
between poverty status (POOR) and participation (PARTICIP) in outcome model (the 
second stage of treatment effects model) in order to estimate the effect of poverty and 
participation all together. For checking robustness, we also run two separated models for 
the poor group and the non-poor group. We expect that participation has different impact 
for different groups.  
5.5. Study area and data collection 
Data were collected through a household survey in Merangin regency, Jambi province. In 
total the survey involved 245 oil palm smallholders consisting of 126 contract smallholders 
and 119 non-contract smallholders spreading in three villages surrounded by a nucleus 
company.  
A multistage sampling procedure was employed in this study. Firstly, an oil palm nucleus 
company covering 15,441 hectares in District of Merangin was selected as study area, 
because it represented several stages of oil palm growth. Secondly, three villages were 
selected based on the criteria distance from production sites to the location of the oil palm 
mill referring to near (10 km), medium (20 km) and far distance (50 km). Thirdly, 
households were sampled randomly with probability proportional to the number of oil palm 
growers in each of villages.  
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Interviews have been carried out by using a modularly structured questionnaire. The major 
modules are household characteristics, shocks, crops, livestock, natural extraction, off-
farm, household expenditures and oil palm. In the section on oil palm, details of production 
and inputs were asked as well as participation in the contractual arrangement and the 
problems faced by smallholders during the past five years.  
 
5.6. Result and discussion 
5.6.1. Descriptive statistics 
The characteristics of contract and non-contract smallholders are shown in Table 5.1. 
Sampled households are composed of four individuals on average, out of which at least 
seventy percent are potential workers (between 15 and 65 years). At least 86 percent of 
them are headed by migrants. This fact strongly relates to history of the communities and 
transmigration program (i.e. national program to resettle people from Java to less populated 
island with several incentives) which was widely promoted by government in the eighties.  
Household heads of contract participants are six years older than those of non-participant 
on average. There is no significant difference in the highest attained education level of 
household head with six years schooling on an average in both groups. Contract 
smallholders can be distinguished clearly from non-contract smallholders in their 
endowments and total assets. Contract smallholders have almost sixty percent larger total 
land size, two times larger oil palm plot size, and two times higher total land value. 
However, there is no significant difference between contract and non-contract smallholders 
in their endowments of rubber plot size, other crop size, and livestock asset.  
It is shown that on average contract smallholders earn four times higher net revenue from 
oil palm than non-contract smallholders. However, both groups do not differ significantly 
in terms of their net revenue from rubber, other crops, livestock, and off-farm activities.  
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Table 5.1. Comparison of means of household characteristics between contract and non-
contract smallholders 
 Non-
contract 
Contract T stat 
Household characteristics    
Household size (no. of person) 4.20 4.33 -0.70 
Age of household head (years) 45.75 52.10 -4.04*** 
Proportion of potential labor (15-65 y) 0.70 0.74 -1.28 
Migrant dummy (1: migrant 0:indigenous/ local) 0.85 0.87 -0.36 
Allocated land by government (1: received ; 
0: not received) 
0.24 0.55 -5.08*** 
Asset holding    
Total land size (hectare) 2.88 4.59 -4.70*** 
Oil palm area (hectare) 1.58 3.51 -9.01*** 
Rubber area (hectare) 0.71 0.65 0.25 
Other crops area (hectare) 0.07 0.08 -0.27 
Total land value ( IDR )1) 165,916.00 355,798.00 -8.99*** 
Livestock asset value (IDR) 2,704.00 2,999.00 -0.24 
Total asset value (IDR 000) 229,359.00 477,129.00 -9.60*** 
Age of oil palm (years) 7.36 16.84 -18.94*** 
Income (per household)    
Net income of on farm (IDR) 17,753.00 50,469.00 -6.19*** 
Net revenue of oil palm (IDR) 9,475.00 41,002.00 -6.60*** 
Net revenue of rubber (IDR) 7,165.00 9,178.00 -0.727 
Net revenue of other crops (IDR) 54.00 91.00 -0.22 
Net revenue of livestock (IDR) 187.00 139.00 0.29 
Net revenue of natural extraction (IDR) 893.00 59.00 1.72* 
Net income of off-farm (IDR) 13,330.00 12,102.00 0.53 
Total net income (IDR) 31,411.00 62,671.00 -4.83 
Source off-farm income (1: have 0: no have) 0.78 0.57 3.58*** 
Note: * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01; 1) Indonesian Rupees (IDR) are given in units of thousand 
Source: own calculation 
 
  
56 Chapter 5 
 
Descriptive statistics of several performance indicators related to oil palm cultivation and 
production are presented in Table 5.2. It shows, for example, that contract smallholders use 
of input per hectare is almost double that of non-contract smallholder. However, they also 
obtain a higher price of IDR 106/ kg on average, which contributes to twenty percent higher 
net revenue from oil palm per hectare than the non-contract smallholders. The results also 
show that contract smallholders appear to be more dependent on oil palm with 70 percent 
of their income from this activity. 
It is important to note that the contractual arrangements require smallholders to apply the 
technology of the company only in the plasma plot. However, in the survey we found that 
almost half of the contract smallholders also have non-plasma plots. In the survey we asked 
farmers about yields in both types of plots. In order to assess the yield effect of contract 
farming, we thus made two comparisons: (i) the difference in yield between plasma plot 
and non-plasma plot owned by the contract smallholders and (ii) the difference in yield on 
non-plasma plot owned by the contract smallholder and those owned by the non-contract 
smallholders.  
Table 5.2. Performance indicators on oil palm cultivation and production 
Variables  Contract smallholder Non-contract 
smallholder 
T stat 
 Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD  
Input per ha (IDR 000/ ha) 126 3300 2124 119 1618 2219.71 6.05*** 
Yield of plasma plot (tonnes/ ha) 126 15.27 4.59 - - - 6.19***a 
Yield of non-plasma plot 
(tonnes/ ha) 
52 13.31 6.03 99 13.45 6.04 -0.14
Received Price (IDR) 126 1087 197.96 99 981 164.99 4.30*** 
Yield of net oil palm revenue 
(IDR 000/ ha) 
126 11649 7242.37 99 9508 8010.88 2.15** 
Share oil palm to total net 
income 
126 0.71 0.28 119 0.30 0.41 9,32*** 
a)Comparison between yield of plasma plot owned by contract smallholders and yield of non-plasma plot 
owned by non-contract smallholders,  * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
Source: own calculation 
 
The results suggest that contract smallholders tend to achieve higher oil palm yields 
especially in their plasma plots. Comparing plasma and non-plasma plots, we find that oil 
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palm yield of plasma plots is significantly higher than that of non-plasma plots owned by 
the same smallholder. Similarly, on average, the yield of plasma plots owned by contract 
smallholders is 2 tons per hectare higher than the yield of non-plasma plots owned by non-
contract smallholders. Comparing the yield of non-plasma plots owned by contract 
smallholders with those of non-contract smallholders there is no significant difference. This 
suggests that there is no measurable spillover effect on non-plasma plots. One of the 
possible reasons is the use of unguaranteed seeds in non-plasma plots due to the higher 
price and the scarcity of guaranteed seeds in open market. 
 
5.6.2. Participation model 
By using a probit model, the probability of participation in the contract scheme is 
estimated. The results reveal that only five variables affect participation significantly (see 
Table 5.3). Age of household head (AGE) has a significant and positive impact on 
participation. This fits our hypothesis that an older household head may be more risk averse 
to grow oil palm independently and therefore tends to join the contract as a safer 
investment option.  
Further, the coefficient for migrant dummy (MIGRANT) is significantly negative. It means 
that a migrant is less likely to participate in the contract than an indigenous smallholder. 
Indigenous households have a long tradition in growing especially rubber. Hence, they may 
be more reluctant to adopt oil palm without incentives which can come from contract 
farming. 
The results reveal that smallholders with larger oil palm plots are more likely to participate 
in the contract. This is plausible because the resulting scale effects reduce the costs of the 
contractual arrangement. Meanwhile, size of rubber area, size of other crop area and the 
engagement in off-farm activities are not significant determinants of participation.  
 
 
  
58 Chapter 5 
 
Table 5.3. The probit model of contract participation 
Variable Var. Code Coef. 
Age of household head AGE  0.03** 
Household size HSIZE  0.07 
Proportion of potential labor 15-65 y PPL  0.68 
Education of household head  EDU  0.01 
Allocated land from the government  ALAND -0.29 
Length of stay in the village STAY -0.01 
Migrant dummy MIGRANT -1.11** 
Size of all palm plots  PALM  0.29*** 
Size of rubber plots RUB -0.03 
Size of other crops plots OCROP -0.01 
Source of off-farm income  OFFF -0.33 
Period of planted year 1989-1994 PLANTY1  3.26*** 
Period of planted year 1995-2000 PLANTY2  1.63*** 
Constant  -3.44 
Number of observations 245  
Prob> chi2 0.00  
Pseudo R2 0.64  
 * p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
Source: own calculation 
 
Finally, the results show that planting periods significantly affect participation. A 
smallholder that planted oil palm in the period of 1989 to 1994 or 1995 to 2000 is much 
more likely to join the contract than a smallholder who planted after 2000, i.e. the 
participation likelihood in the first period is higher than that in the second period. This 
suggests that the match in time between planting period and the contract offered by the 
company is a significant determinant of participation. This also indicates that the time for 
joining the contract is driven more by the company’s plan than the smallholders’ initiative.  
Other variables such as education of household head, household size, proportion of 
potential labor, and allocated land are not significant determinants of participation.  
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5.6.3. Income model 
In the income model, we use natural log of net household income as a dependent variable. 
For better comparison, both the OLS model and the treatment effects model are presented 
in Table 5.4. The results from both models show that contract farming has a positive impact 
on household income but there is a considerable difference in the level of significance and 
the magnitude of the estimated effects. The effect estimated by OLS is significant at the 5% 
level, while the effect estimated by the treatment effects model is significant at the 10% 
level (see column 3 and 4 in Table 5.4). Because the treatment effects model can control for 
selection bias, its results may be more reliable.  
The results reveal that the coefficient of participation in the treatment effects model is 
almost double than the coefficient in OLS. Since the parameter rho in the treatment effects 
model differs from zero and has a negative sign a hidden bias may exist and can affect 
income and participation in the opposite direction. The OLS model cannot account for 
hidden bias which can lead to an underestimation of the magnitude of the coefficient. Both 
models suggest that household income is positively and significantly affected by growing 
rubber and engaging in off-farm activities. Adding one hectare of rubber will increase 
household income by 7 percent and engaging in off-farm activities results in a 35 percent 
increase. In comparison an additional area unit of oil palm contributes to a 17 percent 
increase in household income, while the duration of staying in the village, which can be 
seen as a proxy for social capital raises income by one percent for every additional year of 
staying in the village.  
We also find that household size and age positively (although at decreasing rate of increase) 
affects household income. There is no significant effect generated by education of 
household head, proportion of potential labor in the household and whether a household 
received allocated land or not from the government. The results show that while household 
income can be increased by contract participation other factors are more important. 
Therefore, the equity effects of participation in the contract among different groups of 
smallholders are further analyzed.  
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Table 5.4. Treatment effect model and OLS model  
Variable code Treatment effects 
model 
OLS Treatment effect model 
including a poverty 
dummy 
Treatment effect 
model for Poor Group 
Treatment effect model 
for Non-poor group 
 1st stage 
Participation
2nd stage 
Income 
Income 1st stage 
Participation
2nd stage 
Income 
1st stage 
Participation 
2nd stage 
Income 
1st stage 
participation 
2nd stage 
Income 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
AGE  0.03**  0.04**  0.04**  0.03**  0.04**  0.04  0.04  0.04**  0.02 
AGE2  -0.00** -0.00**  -0.00**  -0.00  -0.00 
HSIZE  0.07  0.07***  0.07***  0.11  0.09*** -0.11  0.07  0.33**  0.09*** 
PPL  0.68 -0.16 -0.14  0.66 -0.16 -1.40 -0.23  1.07 -0.18 
EDU  0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04* -0.03 -0.01 
ALAND -0.29 -0.05 -0.06 -0.28 -0.03 -0.69 -0.21 -0.32  0.03 
STAY -0.01  0.01**  0.01** -0.01  0.01**  0.02  0.012* -0.02  0.01* 
MIGRANT -1.11**   -1.23**   0.63  -1.73**  
PALM  0.29***  0.16***  0.16***  0.27***  0.14***  0.82**  0.29***  0.23**  0.14*** 
RUB -0.03  0.07***  0.07*** -0.03  0.07***  0.10  0.11** -0.14  0.05* 
OCROP -0.01  0.07  0.07 -0.04  0.05  1.87 -1.08** -0.07  0.10 
OPAGE   0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02   0.03  -0.00 
OPAGE2  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00   0.00  -0.00 
OFFF -0.33  0.31***  0.31*** -0.29  0.33***  0.37  0.28 -0.34  0.36*** 
PLANTY1  3.26***    3.27***   3.51***   3.50***  
PLANTY2  1.63***    1.68***   1.41   1.98***  
PARTICIP   0.47*  0.28**   0.50**  -0.86*   0.63** 
POOR    -0.42 -0.28***     
POOR*PARTICIP     -0.01     
Constant -3.44***  8.19***  8.10*** -3.22***  8.33*** -5.03**  8.05 -4.15**  8.74*** 
Lambda   -0.12   -0.15   0.63**  -0.19 
Rho  -0.22   -0.28   1.00  -0.36 
No of observation 245 245 245 245  88 88 157 157 
Adj R2   0.45       
Prob > F   0.00       
Prob > Chi2  0.00     0.00  0.00 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
Source: own calculation 
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5.6.4. Incorporating poverty  
By using the 2 $ (PPP) poverty line, we find that 11.8 % of sampled households are 
categorized as poor. This ratio is below the poverty head count ratio in Indonesia that is 
50.6% in 2009 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.2DAY).  
By introducing a dummy variable for poverty (expressed in terms of consumption poverty) 
in the first stage of the treatment effects model (see column 5 in Table 5.4), we find that 
poor smallholders are not significantly discriminated from the contractual arrangements. 
This is not surprising because to join the contract is not difficult and initially do not require 
high administrative costs. While all necessary investments are pre-financed by the company 
this puts a high debt burden on the smallholder. On the other hand households with less 
land are discriminated to participate in the contractual arrangement as indicated by the 
significantly positive coefficients of oil palm area in all participation models. This is 
plausible because participation in contract requires a smallholder to have at least 2 hectares 
land for oil palm plantation establishment.  
In the treatment effects model we can show that overall contract participation has a positive 
income effect, while being poor has a negative effect. We also included an interaction term 
between poor and participation which was negative but not significant (see column 6 in 
Table 5.4).Therefore to further explore this effect we run two separate models for the poor 
and the non-poor. The results reveal that there are different effects of participation for 
different groups of smallholders (see column 8 and 10 in Table 5.4). The treatment effects 
model shows that the effect of participation on household income is significantly positive 
for non-poor households but negative for poor households. This indicates that contract 
farming may benefit the better-off smallholders who can meet the requirements of contract 
farming.  
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5.7. Conclusions and recommendations 
In summarizing the results of this study, we return to the four specific objectives 
formulated in section 1. First, we find differences in the socio economic characteristics 
between contract and non-contract smallholders. Household income, total land size and 
total asset of contract smallholders are almost double than those of non-contract 
smallholders. We also find that the contract smallholders apply higher inputs and 
consequently have higher yields. Second, our probit analysis reveals that contract 
participation is significantly associated with the age of household head, indigenous, size of 
oil palm plot, and particular planting period. The contractual arrangement is more likely to 
be adopted by an indigenous household than by a migrant who may be a better 
entrepreneur. Considering production scale, a smallholder with a larger oil palm plot is 
more likely to join the contract. Also, a smallholder who planted oil palm between 1989 
and 1994 is more likely to participate in the contract than a smallholder who planted after 
this period. In the early period the company was more pro-active in order to meet the 
Government of Indonesia requirements for plantation establishment.  
Third, we can say that overall, contract farming in the Indonesian oil palm industry has 
positive effects for smallholders in terms of their household income. However, there are 
also other important factors that influence income such as the household’s engagement in 
off-farm activities, the size of oil palm and rubber area, and social capital. This suggests 
that the benefits from contractual arrangements vary considerably depending on household 
type.  
Fourth, whether or not contract farming also benefits the poor has been investigated by 
incorporating poverty into the model. The results show that although we found no evidence 
that poor smallholders are discriminated from participating in the contract, in one of the 
models the effect of participation on household income was negative. Running separate 
models for poor and non-poor households shows that that only for the latter group a 
significantly positive income effect can be shown. One reason for a negative poverty effect 
could be that while the costs for joining the contract may be attractive, loan conditions and 
management requirements may often be beyond the financial and technical capacity of the 
poor.  
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Our results therefore convey a message for policy makers and agro industry companies, 
which is to review the contractual schemes. Survey results show that the higher price of 
input, particularly fertilizer, has become one of the main problems in the past five years. 
Providing subsidized inputs after the gestation period for poor smallholders should be 
considered. The high rate of loan repayment imposed by the company with strict 
enforcement by directly deducting the payments from oil palm sales ignores the 
vulnerabilities of the poor.  
The fact that no spill-over effect from plasma to non-plasma plots was found is linked to 
the credit scheme provided by the company. Credits are limited to the period of plantation 
establishment but smallholders are bound by the contract to follow high standard 
production technologies with high levels of inputs. Hence, smallholders may be forced to 
pay more attention on their plasma plots while neglecting their non-plasma plots. It is 
proposed that the government should assess the adequacy of the existing support scheme in 
order to increase the impact of contract farming on smallholders.  
Finally, although contractual arrangements may benefit smallholders this can also make 
them to become more vulnerable to external shocks due to increasing dependence on oil 
palm. Our survey shows that around 70 percent of their total household income is received 
from oil palm. This question is subject to further analysis.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONTRACT FARMING AND VULNERABILITY TO POVERTY AMONG 
OIL PALM SMALLHOLDERS IN INDONESIA 1 
 
 
While the previous chapter has raised the question of shocks and vulnerability of oil 
palm smallholders, this chapter addresses that question and further investigates the 
effectiveness of contract farming in reducing vulnerability to poverty.  
 6.1. Introduction 
With the rise in global demand for palm oil the area planted to oil palm in Indonesia has 
grown from just about a quarter of million ha in 1980 to almost 8 million ha in 2010 
(MoA, 2011). This expansion has been associated with deforestation which has raised 
concern over its impact on forest dependent communities (Sheil et al. 2006; Belcher et 
al. 2004). These communities are at risk of losing their main source of livelihood which 
is food and other non-food products from natural resources. In order to make them to 
benefit from oil palm development the Government of Indonesia (GoI) has promoted 
contract farming schemes between smallholders and oil palm agri-business companies 
as a part of poverty reduction policies. According to Ministry of Agriculture statistics in 
2009 about 42 percent of oil palm plantations were owned by smallholders (MoA 2011).  
There are pros and cons of oil palm development and area expansion. On the one hand, 
Feintrenie et al. (2010) showed that oil palm generated higher returns to land and labor 
than other crops such as rubber or rice. Hardter et al. (1997) suggested that oil palm 
increased net income of smallholders to be seven times that of their neighbors who rely 
on subsistence production of food crops. In addition, the significant contribution of oil 
palm to economic growth, household welfare and poverty alleviation was pointed out by 
some studies such as Barlow et al. (2003), Zen et al. (2005), the World Bank (2011), 
                                                 
1  This chapter is based on the paper of: Cahyadi, E.R. and Waibel, H. 2012. Contract farming and 
vulnerability to poverty among oil palm smallholders in Indonesia. The paper has been invited to be 
resubmitted to Journal of Development Studies. It has been presented at Tropentag, 19-21 September 
2012 in Gottingen, Germany. 
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and World Growth (2011). Susila (2004) in a study in Sumatra revealed that the poverty 
headcount in oil palm communities was less than 10 percent. The World Bank (2011) 
showed that a 1 percent increase in oil palm production area can contribute to a 
reduction of between 0.15 to 0.25 percentage points of the head count ratio. 
On the other hand, oil palm producing households are vulnerable. Their income is 
exposed to the volatility of oil palm markets and environmental shocks. For instance, 
the fall of palm oil price in the global market in 2008 from US$ 1146 to US$ 433 per 
metric ton as reported by Index Mundi (2010) has severely hit oil palm households. As a 
monoculture cropping system oil palm is also susceptible to various pest and disease 
outbreaks. The high dependency of households on oil palm with more than 63 percent 
share in household income (Susila 2004) could exacerbate the impact of those shocks. 
In addition, oil palm smallholders are also exposed to other shocks, such as health and 
other economic shocks.  
Considering the risks faced by smallholders call for a forward-looking dynamic poverty 
concept since static poverty assessments can be misleading in the presence of shocks 
and risks. Hence this paper contributes to the existing literature on the well-being of oil 
palm smallholders by applying an asset based vulnerability to poverty concept.  
Although contract farming has been widely used by farmers as a risk management 
measure (Hennessey and Lawrence 1999; Minot 1986), the effectiveness of this option 
in reducing particular risks and future poverty in the oil palm communities is still little 
known. Hence this paper aims to contribute to a better understanding on the effects of 
contract farming on the risk to fall into poverty. The paper shows that there is a need to 
make contract farming arrangements in oil palm production to become more pro-poor.  
The paper has four specific objectives: 
(1) To assess the role of different types of shocks for oil palm smallholders. 
(2) To examine the role of contract participation on the likelihood of a household 
experiencing particular shocks. 
(3) To estimate smallholders’ asset-based vulnerability to poverty. 
(4) To assess the impact of contractual arrangements on smallholders’ vulnerability 
to poverty. 
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a literature review of 
contract farming in developing countries and looks at some studies in Indonesia. In 
section three the asset-based vulnerability concept is introduced as our conceptual 
framework. The fourth section outlines the methodology applied to address our four 
objectives. This is followed by a description of the study area and the data collection 
procedure. Section six presents the results and the final section concludes the paper 
together with some policy recommendations. 
 
6.2. Contract farming and smallholder producers 
The literature on contract farming as a component of poverty reduction strategies and 
sustainable development in developing countries has produced mixed results 
(Setboonsarng 2008; da Silva 2005; Eaton and Shepherd 2001; Baumann 2000). On the 
one hand contract farming was shown to increase income of small farmers (Miyata et 
al., 2009; Warning and Key 2002), and generate higher profits (Cai et al. 2008), to 
reduce income volatility (Bellemare 2010), and yielding high returns to capital 
(Simmons et al. 2005) as well as positive labor market effects (Winters et al. 2008).  
On the other hand several authors in earlier studies found that it can lead to unfair 
benefit sharing (Glover and Kusterer 1990; Warning and Key 2002). Glover (1984) 
observed that companies prefer to work with the larger and more advanced farmers. It 
was also found that contract farming can cause increased concentration of land 
ownership, social differentiation and dominance in decision making of the companies 
over small scale farmers (Echanove and Stefen 2005). Overall, Key and Runsten (1999) 
submitted that whether or not contract farming has a positive effect on rural 
development strongly depends on the types of farmers involved in the contractual 
arrangements.  
The contrasting results on the merits of contract farming in the literature in general are 
mirrored in recent studies on oil palm in Indonesia. For example, Sheil et al. (2009) 
found that contractual arrangements can provide income security to smallholders and 
Zen (2005) showed that oil palm companies have provided social services (e.g. in health 
and education) for local communities surrounding the plantation. However, Rist et al. 
(2010) pointed to the lack of clarity in land tenure, unfavorable contractual schemes, 
and lack of contractual compliance by the oil palm companies. Maryadi et al. (2007) in 
a study of South Sumatra found that there was a lack of transparency in the 
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methodology for determining oil palm price believed to be in favor of the companies. 
Therefore the question to what extent existing contractual arrangements in the 
Indonesian oil palm industry are pro-poor seems to be highly relevant.  
In order to formulate a testable hypothesis, in Table 6.1 we outline briefly the core 
elements of the contract scheme between the oil palm company and the smallholder 
farmers in our study area.  
 
Table 6.1. Responsibilities of oil palm company and smallholders under contractual 
arrangements 
Company Smallholders 
1) Establish smallholder oil palm plot on 
credit basis 
2) Provide production inputs on credit 
basis during gestation period 
3) Provide technical assistance free of 
charge  
4) Buy fresh fruits output from oil palm 
plot established by the company at a 
premium price for a defined level of 
quality. The price is oriented at 
provincial price committee’s 
recommendation 
1) Sell output from established oil palm plot 
to the company during entire life span of 
the plantation 
2) Follow technical production standards 
according to company specification 
3) Repay the credit to company in kind, i.e. 
through fresh fruit produce based on 
harvesting periods 
Source: own compilation based on personal communication with company manager, farmer leaders and 
cooperative.  
 
There is no written format of the contractual arrangement specifying the responsibilities 
of both parties. Only the credit contract is in a written document. It specifies the amount 
of the loan and the repayment scheme. It is specified that loan repayment is in kind that 
is through oil palm produce from the plots established by the company at a price 
determined by the company. The fresh fruit price which the company decides is derived 
upon recommendation from a provincial price committee although this procedure is not 
specified in the credit contract. The provincial committee takes into consideration the 
world market price for palm oil, the conversion ratio of fresh fruit into palm oil 
depending on plantation age, transportation costs, processing costs, and the company’s 
overhead costs. The contract is subject to a number of potential fallacies, namely that 
the price determination mechanisms is difficult to understand for the smallholders and 
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furthermore since the credit is paid in kind the amount of interest paid and the 
remaining debt is unknown to the smallholder. Another problem for smallholders is that 
the quality grading which determines the price premium is performed by the company. 
On the other hand the company faces difficulties to make the smallholders implement 
prescribed production technologies and determine the output of the oil palm plot.  
The summary of past experiences with contract farming from the literature suggests that 
in theory contract faming could reduce the financial and technical risk of smallholder 
farmers. On the other hand the discussion of contractual arrangements in oil palm in 
Indonesia has shown that there are also potential risks especially for the less endowed 
farmers. Therefore the vulnerability measures used in this paper can provide further 
insights on the impact of contract farming schemes in the Indonesian oil palm industry. 
In the next section the vulnerability to poverty framework as applied to the case of 
contract farming in the oil palm industry in Indonesia is introduced.  
 
6.3. Conceptual framework 
In this section, we explain the asset based vulnerability concept, which together with the 
literature review on contract farming in the previous section can provide the basis for 
establishing the hypothesis of this study. 
Past poverty studies mostly took a static perspective and have ignored the role of shocks 
and risks which are core to the concept of vulnerability to poverty (UN 2005; the World 
Bank 2006; Balisacan et al. 2002). While there has been a growing theoretical literature 
on vulnerability measurement (Chaudhuri et al. 2002; Chaudhuri 2003; Hoddinott and 
Quisumbing 2003; Calvo and Dercon 2005; Christiansen and Subbarrao 2005; Ligon 
and Schechter 2003; Günther and Harttgen 2009; Povel 2011; Chiwaula et al. 2011). 
However, empirical application is still sparse. In this study, we draw on a survey among 
oil palm producers in Sumatra, Indonesia that has been designed to measure the factors 
which are expected to affect vulnerability to poverty.  
Although we have only cross-section data, following Chaudhuri et al. (2002) and 
Christiansen and Subbarrao (2005) we can estimate consumption variability over time 
assuming that it mirrors consumption variability across households. We use the 
vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP) concept that was defined as probability of a 
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household to fall below poverty line in the near future, regardless of whether it is 
currently poor or not (Chaudhuri et al., 2002). Formally, vulnerability can be stated as:  
 zCV thht  1,Pr  (1) 
where Ch,t+1 is the household’s welfare at time t + 1 and z is the poverty line threshold. 
Vulnerability could be affected by the presence of shocks that can cause income or 
consumption shortfall. In order to smooth its consumption a household may apply a set 
of coping strategies. In the presence of particular covariate shocks such as a drop in 
product prices or yield loss due to pest or other natural factors, income shortfall could 
be exacerbated by the high share of oil palm in household income.  
In this paper we use the asset-based vulnerability approach as introduced by Chiwaula 
et al. (2011) who first applied this idea to fisheries communities in Africa. To introduce 
the asset based vulnerability concept to the problem at hand we establish a functional 
relationship between smallholder household consumption and total household assets 
taking into account risk. Hence, expected consumption )(ˆ hCE  and its standard deviation
)(
^
hCV  of a household h are related to household assets (A) and other control variables. 
In the presence of risks, the consumption will stochastically vary with a range between 
)()(
^
CVCÊ  and )()( ^ CVCÊ  .  
Defining both consumption (z) and an asset poverty line (AT) allows establishing a 
typology of expected poverty as summarized in Table 6.2. The asset poverty line (AT) 
defines the total amount of assets necessary for a household to reach a consumption 
level above z under normal conditions, i.e. )(ˆ hCE is equal to z. In case of a positive 
shock the minimum asset level is AT0. Below that level of asset a household would be 
called chronically poor because even favourable conditions are insufficient for the 
household to escape poverty. In case of a negative shock the minimum level of asset 
must go up to AT1. Above AT1 a household could be defined as “never poor” where even 
in the case of negative shocks he is still able to keep consumption not fall below poverty 
line. The variation in the asset poverty line then allows distinguishing between two 
types of transient poverty, namely structural and stochastic. The former is a situation, 
where based on household assets (AT0<A<AT) the household cannot surpass the poverty 
line unless a positive shock occurs. The latter refers to a situation where a household has 
sufficient asset (AT<A<AT1) but a negative shock can cause consumption to fall below z. 
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Table 6.2. Typology of dynamic poverty 
Expected 
Consumption 
Household assets (A) 
A≤AT0 AT0<A≤AT AT<A<AT1 A>AT1 
zCE h )(ˆ  
Structural 
chronic poor 
Structural 
transient poor 
  
zCE h )(ˆ    
Stochastic 
transient poor 
Never 
poor 
Source: based on Chiwaula et al. (2011) 
 
Based on asset based vulnerability concept the allocation of a smallholder to a certain 
type of poverty is expected to be driven by the presence of risks and the household’s 
asset endowment. The former affects how strong the income fluctuates and influences 
the variation of consumption while the later affects the coping ability to keep 
consumption levels constant. In our case households are highly exposed to covariate 
risks which directly or indirectly relate to oil palm. Some particular risks could be 
reduced while some could be increased by contract farming since the contract allocates 
the distribution of risks between the company and its smallholders.  
Hence, in the light of the discussion above, the central hypothesis of this paper is that 
“contract farming has the potential to reduce particular risks; while the effectiveness of 
such arrangements for reducing vulnerability to poverty will depend on other factors too 
namely the asset endowment of households.”  
6.4. Methodology 
In order to investigate the research objectives stated the analysis is carried out in four 
steps. First, relevant descriptive statistics that show the dependency of households on 
oil palm production, the incidences of oil palm shocks, and the magnitude of the impact 
of each shock are presented.   
Second, we examine the factors that influence the probability of a household to 
experience a shock. We classify shocks into four categories, namely price shock, 
production shock, other economic shocks, and health and demographic shock. The 
former two directly relates to oil palm and is called “oil palm shocks” while the latter 
two does not and is called “non-oil palm shocks”. Contract participation is expected to 
have an impact on the experience of those shocks as previously explained in section 2. 
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We define hiS  as probability of a smallholder h self-reporting a shock i that was 
experienced during the past five years. Such probability could be estimated by using a 
probit model in equation (2) where hiS  is the dependent variable with the value of one if 
an oil palm smallholder experienced a shock during the past five years and zero, 
otherwise. Shock experience hiS  is expected to be affected by household and farm 
characteristics hX , contract participation hP  and error term h .  
However, estimating the effect of participation in contract farming on the likelihood of 
shock experience by using such a model could be misleading since such likelihood and 
participation decision could be interrelated. It is noted that contract participation hP  is 
not randomly assigned but determined by a set of driving forces as shown in equation 
(3). 
hhhhi PXS  *  (2) 
 
 
 (3) 
 
Participation in contract farming is formulated as a zero-one variable which depends on 
a broad set of observable covariates including household and farm characteristics hX  as 
well as unobservable h . If error terms ( h and h ) in both equations are correlated, 
using a separate probit model leads to biased estimates (Arendt and Holm 2006). In 
order to test and control for such endogeneity, bivariate probit models are applied using 
predicted participation as variable in the second equation by assuming a jointly bivariate 
normal error distribution (Freedman and Sekhon 2010). 
For covariates of the shock experience model, age of household head is included to 
capture the notion that the fear of a shock may grow with age and therefore older people 
may tend to report a shock. In order to capture demographic structure of household we 
include education of household head defined as schooling years, household size and 
labor capacity defined as proportion of the number of household members aged between 
15 and 65 years old to the total number of household members. Since our sample 
consists of migrant and indigenous people while the origin of smallholders may 
hhh XP  *
0,01 * otherwisePifP hh 
0,01 * otherwiseSifS hihi 
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influence self-reported shock, a dummy of migrant is included where we give value of 1 
for a migrant, and zero, otherwise. The length of time (in years) a household has stayed 
in the area is included as a proxy of potential ability for adapting and dealing with 
environment and shocks in such area. We also include land size for oil palm, rubber and 
other crops in order to capture the scale effect of each type of crop. Oil palm age is 
included as a technical parameter that theoretically determines the nature of oil palm 
production cycle (Ismail and Mamat 2002). We expect that oil palm age is positively 
associated with the likelihood of experiencing oil palm shocks. Engagement in 
livestock, natural resources extraction (logging, fishing and hunting), wage employment 
and non-farm business are included because such activities expose a smallholder to 
particular risks. Finally, a dummy for contract participation hP is included to capture the 
effect of contract farming. As theoretically argued by Bauman (2000), we expect that 
contract participation reduces the probability of experiencing a shock, particularly for 
oil palm shocks.  
In the contract participation model (equation 3), covariates used are similar to those in 
the shock experience model (equation 2). However we add two dummy variables that 
capture whether a household planted oil palm during an earlier (1989 – 1994) or later 
(1995 – 2000) period. In these two periods the frame conditions under which contract 
farming was introduced differed. These variables are expected to affect participation but 
can be assumed to be independent of shock occurrence.  
Third, vulnerability of smallholders to poverty is estimated by applying the asset based 
approach as described in section two. In this paper we use per capita consumption as a 
measure of household welfare and the $ 2 international poverty line (PPP) as a 
threshold. We also check sensitivity of the results to other poverty thresholds (the $ 1.25 
PPP and national poverty line). The vulnerability to consumption poverty of a 
household is then formalized as follows:  
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In equation (4) we define vulnerability hV  as the probability of a household’s expected 
consumption will fall below the poverty line  zCh Pr . Hence, the range of 
vulnerability estimates is defined from zero to one. The vulnerability of chronically 
poor households is one since their consumption level can be expected to be always 
below the poverty line even in the best case 

  )()( ^ hh CVCÊ . Conversely, vulnerability 
is zero for households whose consumption levels are not expected to fall below the 
poverty line even in case of shocks 

  )()( ^ hh CVCÊ  based on the variance assumption 
applied. Vulnerability between greater than zero and less than one is corresponding with 
transient poverty. Vulnerability for transient poor households is calculated by dividing 
the difference between the poverty line (z) and the minimum level of consumption for a 
given asset with the range in consumption corresponding to two times the standard 
deviation )(2
^
CV  of the expected consumption )(CÊ . 
We specify per capita household consumption as a function of asset and other 
household characteristics following a stochastic process as below: 
hhh XC  ln  (5) 
Where hCln is log per capita consumption, hX  is a set of household and farm 
characteristics including assets endowment and h is a mean-zero disturbance term that 
capture shocks contributing to difference in per capita consumption. Following 
Chaudhuri et al. (2002), we estimate expected consumption and variance of 
consumption by using the three steps feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
procedure. 
 
(4) 
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In this model, we include the value of assets differentiated by income generating 
activities as well as non-productive assets. Following Chiwaula et al. (2011) for the 
former we include agricultural land size, and the value of livestock, natural resources 
extraction equipment, and asset for non-farm business. Considering the importance of 
oil palm and rubber, agricultural land is differentiated into areas for oil palm, rubber, 
and other crops. For non-productive assets we include the value of house and other 
major items like the electricity generator, etc. as these items are expected to affect 
household expenditures especially for electricity, fuel, and communication. Further 
technical specifications for oil palm have been included such as age of oil palm stands. 
In addition, we add a dummy variable for engagement in wage employment. For 
household characteristics, education of household head, age of household head, origin 
of household head (migrant or indigenous), household size and labor capacity are 
included to capture the human capital and demographic structure of households. We 
also include the length of time (in years) that a household stay in the area as a proxy of 
social capital variable that is expected to have positive effect (Grootaert 1999).  
Fourth, the effect of contract farming on vulnerability to poverty was assessed. A 
propensity score matching (PSM) analysis was applied in order to deal with selection 
bias that potentially arise since participation is not randomly assigned (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2008). Propensity score is defined as the possibility of smallholder to 
participate in the contract conditional on covariate X. This is expressed as: 
(6) 
The effect of participation is estimated as Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) 
below: 
(7) 
Where  )(,1|)1( XPPYE   is the expected outcome of contract smallholders which 
participate conditional on covariate X while  )(,0|)0( XPPYE   is the expected 
outcome of equivalent non-contract smallholders which are assumed as the expected 
outcome of contract smallholders if they had not taken part in the contract. The PSM 
estimator is simply the mean difference in outcome over the common support, 
appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants.  
 
)|1Pr()( XPXP 
    )(,0|)0()(,1|)1(1)|( XPPYEXPPYEET PXPATT  
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The propensity score was computed by a probit model with the same covariates as those 
discussed for equation (3). In this study we explore the use of three matching 
algorithms, namely nearest neighbor, caliper and kernel matching. The common support 
condition was imposed in order to ensure that any combination of characteristics 
observed in the participant group can also be observed in the control group. We also 
performed a balancing test to check whether the matching procedure is able to balance 
the distribution of characteristics in both participant and control group which allows us 
to choose the most appropriate matching method.  
6.5. Study area and data 
Our study took place in the district of Merangin, province of Jambi, Indonesia. Our 
study was located in the area of a large-scale private corporation engaged in planting 
and processing oil palm covering some 15 thousands hectares plantation in total and 
involving more than 6800 smallholders under contractual arrangements. We are 
interested to take this area as a case study since the total oil palm area owned by 
smallholders is almost twice larger than that owned by the company. This indicates 
some degree of dependency of the company on smallholders in securing supply of oil 
palm fruit. The location was selected since it represents different stages of plantation 
development and captures different origins of smallholders including migrants and 
indigenous people. 
Oil palm contract farming was first introduced in the study area in 1989 under a scheme 
promoted by the government which was called NES-TRANS (nucleus estate 
smallholders integrated with transmigration program). This scheme offered credit for oil 
palm plantation establishment with subsidized interest rate to households that had 
migrated to this area under the national transmigration program. Migrants from Java 
that came to the study area before oil palm development relied on rice and other food 
crops. The failure of the transmigration project due to poor infrastructure, lack of input, 
difficulties in marketing agricultural products, and inappropriate farming systems 
(Susila 1991) prompted the government to modify the program by enforcing contract 
farming for high value crops such as oil palm and involving private sector.  
Among the eleven villages surrounding the plantation area we selected three villages 
based on the following criteria: (1) distance to the oil palm mill (10 km, 20 km, and 50 
km from the mill), (2) origin of village population (indigenous and migrants), and (3) 
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willingness of village heads to cooperate. A household survey was carried out in 
January and February 2010. The sample size is 245 households consisting of 126 
contract smallholders and 119 non-contract smallholders. Households were randomly 
selected from the list of oil palm smallholders provided by the respective village heads. 
The survey instrument consists of several modules, namely household characteristics; 
income generating activities, including crop and livestock production, natural resource 
extraction, off farm employment and non-farm self-employment. To be able to calculate 
vulnerability levels of the smallholder households, detailed accounts of consumption 
expenditures and household assets were included. Also a section of shocks experienced 
during the past five years which included the year when the event occurred, subjective 
assessment of the severity of shocks and their impact as well as corresponding coping 
actions, and expected risks during the next five years, were elaborated. 
 
6.6. Results and Discussion 
We first describe the economics of smallholder in the study area comparing between 
contract and non-contract farmers. In the second section we present the results of our 
models.  
6.6.1. Descriptive statistics 
In the following we present the composition of household income, the shocks 
experienced and the impact of each shock on income loss or extra expenditure. Figure 
6.1 shows the share of income by source for oil palm contract and non-contract 
smallholders respectively. The results reveal that for contract smallholders, oil palm is 
the major income source with over 60 % of household income, followed by rubber 
(15 %), wage employment (10 %) and self-employment (9 %). For non-contract 
smallholders, off-farm wage employment has the highest share with 31 %, slightly 
higher than oil palm (30 %) followed by rubber (23 %) and non-farm business (11 %). 
The structure of income of the contract smallholders indicates some level of dependency 
on oil palm. On the other hand, since the economy in that area is dominated by oil palm, 
off-farm wage employment and self-employment are directly or indirectly dependent on 
oil palm; hence non-contract farmers also could be exposed to oil palm shocks. For 
example, wage labor that includes employment in the plantation and the mill was 
reported by sixty percent of non-contract smallholders. While non-farm business that 
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includes middleman and transportation services for oil palm fruit was reported by three 
percent of the non-contract smallholders. 
 
Figure 6.1. The structure of household incomes of contract and non-contract 
smallholders  
Source: created from the oil palm household survey 2010 data 
 
In Table 6.3 household characteristics are compared between contract and non–contract 
smallholders using t-test. We find significant differences for about half of the 
characteristics, most of them among household assets and for net income. Total asset, 
total land size, oil palm area, and non-productive assets of contract smallholders are 
almost double than those of non-contract smallholders. Likewise, non-farm business 
assets of contract smallholders are significantly higher and are almost four times larger 
than those of non-contract smallholders. No significant difference was found in other 
farming activities. The difference in assets owned indicates that coping capacity of non-
contract smallholders might be lower.  
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Table 6.3. Comparison of means for the characteristics of contract and non-contract oil 
palm smallholders 
Household characteristics Contract Non-contract T stat 
Household size 4.33 4.20 0.70 
Age of household head (years) 52.10 45.75 4.04*** 
Education of household head 5.93 5.83 0.30 
Number of working age household members  3.17 2.90 1.59 
The length of staying in the area  24.94 23.38 1.03 
Total land size (hectare) 4.59 2.88 4.70*** 
Oil palm area (hectare) 3.51 1.58 9.01*** 
Rubber area (hectare) 0.65 0.71 -0.25 
Other crops area (hectare) 0.08 0.07 0.27 
Livestock asset (IDR 000) 2999.00 2704.00 0.24 
Asset for natural resources extraction (IDR 000) 104.00 40.00 1.74* 
Non-farm business asset (IDR 000) 5610.00 1056.00 1.71* 
Non-productive asset (IDR 000) 111,985.00 58,790.00 6.57*** 
Total asset value (IDR 000) 477,129.00 229,359.00 9.60*** 
Total net income (IDR 000) 62,671.00 31,411.00 4.83*** 
Note : * p≤ 0.1, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01, IDR 000: thousands Indonesian Rupiah 
Source : calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data. 
 
In Table 6.4 we compare shock occurrence between contract and non-contract 
smallholders for different types of shocks, namely price and production shocks related 
to oil palm as well as health, demographic and economic shocks which are not related to 
oil palm production. Oil palm price shocks refer to a sudden and significant drop in oil 
palm prices. Such event was reported by almost all respondents to have taken place 
during the past five years. Production shocks are mainly the drop in oil palm yield that 
can occur before the onset of the rainy season but also refers to such events like the 
unavailability of fertilizer, pest outbreaks, theft and fire. For health and demographic 
shocks, we include illness of household members, accident, death of household head or 
household members and persons unexpectedly joining the household. For economic 
shocks, loss of job, collapse of non-farm business and livestock diseases are included. 
For oil palm related shocks we can see clear differences between the two groups. In 
both cases a higher percentage of contract households had experienced such shocks. For 
health and demographic shocks the results are opposite. More non-contract households 
were exposed to illness, largely attributable to a virus disease that especially occurred 
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among the poorer households who tend to spend less on sanitation. For other economic 
shocks the results are similar. 
 
Table 6.4. Households reporting at least one shock during the past five years by shock 
type for contract and non-contract smallholders (in percent) 
Types of shock Contract 
smallholders 
Non-contract 
smallholders 
Total 
Price shock 95.2 73.9 86.9
Production shock 89.7 63.9 77.1
Production drop in transition period  89.7 63.0 73.5
Strong pest attack 26.1 31.9 28.2
Fire in oil palm 2.3 1.7 2.0
Theft of oil palm fruit 16.7 9.2 13.9
Scarcity of fertilizer 46.8 47.1 46.9
Health and demographic shocks 57.1 77.3 66.9
Illness 46.0 67.2 56.3
Accident  8.3 16.0 10.6
Death of household head or member 3.2 4.0 3.3
Birth or person join with household             27.0 35.3 31
Other economic shocks 26.2 26.9 26.5
Job loss in off-farm and non-farm 2.4 1.7 2
Collapse of non-farm business 3.2 1.7 2.5
Livestock diseases 22.2 25.2 23.7
Source: calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data 
 
In Table 6.5 (columns 3 to 6) we compare frequency, perceived severity, income loss 
and extra expenditure of shocks incurred by a household during the past five years 
across types of shocks and types of smallholders. No big difference can be observed in 
shock frequency and perceived severity. However average income loss differs between 
the two groups and among shock types. Drop in oil palm prices can affect contract 
farmers twice as much as non-contractors while for production shocks the ratio is 
almost 3:1. Although less pronounced, the direction of difference is the same for health 
and demographic as well as for other economic shocks. On the other hand contractors 
spend more money on coping actions to respond to the production shocks and the health 
and demographic shocks. Once again Table 6.5 underlines the dependency of contract 
smallholders on oil palm.  
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Table 6.5. Magnitude of shocks by type of shocks and by type of smallholders 
Types of shock Types of 
smallholder 
Freq. Perceived 
severity* 
Average 
income 
loss  
(IDR 000) 
Average 
extra 
expenditure 
(IDR 000) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price shock Contractor 1.2 3.0 10928.4 0
Non-contractor 0.9 3.0 4009.5 0
Production shock Contractor 2.2 2.7 10716.5 188.0
Non-contractor 1.5 2.7 3838.5 84.2
Health and 
demographic shock 
Contractor 2.2 2.3 1152.5 3919.0
Non-contractor 2.3 2.3 491.1 2748.7
Other economic 
shock 
Contractor 1.2 2.6 1772.7 42.9
Non-contractor 1.2 2.5 1201.7 1409.4
* based on subjective assessment scale: 1 low, 2 medium, 3 high and 4 very high  
Source: calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data 
 
Based on the discussions above, we highlight the dependency of contract smallholders 
on oil palm that lead to more oil palm shocks reported. Conversely, non-contract 
smallholders that tend to have more diversified income portfolios and report more non-
oil palm shocks. 
 
6.6.2. Econometric Analysis  
Likelihood of shock occurrence  
While the descriptive statistics illustrate some observable differences between contract 
and non-contract smallholders we attempt to establish association by applying the 
models outlined in section 4. In this section, we examine whether contract participation 
is associated with the probability of shock occurrence.  
We report results of both the univariate and bivariate probit model respectively for each 
type of shocks in Table 6.6 since we find that endogeneity exists for some but not for all 
the shock types. In the price shock model, we find significantly positive correlation 
between random disturbances of participation and self-reported price shock as shown 
by ρ, hence the probit model tends to underestimate the effect while the bivariate probit 
is able to correct for such bias (see column 2 and 3 in Table 6.6). The results show that 
participation significantly reduces probability of experiencing price shocks. This could 
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be an indication that the arrangement of price premium under the contract is helpful for 
smallholders, particularly when price in the spot market extremely falls. Experiencing 
price shocks is positively associated with household size, oil palm age and oil palm area 
as well as the attention given to the management of other business. Education however 
works in the opposite direction. 
For production shocks, the probit model still could be used since we do not find 
significant coefficient of endogeneity in the bivariate probit model (see column 4 and 5 
in Table 6.6). The results show that the effect of participation is not significant. This 
could be an indication that technical assistance by the company under a contractual 
arrangement is not always effective in reducing such likelihood. However production 
shocks are also influenced by natural conditions which are beyond the control of the 
farmers. The size of oil palm area and the oil palm age are positively associated with the 
likelihood of experiencing production shocks since both variables reflect capacity of oil 
palm production. We also find that a migrant is more likely to report production shock 
than an indigenous farmer.  
For health and demographic shocks, since endogeneity is not significant, we still could 
use the probit model that produces similar results compared to the bivariate probit 
model (see column 6 and 7 in Table 6.6). Results show that contract participation is 
negatively associated with such shock. One possible reason is that participation may 
reduce the workload of household members in the oil palm plantation since the 
management of the household’s oil palm plot was taken over by the company or the 
household has employed waged labor. As we expected, a smallholder that stayed longer 
in the study area is less likely to experience such shock because he might be more 
adaptive with the surrounding environment. The results also show that a migrant is less 
likely to experience such shock than an indigenous farmer. On the other hand, 
household size and natural resources extraction are positively significant increasing the 
likelihood of a health shock. Health problems2 could be related to the location of natural 
resource extraction activities (swamps and creeks) where vector-borne human diseases 
are common. 
In the model for other economic shocks, endogeneity is significant as indicated by ρ; 
hence, the bivariate probit model is better employed for controlling such endogeneity 
                                                 
2 There was a “Chikungunya” epidemic virus outbreak in some villages surrounding the plantation in 
2008. This virus is transmitted to human by mosquitoes. 
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while the univariate probit model produces biased estimates (see column 8 and 9 in 
Table 6.6). The results underline the significant effect of participation in reducing the 
likelihood of experiencing such shock. The notion that contractual arrangement is an 
insurance mechanism in the oil palm industry may encourage a smallholder to allocate 
more resources on oil palm and just spend little rest on other engaged economic 
activities. Hence, a bad event on such activities is less likely to be reported as a shock 
by a contract smallholder. The results show that “livestock” is significantly positive 
since such shocks are more likely to occur more among households whose income 
portfolios diversified into other income generating activities. Results presented in 
Table 6.4 underline this finding as the vast majority of such shocks are livestock 
diseases. As we expected, age of household head is positively associated with self-
reported shocks. We also find that a household with older oil palm stands are more 
likely to experience such shocks. Since harvesting and maintenance activities for older 
oil palm plantation become more difficult and demanding a smallholder may pay less 
attention on other engaged economic activities lead to higher probability of collapse in 
such business.  
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Table 6.6. Univariate and bivariate probit estimations for different type of shocks  
 Price shock Production shock Health and demographic shock 
Other economic 
shock 
Variables Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Age of hh  0.022*  0.028**  0.002  0.005 -0.009 -0.007  0.012  0.014* 
Education of hh -0.102** -0.194** -0.016 -0.015 -0.042 -0.039 -0.014 -0.009 
Household size  0.208*  0.193* -0.048 -0.039  0.130*  0.131**  0.103  0.106 
Labor capacity -0.414 -0.358  0.121  0.169 -0.423 -0.387  0.497  0.557 
Origin dummy  0.113 -0,170  0.905*  0.724 -0.880* -0.990* -0.364 -0.687 
Length of stay -0.009 -0,010  0.009  0.008 -0.027** -0.027** -0.010 -0.011 
Oil palm area  0.213*  0.260**  0.165*  0.207**  0.071  0.095*  0.053  0.097 
Rubber area -0.017 -0.024  0.056  0.050  0.051  0.047 -0.019 -0.016 
Other crop area  0.192  0.146  0.092  0.081 -0.100 -0.097  0.134  0.134 
Oil palm age 0.233***  0.254*** 0.097***  0.123***  0.051  0.075  0.017  0.074** 
Livestock -0.041  0.009  0.012  0.003  0.039  0.031  1.319***  1.189*** 
NR extraction -0.261 -0.304  0.224  0.205  0.471*  0.460*  0.347  0.334 
Employment  0.432  0.258  0.031 -0.028  0.027 -0.071  0.092 -0.048 
Non-farm   0.736*  0.673*  0.402  0.378  0.169  0.159  0.407*  0.320 
Participation  -1.357** -2.359*** -0.220 -0.840 -1.134*** -1.601** -0.288 -1.354
*** 
Constant  -2.209** -2.236 -1.653* -1.780*  1.953  1.808* -2.652*** -2.593*** 
Participation         
Age of hh   0.029**   0.030**   0.030**   0.029** 
Education of hh   0.001   0.001   0.011  -0.003 
Household size   0.099   0.070   0.100   0.090 
Labor capacity   0.893   0.866   0.852   0.922 
Origin dummy  -0.846  -1.108**  -1.077*  -0.975* 
Stay in the area   0.001  -0.009  -0.008  -0.007 
Allocated land  -0.312  -0.296  -0.368  -0.449 
Oil palm area   0.305***   0.298***   0.307***   0.297*** 
Rubber area  -0.052  -0.041  -0.053  -0.041 
Other crop area  -0.063  -0.031  -0.004  -0.027 
Planting period 1   3.349***   3.331***   3.348***   3.498*** 
Planting period 2   1.528***   1.603***   1.739***   1.899*** 
Employment  -0.523*  -0.460  -0.601**  -0.629** 
Non-farm    0.067   0.121   0.047   0.128 
Constant   -3.894***  -3.545***  -3.745***  -3.779*** 
ρ   1.057**   0.439   0.326   0.935** 
Number 
observation 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.431  0.243  0.120  0.201  
Note : * p≤ 0.1, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01 hh: household head 
Source : calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data 
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Vulnerability to poverty 
In this section, vulnerability to poverty among oil palm smallholders is assessed by 
employing the procedure discussed in section 3. In Table 6.7 we present the results of 
the second stage (variance regression) and the last stage (consumption regression) of 
three stages FGLS. The results highlight that assets in a broad meaning including 
productive assets (land size for oil palm, natural resource extraction equipment, and 
non-farm business assets), non-productive assets, and human capital assets (education of 
household head and labor capacity) are positively associated with expected household 
consumption which is a factor that reduces vulnerability to poverty. As shown by 
Table 6.7 column 4, the reduction in consumption variation is significantly affected by 
the size of oil palm plot.  
Table 6.7. Per capita household consumption model using FGLS 
 
Expected log per capita 
consumption 
 Variance of 
consumption 
Variables Coef. Std. Err.  Coef Std. Err 
1 2 3  4 5 
Age of household head 0.000  0.002 0.003 0.001 
Education of household head 0.022 *** 0.007 -0.001 0.002 
Household size -0.096 *** 0.013 -0.001 0.005 
Labor capacity 0.171 * 0.092 0.013 0.033 
The length of stay 0.002  0.002 0.000 0.001 
Origin dummy 0.082  0.093 -0.018 0.033 
Oil palm area 0.038 *** 0.011 -0.007** 0.003 
Rubber area 0.003  0.010 -0.005 0.004 
Other crop area 0.068  0.052 0.013 0.020 
Oil palm age 0.008 ** 0.004 0.001 0.001 
Ln livestock asset 0.003  0.005 -0.000 0.002 
Ln asset for natural extraction  0.019 * 0.011 0.000 0.004 
Ln non-farm business asset 0.023 *** 0.006 0.001 0.002 
Ln non-productive asset 0.121 *** 0.027 0.005 0.009 
Employment -0.068  0.041 0.005 0.014 
Constant 6.948 *** 0.329 -0.053 0.117 
Number of observation 245    245  
R2 0.509    0.050  
Prob > F 0.000    0.681  
Note : * p≤ 0.1, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01  
Source : calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data. 
 
Furthermore, vulnerability of each household was estimated by the expected 
consumption and its variance in the model above. Following the asset based 
vulnerability concept we classify households into four types of expected poverty as 
shown in Table 6.8. Using the $ 2 poverty line PPP we find that households who are 
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structurally-chronic poor are the minority with only 7 percent of sample, quite similar 
with the poverty head count ratio using the US $ 1.25 poverty line (PPP). The results 
underline that the majority of household (42 percent) are stochastically- transient poor, 
that is they are expected to be non-poor but the occurrence of negative shocks could 
push them back to poverty. Almost one-fourth of the sample households are 
structurally-transient poor which cannot escape poverty unless positive shocks occur. 
The remaining group (29 %) belongs to the group of non-poor households who are 
expected to stay out of poverty even in the case of negative shocks. We check 
sensitivity of the results to different poverty thresholds (the $ 2 PPP, the $ 1.25 PPP and 
the national poverty line). As shown by Table 6.8, the composition is sensitive for 
structural chronic, structural transient and non-poor but is less sensitive for the 
stochastic transient group. If we use the $ 1.25 threshold, structural chronic are not 
found anymore, the composition of structural transient extremely decrease from 23 to 1 
percent while “never poor” increase twofold. However, the share of stochastic transient 
is similar (about 40 percent). Even if we use the national poverty line which is the 
lowest threshold, the composition of stochastic-transient is still high (above 30 percent). 
Here we highlight the persistence of large stochastic-transient across different poverty 
lines, which is importance in the policy context.  
 
Table 6.8. Composition of vulnerability typology across different poverty lines 
  Composition in each level (%) 
Types of 
vulnerability  
VEP $ 2 PPP $ 1.25 PPP National poverty  
Structural-chronic 1 7.3 0.0 0.0 
Structural-transient 0.5≤VEP<1 23.3 1.2 0.8 
Stochastic-transient 0<VEP<0.5 42.5 40.4 31.0 
Non poor 0 26.9 58.4 68.2 
Total  100 100 100 
Source : calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data. 
 
From a policy perspective the stochastically transient group is most relevant as it 
indicates that although most oil palm smallholders are expected to be non-poor from a 
static poverty perspective many could fall back into poverty in the case of shocks. This 
is the main message of this study. Hence we complement previous studies on oil palm 
household’s wellbeing (Susila 2004; the World Bank 2011) which focused on ex post 
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poverty measures. The message for policy makers is that it is insufficient to solely rely 
on the past observations of the wealth status of oil palm communities. While the share 
of the stochastic transient poor is less sensitive to the choice of the poverty line, the 
results of static poverty assessments are. Using the US $ 1.25 PPP and the national 
poverty line of 2009 (IDR 200,262 per month), the poverty headcount was 6.53 percent 
and 4.08 percent respectively while applying the US $ 2 the poverty rate goes up to 
35.92 percent.  
 
The effect of contract farming on vulnerability to poverty 
A comparison of composition on vulnerability typologies between contract and non-
contract smallholders is presented in Table 6.9. Overall, contract smallholders appears 
to be less vulnerable than non-contract smallholders when using the share of “never 
poor” and the share of “structurally-chronic” poor. However, we still find a high share 
of contract smallholders (almost a half) to be stochastically transient poor. This suggests 
that many of them still have not been safe from falling to poverty in the case of negative 
shocks.  
Table 6.9. Comparison of composition in vulnerability typology between contract and 
non-contract smallholders using the $ 2 threshold 
  Composition in each level (%) 
Types of 
vulnerability  
VEP Total 
household 
Contract 
smallholder 
Non-contract 
smallholder 
Structural-chronic 1 7.3 0.8 14.3 
Structural-transient 0.5≤VEP<1 23.3 11.1 36.1 
Stochastic-transient 0<VEP<0.5 42.5 46.0 38.7 
Never poor 0 26.9 42.1 10.9 
Total  100 100 100 
Source: calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data. 
 
In Table 6.10 we show results of statistical tests for the mean differences of 
vulnerability estimates between contract and non-contract smallholders. Thus contract 
smallholders are significantly less vulnerable than non-contract smallholders across all 
poverty thresholds. However, such simple mean comparisons cannot distinguish 
whether the participation reduces vulnerability or a less vulnerable smallholder has a 
higher chance to participate in the contract since the participation is not randomly 
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assigned but is determined by a set of covariates. In order to address this problem we 
implement a propensity score matching analysis. 
Table 6.10. Mean comparison of vulnerability estimates between contract and non-
contract smallholders  
Poverty threshold Contract 
smallholders 
Non-contract 
smallholders 
T stat 
The $ 2 PPP 0.193 0.486 -7.32*** 
The $ 1.25 PPP 0.034 0.137 -6.20*** 
The national poverty 0.022 0.097 -5.51*** 
Source: calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data. 
 
Table 6.11 shows the results of a probit model that yields the propensity scores for 
smallholder participation in the contract based on 14 observable covariates.  
Table 6.11. Participation model 
 Participation 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. 
Age of household head 0.031*** 0.012 
Education of household head 0.010 0.043 
Household size 0.084 0.089 
Labor capacity 0.806 0.654 
Origin dummy  - 1.090* 0.558 
The length of stay - 0.010 0.016 
Allocated land  - 0.347 0.303 
Oil palm area 0.300*** 0.089 
Rubber area - 0.044 0.077 
Other crop area - 0.015 0.260 
Dummy of planting period 1 (1989-1994) 3.350*** 0.443 
Dummy of planting period 2 (1995-2000) 1.712*** 0.395 
Wage employment - 0.555* 0.291 
Non-farm business 0.068 0.323 
Constant  - 3.598*** 1.156 
Number of observation 245   
Psudo R2 0.61   
LR Chi2 206.99***  
Source : calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data. 
 
As shown by the significant coefficients in the model, participation is unlikely to be a 
random process. There are certain characteristics that make participation more likely, 
hence self-selection is likely to exist. The coefficient for land size suggests that either 
the company tends to choose a larger smallholder or a larger farmer more prefers to 
participate. The significant coefficients for the planting period dummies also support the 
self-selection hypothesis. A smallholder is more likely to participate if his oil palm was 
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planted during the particular periods when the government promoted the contract 
schemes with subsidized interest rate. We also find that an indigenous farmer is more 
likely to join the contract. This is largely driven by prevailing land policies where they 
could only receive compensation for land occupied by the company and migrants if they 
joined the contract.  
As matching algorithm we use three algorithms namely nearest neighbor, caliper and 
kernel matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Considering the distribution of data at 
hand as shown by Figure 6.2, we impose common support conditions by applying 
“minima-maxima” and trimming procedure in order to ensure the existence of potential 
matches in the control group. The minima-maxima excludes all participants, whose 
propensity score is smaller than the minimum and higher than the maximum in the 
comparison group while the trimming excludes treated observations in the propensity 
score range where there is a lack of control individuals (0.5, 0.7). By imposing such 
common support conditions we lose 69 households.  
 
Figure 6.2. The distribution of propensity score densities 
Source: created from the oil palm household survey 2010 data. 
Based on the balancing tests the kernel matching has been identified as the most 
appropriate matching method. As shown by Table 6.12, after matching the differences 
in all covariates between the two groups are no longer significant, the pseudo R2 
strongly decreases (from 0.61 to 0.09) and the likelihood ratio test becomes insignificant 
indicating that no systematic differences in the distribution of covariates between both 
groups exists.  
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Table 6.12. The results of the covariate balancing test 
Variable Sample Mean % bias % 
reduct 
|bias| 
T 
Treated Control 
Age of household head Unmatched 52.095 45.748 51.6  4.04*** 
 Matched 48.158 45.659 30.5 40.9 1.24 
Education of household 
head 
Unmatched 5.952 5.832 3.8  0.30 
Matched 6.228 5.864 2.6 30.4 0.13 
Household size Unmatched 4.333 4.202 8.9  0.70 
 Matched 4.246 3.806 29.8 -233.7 1.65 
Labor capacity Unmatched 0.736 0.696 18.8  1.47 
 Matched 0.724 0.740 -7.4 60.6 -0.36 
Origin dummy  Unmatched 0.865 0.849 4.6  0.36 
 Matched 0.825 0.743 23.1 -397.8 1.05 
The length of time a 
household stayed in the area 
Unmatched 24.937 23.378 13.2  1.03 
Matched 25.789 24.860 7.9 40.4 0.43 
Allocated land  Unmatched 0.563 0.378 37.6  2.94*** 
 Matched 0.474 0.333 29.2 22.4 1.56 
Oil palm area Unmatched 3.506 1.585 115.7  9.00*** 
 Matched 2.654 2.565 5.3 95.4 0.33 
Rubber area Unmatched 0.653 0.714 -3.2  -0.25 
 Matched 0.979 1.326 -18.1 -467.3 -0.71 
Other crop area Unmatched 0.080 0.066 3.4  0.27 
 Matched 0.114 0.150 -8.4 -114.7 -0.31 
Dummy of planting period 1 
(1989-1994) 
Unmatched 0.722 0.059 184.7  14.33*** 
Matched 0.544 0.599 -15.5 91.6 -0.59 
Dummy of planting period 2 
(1995-2000) 
Unmatched 0.421 0.370 10.4  0.81 
Matched 0.439 0.370 14.1 -35.4 0.74 
Wage employment Unmatched 0.413 0.630 -44.4  -3.48*** 
 Matched 0.544 0.641 -19.8 55.4 -1.05 
Non-farm business Unmatched 0.198 0.218 -4.9  -0.39 
 Matched 0.158 0.116 10.2 -107.5 0.64 
Sample Unmatched 245 Matched 176  
Pseudo R2 Unmatched 0.610 Matched 0.092  
LR Chi2 Unmatched   296.99*** Matched 14.53  
Note: using kernel matching algorithm and imposing common support condition by applying “minima 
maxima” and trimming procedures, ***p<0.01.  
Source: calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data. 
 
In Table 6.13, we show the results of propensity score matching on the poverty typology 
estimates. After matching the mean differences for the vulnerability estimate 
(probability of falling to poverty) and poverty typology across three different poverty 
lines poverty are not significant. In contrast to the simple mean comparison with the 
unmatched sample, the results suggest that contract participation does not significantly 
reduce vulnerability to poverty.  
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Table 6.13. Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of participation  
Poverty line thresholds Vulnerability estimates Vulnerability typology 
 ATT T stat ATT T stat 
$ 2 PPP -0.031 -0.28 -0.244 -0.91 
$ 1.25 PPP -0.028 -0.65 -0.173 -1.07 
National (200,262/ month)  -0.023 -0.68 -0.069 -0.44 
Source : calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data. 
 
While we have attempted to control for all observable sources of bias, unobservable 
covariates may simultaneously affect participation and vulnerability leading to a hidden 
bias (Rosenbaum 2002). Therefore, a sensitivity analysis by Roosenbaum was applied 
to determine how strongly an unobservable variable must affect the selection process in 
order to alter the conclusions. The results of Rosenbaum bound analysis are presented in 
Table 6.14. 
Table 6.14. The results of sensitivity analysis 
Γ P critical value for lower bound 
 $ 2 PPP $ 1.25 national 
1.0 0.0769 0.0005 0.0006 
1.1 0.1325 0.0015 0.0017 
1.2 0.2025 0.0036 0.0037 
1.3 0.2828 0.0073 0.0072 
1.4 0.3683 0.0134 0.0127 
1.5 0.4542 0.0225 0.0206 
1.6 0.5365 0.0351 0.0312 
1.7 0.6126 0.0515 0.0448 
1.8 0.6807 0.0719 0.0615 
1.9 0.7401 0.0961 0.0813 
2.0 0.7907 0.1241 0.1039 
Source: calculated from the oil palm household survey 2010 data. 
 
The results show that while the inference for the $ 2 threshold could be altered if 
unobservable presences with the magnitude of 1.1, the inferences for both the $ 1.25 
and national poverty line are less sensitive to hidden bias at the magnitude of 2. 
Therefore, overall we maintain our conclusion that there is no effect of participation on 
vulnerability reduction (using the $ 1.25 and national poverty lines).  
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6.7. Summary and Conclusions 
Summarizing the results of this study we return to the four specific objectives posed in 
the introduction. First, the results reveal that contract smallholders are more dependent 
on oil palm than non-contract farmers; hence the former group experienced more oil 
palm shocks while the latter tend to have a more diversified income portfolio and more 
often reported non-oil palm shocks.  
Second, after controlling for correlation among unobservable factors of experiencing 
shocks and the participation decision, the results show that a negative impact of price 
shocks can be reduced by participation; however this is not the case for production 
shocks. This could be an indication that price premium awarded by the contract 
effectively works while technical assistance provided through the contract may often 
not be effective to cope with production shocks.  
Third, using the asset based vulnerability approach we find that most of the oil palm 
smallholders (about 40 percent) belong to the group of stochastically-transient poor. 
This finding differs from previous literatures on oil palm smallholders’ wellbeing that 
concentrated on static poverty. Our findings thus could serve as a signal for policy 
makers that reduction of static poverty among oil palm smallholders is not a guarantee 
that they could not fall back into poverty. We therefore recommend developing better 
social protection policies for oil palm smallholders.  
Fourth, while statistical tests for simple mean difference show that contract 
smallholders are significantly less vulnerable than non-contract smallholders, the 
propensity score matching analysis differently suggests that participation does not 
reduce vulnerability and identifies asset endowment as a decisive factor for participation 
selection.  
In conclusion, this study suggests that the potential of the oil palm smallholder contract 
farming schemes in Indonesia to sustainably reduce poverty may be less than suggested 
by earlier literature. There is a need to review the contract scheme if it is to become 
more pro-poor.  
 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 7 
SUBJECTIVE RISK EXPECTATIONS AND FUTURE PLAN OF INVESTMENT 
AMONG OIL PALM SMALLHOLDERS IN INDONESIA 1 
 
 
While the importance of taking into account risks in designing poverty reduction 
policies has been pointed out in the previous chapter, this chapter further investigates 
decision making behavior toward risks among oil palm smallholders that would be also 
relevant to complement a proper policy recommendation. 
7.1. Introduction 
In recent years, the importance of risk research in agricultural economics and the 
heterogeneity of behavior among agricultural decision makers when facing uncertainty 
have been subject to a vast amount of literatures (e.g. Just et al. 2002; Just 2002). Risk 
perception and risk attitude are major factors that determine economic behavior (Nosic 
and Weber 2010). In agribusiness several examples are now available that shows the 
relationship between risk perception and risk management strategies (e.g. Flaten et al. 
2005; Lien et al. 2006; Ahsan 2011; Ahsan and Roth 2010; Hall et al. 2003; Koesling et 
al. 2004).  
Some literatures dealing with risk experiments showed that risk attitudes may vary in 
response to changing conditions. This has been found in developed countries (e.g. 
Andersen et al. 2008; Dohmen et al. 2009) in emerging market economies like Vietnam 
(e.g. Tanaka et al. 2010) and for farmers in poor countries (e.g. Humphrey and 
Verschoor 2004; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009). 
In this paper we add to this literature by investigating the case of smallholder farmers in 
Indonesia who have transformed from a traditional cropping system to oil palm 
plantations in co-existence with large agro industry.  These farmers have been attracted 
                                                            
1  This chapter is based on the article of: Cahyadi, E.R. 2013. Subjective risk expectation and future plan 
of investment among oil palm smallholders, which was submitted to Journal of Risk Research. 
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high international prices for palm oil, which made investments in oil palm plantations 
profitable (Feintrenie et al. 2010). On the other hand, market and production risks are 
higher than in traditional crops like rice. The price of palm oil depends on a volatile 
global market. Oil palm plantations are monocultures which are susceptible to pest and 
disease outbreaks (Paterson 2007). In addition the startup costs for oil palm plantations 
are large and the cash flows turns positive only five years after planting (Pafenfus 2001; 
Feintrenie et al. 2010). The optimal economic life span of an oil palm plantation is in 
the order of 20 years after which time yields decline and replacement becomes 
necessary unless the farmer wants to shift to another crop. Hence we have a good case 
where farmers are confronted with a risky decision, namely whether or not to replace 
their oil palm plantation, re-allocate their land to other crops or take up other enterprises 
outside agriculture. Also, our past work has shown that oil palm smallholders are indeed 
subject to shocks that negatively affect their well-being push them into poverty 
(Cahyadi and Waibel 2012). In this study we can therefore investigate if the 
management behavior as measured by smallholders’ investment plans can be explained 
by their subjective risk expectation and risk attitude. We take into account that 
subjective risk expectation is not exogenous but can be affected by unobservable 
individual heterogeneity that may simultaneously affect the future plan of investment. 
Hence, the determinants of subjective risk expectation are also investigated. 
The data available to us are from a sample of some 246 households in three villages in 
the district of Merangin in the province of Jambi in Sumatra. The survey instrument 
provides information on a rich set of variables including household characteristics, 
consumption, income and assets. Central to the analysis presented in this paper are data 
on past shocks, risk expectations and future plans of smallholders currently engaged in 
oil palm production. Shocks were measured as frequency and severity of negative 
events during the past five years. Risk expectations were elicited by asking respondents 
whether they expect the occurrence of a negative event in the near future. Risk attitude 
was captured by a simple risk item where respondents were asked to place their 
willingness to take a risk on a six point Likert scale. Although economists in the past 
have measured risk attitude through incentivized experiments (e.g. Binswanger 1980) 
recent work in Thailand has shown that survey based risk items can yield a similar 
degree of reliability (Hardeweg et al. 2013).  We therefore believe that our data provide 
an excellent base to investigate the relationship between risk attitude, risk expectations 
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and actual behavior as measured through the investment plans of oil palm smallholders 
in Indonesia.  
We take the investment plan which was revealed by the respondents as a proxy of 
decision making behavior. We thus are able to examine whether risk expectations are 
consistent with investment plans. We hypothesize that a pessimist has a lower 
propensity to invest in a potentially high return but risky portfolio such as replanting oil 
palm plantations.  
The overall objective of this paper is to better understand the relationship between 
subjective risk expectations, risk attitude and management behavior, namely the future 
plan of investment among oil palm smallholders in Indonesia. Hence, the paper has two 
specific research objectives:  
1. To analyze the determinants of subjective risk expectation.  
2. To examine whether subjective risk expectation and risk attitude can explain the 
future plan of investment. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a conceptual framework that 
explains the links between risk expectation, risk attitude and the future plan of 
investment is presented together with methodology to address the two specific 
objectives above. This is followed by study area and data collection procedure in section 
three. In section four, results are discussed. Finally, conclusions are drawn accompanied 
with policy recommendations. 
 
7.2. Conceptual framework and methodology 
Smallholders commonly react to risks that they perceived. Hence, subjective risk 
expectation based on past experience, level of information, and degree of risk aversion 
can be used to explain smallholders decision (Anderson et al. 1977). Weber and Hsee 
(1998) showed that subjective risk expectations are better used than the variances of 
outcomes in lottery task to improve the goodness of fit of regression analysis in 
predicting risk behavior. 
Van Raaij (1981) provided a framework for the analysis of agents’ economic behavior 
that explains how the economic environment (market conditions, sources of income, 
type of employment) and agents’ characteristics influence perceptions and how such 
perceptions can determine individual economic behavior. Adapting van Raaij (1981), a 
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conceptual framework for this study is presented in Figure 7.1. The framework explains 
how experienced shocks, risk attitude, and smallholder’s characteristics influence 
subjective risk expectation and how such expectations can explain portfolio choice in 
the future plan of investment. As shown in Figure 7.1 smallholder characteristics (e.g. 
age, education, household size, and asset endowments) are expected to influence risk 
expectation in oil palm and non-oil palm enterprises. Risk expectation also could be 
shaped by experienced shocks in the past. One who experienced a certain shock more 
frequently and severe may expect the occurrence of that shock in the future. Risk 
perception can be also influenced by general risk attitude as theoretically argued by 
Sitkin and Pablo (1992). An individual with high risk aversion may tend to overestimate 
risk expectation or be a pessimist.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. The relationship between subjective risk expectation, risk attitude and 
investment plan 
Source: Adapted from Van Raaij (1981)  
 
In planning an investment a smallholder may consider two major strategies, namely (1) 
investing in a higher return but more risky portfolio such as increasing the economic 
scale of oil palm or replanting oil palm plantation and (2) investing in another enterprise 
that may be less risky but generate lower return. Hence, in this paper investment choices 
in the future plan are classified into two major portfolios, namely oil palm and non-oil 
palm enterprises. 
As argued by Weber and Hsee (1998), people tend to invest more in financial 
alternatives that they perceive as less risky. Thus, a smallholder is expected to plan for 
investing in oil palm if he perceives that the risk of oil palm is lower than that of non-oil 
palm enterprises. However, a risk lover may choose to invest in oil palm even if he 
perceived it as a risky business. Risk aversion and pessimistic expectation are two 
different factors that may be correlated and may influence the future plan of investment. 
Smallholder 
characteristics 
Subjective risk 
expectation 
Shocks experienced in 
oil palm and non-oil 
palm business in the past 
Investment plan:  
1. Expanding/ replanting oil palm 
2. Non-oil palm business 
3. Both oil palm and non-oil palm 
4. No investment 
General risk attitude
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Hence, this study investigates the influence of risk expectation and risk attitude on the 
portfolio choice of investment plan. 
Subjective risk expectation can be formally stated as following. 
Rhi* = β’Xh +  ’Ah + ’Sh + εhi where i =1, 2, 3  (1) 
Rhi = 1 if  Rhi* > 0, and 0 otherwise 
 
Rhi is subjective expected risk i which is assessed by a smallholder h.  Rih is a 
dichotomous variable defined as one if a smallholder h perceives that he will severely 
hit by a shock i during the next five years and zero otherwise. For Rhi is one, we also can 
say that a smallholder h is pessimistic on event i.   As a mental process containing 
thoughts, beliefs and constructs the perceived risk Rhi is expected to be influenced by 
household’s characteristics Xh,, general risk attitude Ah, and the same shock experienced 
in the past Shi  with error term or disturbance εhi. Shocks included in the model are 
classified into three categories, namely price shocks, production shocks and other 
economic shocks. The former two relate to oil palm investment including falling price, 
pest attack, and oil palm diseases outbreak while the latter is associated with non-oil 
palm investment such as livestock diseases, non-farm business collapse, and job loss.  
Shi captures the depth of experienced shock which is computed as shock frequency 
multiplied by subjective shock severity.   
Subjective risk expectation is hypothesized to influence the portfolio choice of 
investment plan among smallholders.  The portfolio choice can be formally stated as 
follows  
Ihj* = η’Xh + λ’ Rhi + ρ’Ah + µhij where i =1, 2, 3 and j=1, 2 (2) 
Ihj = 1 if Ihj* > 0, and 0 otherwise 
 
Ihj is the decision for choosing a certain portfolio in the future plan of investment. 
Hence, Ihj is a dichotomous variable defined as one if a smallholder chooses portfolio j, 
and zero otherwise. In this study, there are two major portfolios j, namely oil palm (j=1) 
and non-oil palm enterprises (j=2). Hence, there are four possibilities for each 
smallholder in planning his investment, namely investing in oil palm only, investing 
only in non-oil palm enterprises, investing in both enterprises, or not investing at all. 
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We expect that the portfolio choice can be explained by household characteristics Xh, 
subjective risk expectations Rhi, and general risk attitude Ah with error term µhij.  
Error terms of risk expectations εhi in equation 1 could be inter-correlated. Likewise, 
those can be correlated with error terms of portfolio choices µhij in equation 2, called as 
endogeneity problem. If such case occurs, using a probit model could produce biased 
results. In order to deal with such endogeneity in binary response model, a multivariate 
probit model can be employed (Arendt and Holm 2006). In addition, the multivariate 
probit model is also called to deal with the simultaneous nature of smallholders’ choices 
of investment portfolio because the model allows for coexistence of two different 
investment choices as responses to the risk perceptions. In estimating the multivariate 
probit model, the GHK (Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) smooth recursive simulator that 
draws upon the product of sequentially conditioned univariate normal distribution 
functions with joint probability is applied and Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) 
estimator is employed. 
As empirically shown by Meuwissen et al. (2001), socio-demographic household 
characteristics are included as independent variables of both risk expectation and 
investment plan. Household characteristics here include age and education of household 
head, household size, engagement in off-farm employment, and asset endowments such 
as land size for oil palm, rubber and other crops, livestock asset, equipment for natural 
resource extraction, and non-farm asset. We include oil palm age to capture the role of 
technical parameter of oil palm production on shaping perception. The depth of 
experienced shock computed from the frequency and the perceived severity of shock 
experienced by a smallholder during the past five years is also included in the risk 
expectation model.  
7.3. Study area and data collection 
The empirical base of this this study is the district of Merangin in the province of Jambi, 
Indonesia. While Indonesia is the largest oil palm producer that contributes almost a 
half of global palm oil production the province of Jambi is one of the four largest oil 
palm producing provinces in Indonesia. About 160 thousand people in this province 
were employed in this sector. Among other districts Merangin has the highest number 
of oil palm smallholders (BoA 2010).  
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A household survey was carried out from January to February 2010. We interviewed 
245 households which were randomly selected from the list of oil palm smallholders 
provided by village heads. We asked for basic household characteristics such as age, 
education, and household members. We also explored existing asset endowments 
including productive asset such as land, livestock, natural resource extraction asset, 
non-farm assets as well as non-productive assets such as house, television, motorbike, 
and electricity generator. 
A specific section was designed in our questionnaire to elicit information about shocks 
incurred during the past five years and risks perceived during the next five years by 
smallholders. We asked respondents to report the types of experienced bad event, their 
frequency, their perceived severity, and their magnitude including income loss due to 
such events. The subjective severity is assessed by the respondent by using scale from 1 
(low impact) to 4 (very high impact). In addition the possibility of the occurrence of 
such events during the next five years was also explored.  
The future plan of investment was asked in a specific module. We asked whether the 
respondents have any investment plan in the near future and in what types of business 
they were interested. In order to elicit risk attitude we asked respondents to assess their 
willingness to take a risk in general by using the scale from 1 (very risk averse) to 6 
(very risk loving). As shown by Kapteyn and Teppa (2002), simple intuitive measure of 
risk aversion can be used to explain portfolio choice.  
 
7.4. Results and discussion 
First, the dependency of smallholders on oil palm, experienced shocks in the past and 
expected shocks in the future are described in order to better understand the socio 
economic situation behind risk taking behavior of smallholders. Second, we present 
econometric model to understand how perceptions are shaped and how they influence 
investment behavior. 
7.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The characteristics of oil palm smallholders are shown in Table 7.1. Sample households 
are composed of four individuals on average. Household heads are 49 years old and 
attain education for six schooling years (elementary school). About a half of sample 
households participate in contractual arrangements with an oil palm corporation. Our 
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sample households also engage in other income generating activities such as rubber, 
other crops, livestock, natural resource extraction, off-farm employment and non-farm 
business. As shown by Table 7.1, land use seems to be dominated by oil palm, followed 
by rubber.  
Table 7.1. Characteristics of oil palm smallholders 
Characteristics Mean Standard 
deviation 
Age of household head (years) 49.0 12.7 
Education of household head (years) 5.9 3.2 
Household size 4.3 1.5 
Size of oil palm area (hectares) 2.6 1.9 
Size of rubber (years)  0.7 1.9 
Size of other crops area 0.1 0.4 
Livestock asset (IDR thousands) 2855.7 9609.0 
Natural resource extraction equipment (IDR 
thousands) 
73.4 290.3 
Non-farm asset (IDR thousands) 3397.6 20966.4 
Participation in contract scheme (1=engaged, 0 
otherwise) 
0.5 0.5 
Note    :N= 245 smallholders 
Source: Calculated from oil palm household survey 2010 data 
 
Among all income sources oil palm contributes the largest share on total net household 
income (more than a half), followed by off-farm wage employment (24 percent) and 
rubber (14 percent). Net income of oil palm on average was about IDR 25.7 million a 
year on average but the amount widely varied from -14.6 million to 533.9 million. Some 
farmers suffer from negative profit since their plantations were still in the gestation 
period that needed high cost for maintenance but was not able to produce profitable 
yield.  
We classify 50 percent of sample households with the highest net profit of oil palm as 
successful smallholders and the rest 50 percent as less successful smallholders. Table 
7.2 shows a comparison of some relevant characteristics between both groups.  
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Table 7.2. Mean of characteristics of successful and less successful oil palm 
smallholders 
Characteristics of smallholders Successful 
smallholders 
Less 
successful 
smallholders 
T stat 
Age of household head (years) 51.7 46.3 3.40*** 
Education of household head (years) 5.7 6.1 0.84 
Household size 4.3 4.3 0.19 
Oil palm size (ha) 3.5 1.6 1.92*** 
Oil palm age (years) 8.9 15.6 10.25*** 
Net profit of oil palm (IDR thousand) 44764.6 6456.6 8.38 
Source: oil palm household survey data 2010 
 
There is no significant difference in education level of household head and household 
size between the two groups. However, successful smallholders have twice larger and 
much older oil palm plot than less successful smallholders on an average. The 
plantation size and the plantation age may become one of driving factors behind the 
success of oil palm smallholders. The relation between net income of oil palm (in log 
form) and land sizes for oil palm is presented in Figure 7.2. Figure 7.2 shows that the 
net profit from oil palm is highly associated with the scale of the plantation owned. 
Hence, a smallholder may be encouraged to invest more for increasing oil palm size to 
get success. 
 
 
Figure 7.2. The relationship between net income of oil palm (in log form) and oil palm 
size (ha) 
Source: generated from oil palm household survey data 2010 
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In order to better understand investment plan made by smallholders, their past 
experience of shocks and risks expectation should be taken into consideration. In Table 
7.3 we present a comparison of shocks experience during past 5 years and risk 
expectation in the next five years between successful and less successful smallholders. 
Table 7.3. Shock experiences and risk expectation between successful and less 
successful smallholders  
 Types of shocks  Successful 
smallholder 
Less successful 
smallholders 
T stat 
Households that 
experienced a shock 
during past 5 years 
(%) 
Oil palm price shock 94 75 4.27*** 
Oil palm production 
shock  
85 69 3.12*** 
Non-oil palm business 
shock  
28 25 0.39 
Shock frequency 
during past five years 
Oil palm price shock 1.2 0.9 4.52*** 
Oil palm production 
shock 
1.9 1.7 0.71 
Non-oil palm business 
shock 
0.3 0.3 0.23 
Perceived severity of 
shocks 
Oil palm price shock 3 3 0.05 
Oil palm production 
shock 
2.8 2.5 2.63*** 
Non-oil palm business 
shock 
2.6 2.6 0.04 
Loss income (IDR 
thousands) 
Oil palm price shock 10466.7 4829.5 4.19*** 
Oil palm production 
shock 
10693.3 4522.0 3.89*** 
Non-oil palm business 
shock 
25062.1 3331.6 0.92 
Households that 
expect experiencing a 
shock in the next 5 
years (%) 
Oil palm price risk 50 51 0.19 
Oil palm production risk 90 75 3.19*** 
Non-oil palm business 
risk 
15 9 1.31 
Source: oil palm household survey data 2010 
 
The results show that successful smallholders experienced price shocks and production 
shocks (e.g. declined production during the seasonal transition, pest attack, fire) more 
widely than less successful ones. Successful smallholders also reported more frequently 
price shocks and more severe production shock. Loss income of successful smallholders 
due to oil palm price or production shocks is almost double than that of less successful 
smallholders. There is no significant difference in frequency, perceived severity and 
loss income of other economic shocks (e.g. livestock diseases or job loss) between both 
the groups.  
Both groups seem to have similar expectation regarding price risk of oil palm. About a 
half of successful and less successful smallholders have pessimistic expectation about 
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oil palm price risk during the next five years. The information regarding the prospective 
market of palm oil in one hand and the experience of suffering from price shock in 2008 
on the other hand may explain the 50:50 of price risk expectation. However, for the case 
of production risks, successful smallholders tend to be more pessimistic than less 
successful ones. Such expectation may be influenced by shocks experience in the past 
that caused higher income shortfall. Both groups are more pessimistic on production 
risks instead of price risks. Most households may realize the nature of oil palm as 
monoculture which is vulnerable to diseases outbreak. On the other hand, the 
information about prospective market of palm oil may reduce pessimism on price risks. 
Our respondents are also asked to rank five main problems experienced during past five 
years and expected in the next five years. We find that 30 percent of sample household 
placed high cost of input as the most important problem during the past five years, 
followed by the volatility of price, and scarcity of fertilizer. But, in the next five years, 
beside those problems majority of smallholders also expect the declined production by 
natural life cycle as one of the major problems since some plantations become too old.  
It is noted that oil palm has 25 years life cycle in which after the period the production 
is expected to be not economically feasible. In order to respond to such risks and ensure 
sustainability of oil palm income, a smallholder might be encouraged to establish a new 
oil palm plantation in the near future. However, if they perceive that oil palm might be 
no longer interesting they may be encouraged to invest in non-oil palm enterprises. 
Hence, expected risks in both oil palm and non-oil palm business potentially influence 
their investment plan.  
We find that 19 percent of sample households have at least one investment plan which 
is ready to be implemented in the near future. Almost 70 percent of them plan to invest 
in non-oil palm business while the rest choose to invest in oil palm.  
We present a comparison of investment plan made by successful and less successful 
smallholders in Table 7.4. There is only 6 to 7 percent of each group that plan for 
investing in oil palm. A large amount of initial investment required for plantation 
establishment may be a reason behind this small percentage. We find that there are more 
successful smallholders (24 percent) that plan for investing in non-oil palm than less 
successful smallholders (10 percent). They may have a larger accumulated saving or 
assets that can be used to build up an alternative business. 
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Table 7.4. Investment plan of successful and less successful smallholders 
Having plan for investment in Successful 
smallholders (%) 
Less successful 
smallholders (%) 
Oil palm 6  7 
Non-oil palm 24 10 
Source: oil palm household survey data 2010 
 
While the descriptive statistics highlight the dependency of smallholders on oil palm 
and the pessimism among smallholders about oil palm production in the future, the 
relationship between such perceptions and the portfolio choices of planned investment 
has not been established. 
7.4.2. Econometric model 
The determinants of subjective risk expectations and the effect of those expectations on 
investment plan are simultaneously analyzed. First, we investigate how subjective risk 
expectations are shaped. The results are presented in Table 7.5. As shown by column 6, 
the depth of oil palm price shock experienced during the past five years significantly 
influences risk expectation on price. A smallholder that experienced price shock in the 
past more severe and more frequently tends to be more pessimistic on oil palm price. 
The results show that such pessimism can be reduced by the size of rubber plot, 
livestock asset and non-farm business asset that he owns. All those assets allow one to 
have sufficient alternative incomes that may increase his confidence against that shock. 
The driving factors behind pessimism in oil palm production are shown in column 7. 
The results underline the importance of shock experience in shaping subjective risk 
expectation. Another finding is that the size and the age of oil palm plantation 
significantly increase pessimism regarding oil palm production risks while non-
productive asset reduces such pessimism. A large farmer seems to be more pessimistic 
since he may associate the potential loss with plantation scale. Likewise, a farmer with 
too old plantation is more likely to be a pessimist since he may realize the declining 
trend of production following oil palm life span. On the contrary, non-productive assets 
such as house or motor bike can be used to apply risk coping strategies, such as selling 
them or using them as collateral to get loan in case of shocks in order to smooth 
consumption, and therefore that variable may increase confidence and reduce the worry 
of suffering from production shock in the future.  
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Column 8 shows the determinants of subjective risk expectation connected with non-oil 
palm enterprises. Again, shock experience encourages a smallholder to be more 
pessimistic in alternative enterprises. Such pessimism is also positively influenced by 
livestock asset and asset for natural resource extraction. This is understandable since 
shocks in alternative enterprises in the past were dominated by livestock diseases while 
income from natural resources extraction activities inherently relies on natural 
condition.  
In all risk categories, the importance of shock experiences in the past in shaping 
subjective risk expectation is highlighted. On the other hand, general risk attitude does 
not significantly influence subjective risk expectation.  
The determinants of investment portfolio choices are further analyzed. In Table 7.5 we 
show the results of both simple probit (column 2 to 3) and multivariate probit model 
taking into account endogeneity (column 4 to 8). The results of both models seem quite 
similar in term of significant variables and their signs (the effect direction); however 
there are considerable differences in the magnitudes of estimated effects, especially for 
subjective risk expectations. As shown in column 4, the disturbances of the plan for 
investing in oil palm and the expected production risk are significantly correlated. We 
also find intrinsic correlation between expected risks of oil palm price and non-oil palm 
business. This could be an indication that smallholders expect oil palm price risks as a 
prominent covariate risk that could affect other enterprises in the oil palm community. 
Therefore, multivariate probit model is better employed since it is able to control for 
such endogeneity while simple probit leads to biased estimates. The effect of pessimism 
in non-oil palm enterprises on the decision for choosing oil palm investment tends to be 
overestimated by simple probit model while multivariate probit model corrects the 
magnitude and the significant level (see column 2 and 4). As shown by column 4 and 5, 
pessimism in non-oil palm business significantly encourage a smallholder to plan for 
investing in oil palm while pessimism in oil palm production significantly leads to a 
plan for investing in alternative enterprises. The results suggest that the portfolio choice 
is not significantly influenced by risk expectation connected with the chosen portfolio 
itself but tend to be driven by pessimism in the other one. This could be an indication 
that the chosen portfolio is planned to generate alternative income in order to mitigate 
the impact of expected risks in another business that is currently run. Hence, this finding 
improves our understanding on risk behavior and complement previous literature that 
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pointed out the tendency of individual to invest in the financial alternative perceived as 
less risky (e.g. Weber and Hsee 1998).  
In column 4 and 5 in Table 7.5, the results also show that a smallholder with low risk 
aversion tends to plan for investing in oil palm, but this is not the case for non-oil palm 
investment. As a risky business, obviously oil palm requires a higher willingness to take 
a risk. The amount of assets for natural resource extraction activities is also significantly 
associated with the plan for investing in oil palm. Some kinds of equipment, such as 
chain saw, can be used for land clearing and may be prepared for establishing oil palm 
plantation. Another finding is that a more educated household head is more likely to 
invest in non-oil palm business. This is not surprising since education may increase 
awareness and carefulness for diversifying income sources in order to mitigate the 
impact of oil palm shocks. The total amount of non-productive assets (for example 
house, motorbike, electronic devices) significantly influences a smallholder to plan for 
investing in non-oil palm business. Such assets can be used as collateral to access a 
formal credit that may be needed to make a new investment. We find that a contract 
smallholder is less likely to plan for investing in non-oil palm business. There might be 
just little incentives for him to engage in non-oil palm business since he may benefit 
from the contract and therefore, pays more attention on the current oil palm plantation 
in order to meet the required production standards.  
 
 
Chapter 7  107 
Table 7.5. Investment plan and subjective risk expectation model 
 Probit Probit Multivariate Probit  
Variables Investing in Investing in Investing in Investing in Subjective risk expectation on 
 Oil palm Non-oil palm Oil palm Non-oil palm Oil palm 
price 
Oil palm 
production 
Non-oil palm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age of household head -0.010 
 (0.015) 
-0.005 
 (0.012) 
-0.010 
 (0.015) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.011 
 (0.008) 
-0.001 
 (0.010) 
 0.000 
 (0.012) 
Education of household head  0.012 
 (0.056) 
 0.080* 
 (0.043) 
-0.005 
 (0.055) 
0.080* 
(0.043) 
-0.009 
 (0.030) 
-0.053 
 (0.038) 
 0.010 
 (0.045) 
Household size  0.071 
 (0.108) 
 0.024 
 (0.087) 
 0.078 
 (0.103) 
0.018 
(0.088) 
 0.064 
 (0.060) 
 0.041 
 (0.086) 
-0.004 
 (0.085) 
Size of oil palm area -0.038 
 (0.105) 
 0.066 
 (0.066) 
-0.015 
 (0.101) 
0.061 
(0.067) 
-0.040 
 (0.055) 
 0.165* 
 (0.085) 
 0.091 
 (0.075) 
Size of rubber area -0.276 
 (0.272) 
 0.010 
 (0.075) 
-0.300 
 (0.273) 
0.025 
(0.077) 
-0.105* 
 (0.063) 
-0.073 
 (0.056) 
 0.104 
 (0.072) 
Size of other crop area  0.135 
 (0.279) 
-0.234 
 (0.819) 
 0.044 
 (0.267) 
-0.198 
(0.997) 
-0.280 
 (0.235) 
-0.271 
 (0.192) 
-23.676 
 (1114) 
Ln livestock assets  -0.082 
 (0.056) 
 0.019 
 (0.036) 
-0.077 
 (0.056) 
0.024 
(0.037) 
-0.068*** 
 (0.024) 
-0.026 
 (0.031) 
 0.088*** 
 (0.036) 
Ln natural resource extraction 
equipment  
 0.135* 
 (0.071) 
 0.054 
 (0.061) 
 0.143** 
 (0.068) 
0.052 
(0.060) 
-0.004 
 (0.049) 
 0.013 
 (0.061) 
 0.112* 
 (0.060) 
Ln non-farm business assets  0.027 
 (0.051) 
 0.036 
 (0.035) 
 0.028 
 (0.050) 
0.040 
(0.035) 
-0.050* 
 (0.028) 
-0.010 
 (0.037) 
 0.004 
 (0.041) 
Ln non-productive asset -0.250 
 (0.200) 
 0.567*** 
 (0.196) 
-0.276 
 (0.195) 
0.584*** 
(0.200) 
-0.029 
 (0.124) 
-0.337* 
 (0.178) 
-0.090 
 (0.172) 
Engagement in wage employment  0.471 
 (0.371) 
-0.218 
 (0.260) 
 0.412 
 (0.358) 
-0.211 
(0.261) 
-0.195 
 (0.191) 
-0.289 
 (0.250) 
 0.039 
 (0.274) 
Type of smallholders  0.144 
 (0.388) 
-0.980*** 
 (0.317) 
 0.279 
 (0.386) 
-1.023*** 
(0.325) 
 0.205 
 (0.294) 
-0.463 
 (0.384) 
-0.339 
 (0.424) 
        
Note : *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001  
Source: Calculated from oil palm household survey 2010 data  
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Table 7.5. Investment plan and subjective risk expectation model (continued) 
 Probit Probit Multivariate Probit 
Variables Investing in Investing in Investing in Investing in Subjective risk prediction on 
 Oil palm Non-oil palm Oil palm Non-oil palm Oil palm 
price 
Oil palm 
production 
Non-oil palm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Expected price risk   0.093 
 (0.323) 
 0.525** 
 (0.263) 
-0.281 
 (0.476) 
0.692 
(0.457) 
   
Expected production risk -0.270 
 (0.413) 
 1.138** 
 (0.510) 
-0.988 
 (0.622) 
1.300** 
(0.597) 
   
Expected other economic risk  1.622*** 
 (0.450) 
 0.386 
 (0.365) 
 1.215* 
 (0.647) 
0.285 
(0.500) 
   
Subjective risk attitude   0.177** 
 (0.089) 
 0.083 
 (0.061) 
 0.165* 
 (0.087) 
0.081 
(0.061) 
 0.033 
 (0.045) 
-0.035 
 (0.056) 
-0.117 
 (0.072) 
Oil palm age      0.023 
 (0.026) 
 0.076*** 
 (0.027) 
 0.052 
 (0.039) 
The depth of experienced price 
shocks past 5 years 
     0.141*** 
 (0.053) 
  
The depth of experienced 
production shock past 5 years 
      0.145*** 
 (0.035) 
 
The depth of other economic 
shocks past 5 yeas 
       0.273*** 
 (0.072) 
Constant  0.400 
 (2.371) 
-9.271*** 
 (2.392) 
  1.680 
  (2.401) 
-9.634*** 
(2.451) 
 0.427 
 (1.435) 
 3.773 
 (2.015) 
-1.447 
 (2.048) 
Rho12   -0.135 
  (0.249) 
    
Rho13     0.314 
  (0.222) 
    
Rho14     0.444* 
  (0.242) 
    
Rho15     0.295 
  (0.333) 
    
Note : *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001  
Source: Calculated from oil palm household survey 2010 data  
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Table 7.5. Investment plan and subjective risk expectation model (continued) 
 Probit Probit Multivariate Probit 
Variables Investing in Investing in Investing in Investing in Subjective risk prediction on 
 Oil palm Non-oil palm Oil palm Non-oil palm Oil palm 
price 
Oil palm 
production 
Non-oil palm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rho23   -0.119 
  (0.248) 
    
Rho24   -0.146 
  (0.263) 
    
Rho25     0.0163 
  (0.234) 
    
Rho34     0.133 
  (0.143) 
    
Rho35     0.289* 
  (0.156) 
    
Rho45   -0.194 
  (0.205) 
    
Prob > chi2 0.006 0.000  0.000     
Log likelihood -42.086 -71.354 -402.287     
N 242 242 242     
 
Note : *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001  
Source: Calculated from oil palm household survey 2010 data  
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7.5. Conclusions and recommendations 
Based on the discussion above, conclusions can be drawn in addressing the two specific 
research objectives previously posted. First, subjective risk expectations are mainly 
shaped by the depth of experienced shocks in the past including shock frequency and 
perceived severity. A smallholder that experienced a bad event more frequently and 
more severe tend to be pessimistic or expect the occurrence of the same bad event in the 
near future. In addition, asset portfolios also significantly influence risk expectations. 
For example, a farmer with a larger oil palm tends to be more pessimistic on oil palm 
production. Another finding is that risk aversion does not significantly affect risk 
expectations.  
Second, the paper analyzes how subjective risk expectations determine the future plan 
of investment. The results show that a plan for investing in oil palm tends to be mainly 
driven by the low risk aversion and pessimism in non-oil palm business risks, no matter 
how risky oil palm itself is expected to be. This indicates that such investment may be 
planned by smallholders as an ex-ante risk management strategy to mitigate the impact 
of expected risks in non-oil palm business that currently run. On the other side, a plan 
for investing in non-oil palm business tends to be determined by pessimism in oil palm 
production. This could be an indication that such portfolio is also planned to generate 
alternative income in order to mitigate the impact of oil palm production shock in the 
future. 
Since empirical evidences reveal that an investment portfolio is chosen to respond to 
subjective expectation toward risks in another portfolio, the suitability of the choice 
mainly depends on the correctness of the expectation. If the expectations do not match 
the reality in the future, the smallholders will misallocate resources in investment and 
therefore they could lose opportunities in another business or suffer from unexpected 
shocks in the chosen business. While the results suggest that subjective risk expectation 
is mainly driven by the shock experience, the actual risk in the future does not always 
relate to shocks in the past. Hence, adequate and accurate information regarding 
prospects and risks of oil palm and non-oil palm enterprises are important to be 
facilitated by policy makers in order to offer appropriate investment advice for 
smallholders.  
 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 8 
SYNTHESIS 
 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the socio-economic conditions of oil palm 
smallholders in Indonesia. The study is based on two districts in the province of Jambi, 
Sumatra. The themes dealt with in this research are contract farming, poverty, risks and 
vulnerability. The cores of the thesis are three journal papers which are complemented 
by a descriptive case study. The journal papers were presented respectively in chapter 5 
to 7 to address the three specific research objectives stated in section 1 while the case 
study was presented in chapter 4. 
In chapter 4 the case of oil palm farmers is introduced in an area where indigenous 
communities have recently started oil palm plantations under contract farming scheme 
with oil palm companies. The case study illustrates the pros and cons of oil palm 
development in Indonesia and serves as good counterfactual for the more rigorous 
analysis of oil palm smallholders presented in the three subsequent chapters. Chapter 5 
analyses the impact of contract farming on the well-being of smallholders in an area 
where oil palm plantation are in an advanced phase of development. The same data set 
is used in the paper in chapter 6. Here the question is asked how vulnerable oil palm 
smallholders are, i.e. what is the risk that they would fall into poverty when they 
experience shocks? The third paper is presented in chapter 7. Here the question of risk 
and sustainability is asked, i.e. what is the role of subjective risk expectation for the 
stated investment behavior and preferences?  
This chapter presents a synthesis of the three main chapters and draws some links to the 
case study of chapter 4. Overall conclusions are drawn and recommendations relevant 
for policy and future research are submitted. 
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8.1. Key findings  
The first specific research objective was addressed in chapter 5 entitled “Is contract 
farming in the Indonesian oil palm industry pro-poor?” Chapter 5 investigates the 
effects of contract participation on the well-being of oil palm smallholders and the 
equity effect of such schemes among different groups of smallholders. The following 
can be said about the comparison between oil palm farmers who are under contract with 
oil palm companies and those who are not. On average, contract smallholders have 
almost double the household income and total land size of non-contract smallholders. 
The contract smallholders apply higher inputs and therefore produce higher yields. 
Contract participation does not generate spill-over effects to other oil palm plots owned 
and independently established by the same smallholders. Credits are limited to the 
period of plantation establishment but smallholders are bound by the contract to follow 
high standard production technologies with high levels of inputs. Hence, smallholders 
may be forced to pay more attention on their plasma plots while neglecting their non-
plasma plots. Contract participation is positively associated with age of household head, 
indigenous smallholders, oil palm land size, and particular planting periods. Overall 
contract participation has a positive income effect. However, there are other factors such 
as the land size for oil palm and rubber as well as the engagement in off-farm activities 
that also significantly affect income. While non-poor households are much gained, poor 
households fail to benefit from such contract. One of possible reasons is that loan 
conditions and management requirements may often be beyond the financial and 
technical capacity of the poor.  
The second specific objective was addressed in chapter 6 entitled “Contract farming and 
vulnerability to poverty”. Chapter 6 assesses vulnerability to poverty among oil palm 
smallholders and investigates the effects of contract farming on vulnerability to poverty. 
The following findings can be submitted. A contract smallholder tends to experience 
more frequently oil palm shocks than a non-contract smallholder. The likelihood of 
price shocks can be reduced by contract participation but this is not the case for 
production shocks. This could indicate that price premium awarded by the contract 
effectively works while technical assistance under the contract does not. The majority of 
sample households (about 40 percent) belong to the group of stochastically transient 
poor who can fall into poverty in the presence of shocks. The share of the stochastically 
transient poor group seems to be persistent across poverty thresholds. This finding 
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complements previous studies that relied on static poverty analysis and thus reported 
low poverty headcount (World Bank 2011; Susila 2004). The findings serve as a signal 
for policy makers that reduction of static poverty among oil palm smallholders is not a 
guarantee that they could not fall back into poverty.  
The third specific objective was addressed in chapter 7 entitled “Subjective risk 
expectations and future plan of investment among oil palm smallholders in Indonesia”.  
It examines whether subjective risk expectations and risk attitude can explain portfolio 
choice of planned investment among oil palm smallholders. This chapter also 
investigates the determinants of subjective risk expectations. The results suggest the 
following. Subjective risk expectation is mainly driven by how often and severe similar 
shocks were experienced by a smallholder in the past. Asset endowments are also found 
as key factors. Pessimism in oil palm production significantly increases with the size of 
oil palm plot. A smallholder who owns a larger rubber plot, livestock assets and non-
farm business assets tends to be less pessimistic in oil palm price. Negative assessment 
in non-oil palm enterprises grows with the value of livestock assets and natural resource 
extraction equipment currently owned. 
The linkages between subjective risk expectation, risk attitude and the decision making 
behavior in investment plan can be summarized as following. Decision makers who are 
pessimistic in oil palm production plan to invest in non-oil palm enterprises while those 
who expect adverse shocks in non-oil palm enterprises are more likely to plan to invest 
further in oil palm. A future plan for investing in oil palm is also mainly driven by risk 
loving attitude, no matter how risky oil palm itself perceived. This indicates that while 
smallholders may realize the risks of oil palm, they may expect higher return that 
adequately compensate for the risks in the future.  
The case study presented in chapter 4 complements our understanding on the well-being 
and livelihoods of oil palm communities especially in the early stage of oil palm 
development. In the Muaro Jambi site oil palm production was still low and therefore 
contributed only minor share on household income. Such condition was associated with 
the young oil palm plantation. Since the contact arranges that the companies take over 
management of household oil palm plots, the oil palm benefit received by households 
mainly depends on the fairness and the transparency of the company in oil palm 
production and benefit sharing. There are considerable differences in socio-economic 
conditions among smallholders in different phased plantations. When smallholders in 
114 Chapter 8 
 
the advanced phase site more frequently suffered from oil palm shocks due to the higher 
dependency on oil palm, those in the early phase suffered from little margin left by the 
company. Inequality rises with the advancement of the oil palm plantations while 
poverty incidence is higher in the early phase. 
8.2. Conclusions and policy implications 
The results of the three papers in chapter 5 to 7 complemented with a descriptive case 
study in chapter 4 allow drawing some conclusions that convey important messages for 
policy makers. The analyses in chapter 5 finds that while overall contract farming has a 
positive income effect for smallholders, poorer smallholders mostly do not benefit from 
such arrangements. Loan conditions and management requirements are often beyond 
their financial and technical capacity. Hence, if contract schemes are to be designed in a 
more pro-poor manner this first requires a thorough evaluation of existing contract 
schemes. This is the first recommendation which can be drawn from this study. It is 
further suggested that the Government of Indonesia reassess its current policy of 
smallholder participation as our results suggest that smallholders may not always get a 
fair share from oil palm development. For example, the rule that the subsidy scheme for 
fertilizer is limited to the gestation period of the plantation requires reassessment if poor 
smallholders are to be involved more widely. 
A similar recommendation can be derived from the analysis presented in chapter 5. This 
chapter suggests that contract farming schemes in the oil palm industry in Indonesia 
may not be very effective to reduce vulnerability to poverty. While poverty headcount 
among oil palm smallholders was quite low as also reported by previous studies (World 
Bank 2011; Susila et al. 2004), this chapter underlines that the majority of smallholders 
is expected to be non-poor but can fall into poverty in the presence of shocks. This 
conveys a critical message for policy makers in order to be more careful and not be 
satisfied with only the socio-economic condition of oil palm smallholders. A proactive 
approach in social protection policy targeting to prevent the stochastically transient poor 
group fall into poverty is highly recommended. For example, providing adequate health 
service and infrastructure at the village level is needed. In addition, a micro credit 
scheme and technical assistance that can stimulate the target group to generate 
alternative incomes, for example combining oil palm and cattle or running small scale 
business are also suggested in order to mitigate future risks of oil palm.  
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In order to design effective social protection policy schemes for rural areas, policy 
makers also should consider risk behavior of oil palm smallholders analyzed in 
chapter 7. This chapter investigates to what extent subjective risk expectations and risk 
attitude can explain decision making behavior of oil palm smallholders in planning an 
investment. This chapter suggests that an investment portfolio seems to be chosen to 
respond to subjective expectation toward risks in another portfolio. The role of risk 
attitude is only relevant for the case of oil palm investment but not for the case of non-
oil palm enterprises. Since risk expectations can significantly explain portfolio choice of 
investment, the suitability of the chosen portfolio mainly depends on the quality of 
subjective risk expectation, i.e. whether the expectations fit the reality in the future. 
Having poor quality of risk expectations can cause misallocation of resources leading to 
opportunity loss in another business or worse impact of unexpected shocks in the 
chosen business in the future. Hence, policy makers need to assist smallholders in 
improving the quality of their risk expectations, for example through extension service 
that provides accurate and adequate information regarding prospects and risks of oil 
palm as well as non-oil palm enterprises.  
While based on static poverty measures poverty among oil palm smallholders has 
declined once the plantations are in their productive phase, a much higher poverty 
incidence and a higher poverty depth exist in the oil palm communities under early 
phase plantation as shown in chapter 4. Households lack benefits from the contractual 
arrangements with oil palm companies. The young phase plantation have not allowed 
for a high oil palm production. There is also another concern that the contractual 
arrangements are susceptible to be exploited by the companies since they control the 
plots of smallholders and the smallholders received benefit sharing based on the 
companies’ calculation. In the early phase of oil palm development poverty is high 
while inequality is relatively low. This suggests that smallholders have similar 
conditions under poverty when oil palm contract farming has just commenced. On the 
contrary, under advanced phase of oil palm development, poverty headcount is much 
lower but inequality is much higher. This suggests that some smallholders may benefit a 
lot from the contract but some others are at loss, which is in line with the message in 
chapter 5. Considering the different problems in two different oil palm development 
phases a more situation-specific policy is required. In the early phase of oil palm 
development, the policy should be oriented to escape households from poverty while in 
the advance phase of development the policy should be more pro-active in order to 
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prevent vulnerable households falling into poverty. For example, in the former a more 
intensive labor market intervention is required in order to generate adequate alternative 
incomes during gestation period and social insurance should be provided in order to 
deal with risks. In the later, in order to mitigate the impact of oil palm shocks, 
stimulating vulnerable smallholders to have additional alternative income, for example, 
combining oil palm and cattle by providing technical assistance and credit is necessary. 
 
8.3. Recommendations for further research 
While a forward looking concept has been applied in this study in order to capture the 
dynamics of well-being, the analysis still relied on cross sectional data and strong 
assumption on the variability of household consumption. Thus, while the analysis is 
informative in the policy context, the applied methodology has not been ideal. In order 
to improve such assessment, the application of panel data is highly recommended for 
further research. 
In the next five years, the socio-economic situation of the oil palm communities in the 
study area is expected to change considerably. For example, many plantations in the 
Merangin site would be over 25 years and therefore would not be economically feasible 
while in the Muaro Jambi site most plantations would have entered mature phase which 
allows producing commercial yields. In order to capture such expected changes socio-
economic household data need to be updated in order to carry out further analyses. In 
the Merangin site, such data can be employed to analyze coping strategies adopted by 
smallholders to deal with the end of oil palm life span. In the Muaro Jambi site, such 
data can be used to examine whether the net margin for smallholders under the contract 
schemes can significantly increase and the poverty can be reduced when the oil palms 
have been mature. The dynamics of income inequality among households in the two 
sites also can be further investigated. In addition such panel data will be useful to 
evaluate the implementations of investment plans which were reported by smallholders 
in the first wave of household survey in order to analyze the dynamics of risk behaviors.  
While the socio-economic impact of oil palm contract farming has been 
comprehensively discussed in this thesis, the environmental impact of such policy has 
not been adequately addressed. The concerns over the environmental impacts of oil 
palm development including on natural habitat, biodiversity and the global climate were 
shown by some studies (e.g. Fargione et al. 2008; Nantha and Tisdell 2008; Koh and 
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Ghazaoul 2008; Koh and Wilcove 2008; Hartemink 2005). However, how smallholders 
perceive such environmental impacts and how smallholders react to their perceptions is 
still little known. It is important to examine whether the economic benefit of oil palm 
adequately compensate adverse environmental externalities for smallholders because 
they may weigh the both benefits differently. Thus, there is a chance to develop a new 
concept of vulnerability by taking into account either actual or perceived environmental 
impacts. 
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NO Questionnaire
No Entry
Household Survey Jambi, Indonesia
The Impact of Contract Farming in the Oil Palm Industry on Vulnerability to Poverty
Version 1.4
January 2010
Introductory Statement
Section
1 Survey information 9 Off farm employement
2 Household member 10 Off farm self employement
3 Shock 11 Public Transfer and other payment
4 Land and crops 12 Expenditure, saving and Insurance
5 Production and sales 13 Asset
6 Oil Palm and Other crops Input 14 Loan and Lending
7 Livestock 15 Perception of change over 5 years
8 Fishing, collecting, hunting 16 Investment and future plan
17 Oil Palm contract participation
We are German university researchers who work together with researchers from Indonesia to study the impact of contract farming in the oil palm
industry on poverty reduction. We interview 300 households in four villages in three districts in Jambi. This survey will involve contracted
smallholders and independent smallholders as our respondents. We will analyze vulnerability of oil palm smallholders to potential shock and
poverty. How the smallholders manage changes in several stages of oil palm plantation will be explored further. To achieve the objective of our
research we kindly ask for your cooperation. We want to ask some questions regarding your income, asset, expenditure, consumption, risks and
changes, and expectation. We also want to ask you about some shocks or big problems that you or your other household members have
experienced during the past years or probably will happen in the future. We can assure you that all information you give during the interview is
kept strictly confidential. 
The Data will be used for scientific purposes only and we will not give away the data to any outside person. As a sign of our great appreciation that 
you take your time for our interview please accept this small gift from us
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1 Survey Information
ID Name CODE A ID District
1 District : 12 Date of Interview 1 HH 1 Merangin
2 Wife 2 Muaro Jambi
2 Sub District ID : 13 Time Started 3 Son/ daughter 3 Sorolangun
4 son/ daughter in law
3 Village ID : 14 Time Finished 5 Brother/ sister ID Sub District
6 Brother/ sister in law 11 Tabir Selatan
4 Sub village 15 sign of respondents 7 Father/ Mother 12 Ranto Panjang
8 Father/ Mother in law 21 Kumpeh
9 Cousin 31 Air Hitam
Respondent 16 Enumerator ID 10 Grandchild
11 Nephew ID Village
5 Name 12 Son/ daughter adopted 100 Rawa Jaya
13 other relatives 200 Mentawak Baru
6 Relation to household A 98 No answer 300 Dusun Baru
400 Arang-Arang
7 Name of head household
CODE B
8 Live in this village since 1 contracted oil palm smallholders
2 independent oil palm smallholders
9 Adress 3 mix oil palm smallholders
10 Phone
11 type of smallholder B
Name Code Date
Data entered 17 18
Data revised 19 20
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2 Household Information
2,1 Household Member
Please report household members, start with head of household
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Name gender Age Religion
Code A B C E F G D H
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
. live before 
joining this 
Marrital 
status
relation to 
HH
Ethnic 
group
ID
 C
ode
Reason for 
joining
history live 
here
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Sub Section 2.1. Household Members
CODE A CODE D CODE G
1 Male 1 In the same village 1 founded HH
2 Female 2 in the same sub district 2 Married
3 In the same district 3 born in HH
4 in the same province (Jambi) 4 Found Job 
4 in other provinces in Sumatera 5 Looking for job 
CODE B 6 In West Java 6 Schooling
1 Unmaried 7 in Center Java / Yogjakarta 7 Followed the family
2 Married 8 In East Java 8 Came to be looked after (ill, Old, etc)
3 Widow 9 In Jakarta 9 Came to help HH
4 Divorced/ separated 10 in Kalimantan 10 Economic problems 
98 No answer 11 in Sulawesi 11 Personal problems
12 in Papua 90 Others
90 Others 98 No answer
CODE C 97 Don’t know
1 HH 98 No Answer
2 Wife
3 Son/ daughter
4 son/ daughter in law CODE E CODE H
5 Brother/ sister 1 Javanese 1 originally, indegenous people
6 Brother/ sister in law 2 Sundanese 2 was born in this village
7 Father/ Mother 3 Melayu 3 national transmigration program participant
8 Father/ Mother in law 4 Minangkabau 4 local transmigration program participant
9 Cousin 5 Batak 5 independent transmigration program participant
10 Grandchild 6 Tioghoa 6 new comer/ coming by my self initiative
11 Nephew 7 anak dalam
12 Son/ daughter adopted 8 bugis
13 other relatives 90 others
98 No answer
CODE F
1 Islam
2 Christian
3 Catolic
4 Budhist
5 Hindhu
6 Animist
90 others
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2,2 Occupation
1 2 12 13 14
Name/ nick name
Main second third
I I I Rp 000 Rp 000
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
15 17
Remittance sent 
from…between 1 Jan and 31 
Des 2009
occupation between 1 jan to 31 Des 09 
by time spent
how many days…did 
stay in the HH from 1 jan 
to 31 des 2009
Remittance received 
by…between 1 Jan and 
31 Des 2009
16
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Sub Section 2.2. Occupation
CODE I
1 Oil palm farmer (engaged in own plantation)
2 Rubber farmer
3 Other crops farmer
4 agent / middleman of agricultural commodities
5 Oil palm free labor
6 Rubber free labor
7 the Cooperative manager or staf
8 the cooperative employee
9 chief of farmer group
10 mill labor in nucleus company
11 oil palm estate labor in nucleus company
12 transport service provider for agricultural commodities
13 animal farmer
14 fishing
15 Non farm owned business
16 Non farm labor
17 Government employee
18 spiritual leader
19 student
20 housewife
21 Child below school age
22 Unemployed
90 Others
97 don’t know
98 No answer
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2,3 Education
1 2 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Name
J J K J K L M O J N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
what grade 
is..currently 
enrolled?
if no go to 
section 2.4
ID
 code
Has..ever 
been to 
school?
Can read 
and write?
Where did.. 
.obtain the 
highest edu 
degree? 
Why was 
absent?
if no, go to next 
rowif no, go to Q21
why 
did..leave 
school?
What 
was..the 
highest edu 
attaintment
Who is pay 
for study?
was ..ever 
absent for 
whole school 
year?
Is..currently 
enrolled in 
schools?
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Sub Section 2.3. Education
CODE J CODE L CODE N
1 Yes 1 Graduated 1 had to work with family business
2 No 2 had to work with family business 2 migrated
97 don’t know 3 migrated 3 can not afford to go to school
98 no answer 4 can not afford to go to school 4 ill
5 ill 5 don’t want to study
6 don’t want to study 6 lack of qualification
CODE K 7 lack of qualification 7 natural disaster
1 kindergarten 8 natural disaster 8 political disruption
2 SD-1 9 political disruption 9 other
3 SD-2 90 other 97 don’t know
4 SD-3 97 don’t know 98 No answer
5 SD-4 98 No answer
6 SD-5
7 SD-6
8 SLTP-1 CODE M CODE O
9 SLTP-2 1 In the same village 1 financed by household self
10 SLTP-3 2 in the same sub district 2 supported by relatives/ friends
11 SMU-1 3 In the same district 3 get scholarship
12 SMU-2 4 in the same province (Jambi)
13 SMU-3 5 in other provinces in Sumatera
14 Univ-1 6 In West Java
15 Univ-2 7 in Center Java / Yogjakarta
16 Univ-3 8 In East Java
17 Univ-4 9 In Jakarta
18 Univ-5 10 in Kalimantan
97 don’t know 11 in Sulawesi
98 no answer 12 in Papua
13 in Overseas
90 Others
97 Don’t know
98 No Answer
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2,4 Health
1 2 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
ID Name
P R weeks S M km Rp 000 T
how much 
cost must 
be paid at 
the time?
how 
healthy 
is..
Please 
specify the 
most 
severe 
illness 1 last 
year
where is 
the facility 
where..go 
to main 
treatment 
what did do?   
If  0 (no 
treatment) go 
to Q39
if no 
treatment 
was sought, 
why ?
distance 
the facility 
from 
home
for how many 
weeks..was 
unable to 
pursue his/her 
main 
occupation
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Sub Section 2.4. Health
CODE P CODE S CODE T
1 healthy 0 did nothing 1 not necessary
2 can manage 1 went to government hospital 2 no facility available
3  sick 2 went to commune health center 3 facility too expensive
98 no answer 3 went to a pharmacy 4 transport to facility too expensive
4 went to a doctor (clinic) 5 low quality of facility
CODE R 5 went to health worker 6 could not spare the time
0  none 6 went to traditional healer 90 others, specify…
1 Influenza 7 went to private hospital 97 don’t know
2 Cataract and other disorders of lens 8 self-treatment
3 Ischaemic heart diseases 90 others
4 Diarrhoea 98 no answer
5 Cikungunya
6 malaria
7 malignant neoplasm of lip, oral cavity, and pharynx
8 lung cancer
9 diphteria CODE M
10 Pertusis 1 In the same village
11 tetanus 2 in the same sub district
12 poliomyelitis 3 In the same district
13 rubela 4 in the province (Jambi)
14 mumps 5 in other provinces in Sumatera
15 encephalitis 6 In West Java
16 hepatitis 7 in Center Java / Yogjakarta
17 tuberculosis 8 In East Java
18 epilepsy 9 In Jakarta
19 pneumonia 10 abroad
20 typus 90 Others
21 Diseases of apendix 97 Don’t know
22 diabetes melitus 98 No Answer
23 hypertension
24 accident related injury
25 cancer
26 liver
27 maag
28 bone disease/ reumatic
90 others
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3 Shock
3,1 Experienced Shock
1 Please rank the most severe problem from three main shocks that effect your live over past 5 years No of Event
1
2
3
Please think any experienced shock you faced for five past years 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
N
o event
Type of event
How many 
times in 
the last five 
years, the 
event has 
occurred?
When did 
it 
happen?
How long 
times  the 
event has 
been 
occured ?
Please 
estimate 
the severity 
level of the 
event?
Please 
estimate your 
loss of income 
due to the 
event in the 
reference 
period
Estimated total 
extra 
expenditure due 
to the event in 
the reference 
period
Estimated total 
loss of asset 
due to the 
event in the 
reference 
period
A side 
from your 
HH, who 
was 
affected by 
the event? 
(effect 
scale)
Did the 
HH still 
reduce 
consumpti
on 
expenditur
e due to 
the event?
How 
many 
month 
did it 
take to 
recover 
from the 
event
times year month A Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 B C C C D month
general
1 illness 
2 accident
3 Death of head of household
4 Death of household member
5 birth or person joint to HH
6 money spend for ceremony
7 house damage
8 theft in home
natural disaster
9 earthquake
10 drought
11 flood
12 erotion
Coping strategies 
to deal with the 
event ( C )
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Section 3. 1 Experienced Shock
CODE A CODE C continue..CODE C
1 low impact 1 did nothing sold assets
2 medium economic and plant activities 31 sold oil palm plantation
3 high 2 reduced input quantity 32 sold other lands
4 very high impact 3 purchase the lower quality of input 33 sold livelistock
97 don’t know 4 didn’t bought any input at the moment 34 sold house
98 no answer 5 decreased paid labor 35 sold motorcycle
6 didn’t use paid labor any more 36 sold other asset
7 diversify agricultural portfolio
8 substitute/ change crop with  new ones 37 additional effort to take FFB  
9 prepare to replant 38 take far way to take water
CODE B 10 took up additional occupation
1 no other HH 11 veterinery treatment 90 Others
2 some other HH 12 using natural/ biologist enemy
3 most HH in the village 13 using manual/ fog method for pest
4 most HH in the sub district 14 using chemical material as pestisides CODE D
5 most HH in the province 15 make or drill a well 1 yes
6 most HH in Sumatera 16 make organic traditional fertilizer 2 No
7 most HH in Indonesia 17 use anorganic fertilizer (urea, NPK, etc)
98 no answer 18 collective action to improve infrastructure
Finance
19 take a loan
20 credit reschedule
21 using my saving
Security
22 pay security officer
23 take part in collectiveaction to look around in the night
24 invest security devices
Health
25 sport
26 take a rest and decreasing work hours
27 therapy and routine treatment
Demographics
28 took children out of school
29 sent children to relatives/ friends
30 adult migrated to look for job
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
No Type of event
How many 
times in 
the last five 
years, the 
event has 
occurred?
When did 
it 
happen?
How long 
times  the 
event has 
been 
occured ?
Please 
estimate 
the severity 
level of the 
event?
Please 
estimate your 
loss of income 
due to the 
event in the 
reference 
period
Estimated total 
extra 
expenditure due 
to the event in 
the reference 
period
Estimated total 
loss of asset 
due to the 
event in the 
reference 
period
A side 
from your 
HH, who 
was 
affected by 
the event? 
(effect 
scale)
Did the 
HH still 
reduce 
consumpti
on 
expenditur
e due to 
the event?
How 
many 
month 
did it 
take to 
recover 
from the 
event
times year month A Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 B C C C D month
Oil palm related shock
13 the fall of  FFB price
14 strong pest attack
15 the scarcity of fertilizer
16 the lack of water supply 
17 fire in oil palm
18 the damage of infrastructure due to 
unusual heavy rain
19 violance due to social/ land conflict
20 fruit theft
21 the diminishing of productivity
other economic shocks
22 job loss in agriculture
23 job loss in non agriculture
24 deases of livestock
25 collapse of business
26 strong increase of interest loan
90 Others
Coping strategies 
to deal with the 
event ( C )
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Section 3. 1 Experienced Shock
CODE A CODE C continue..CODE C
1 low impact 1 did nothing sold assets
2 medium economic and plant activities 31 sold oil palm plantation
3 high 2 reduced input quantity 32 sold other lands
4 very high impact 3 purchase the lower quality of input 33 sold livelistock
97 don’t know 4 didn’t bought any input at the moment 34 sold house
98 no answer 5 decreased paid labor 35 sold motorcycle
6 didn’t use paid labor any more 36 sold other asset
7 diversify agricultural portfolio
8 substitute/ change crop with  new ones 37 additional effort to take FFB  
9 prepare to replant 38 take far way to take water
CODE B 10 took up additional occupation
1 no other HH 11 veterinery treatment 90 Others
2 some other HH 12 using natural/ biologist enemy
3 most HH in the village 13 using manual/ fog method for pest
4 most HH in the sub district 14 using chemical material as pestisides CODE D
5 most HH in the province 15 make or drill a well 1 yes
6 most HH in Sumatera 16 make organic traditional fertilizer 2 No
7 most HH in Indonesia 17 use anorganic fertilizer (urea, NPK, etc)
98 no answer 18 collective action to improve infrastructure
Finance
19 take a loan
20 credit reschedule
21 using my saving
Security
22 pay security officer
23 take part in collectiveaction to look around in the night
24 invest security devices
Health
25 sport
26 take a rest and decreasing work hours
27 therapy and routine treatment
Demographics
28 took children out of school
29 sent children to relatives/ friends
30 adult migrated to look for job
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3,2 Potential Risk
2 3 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
N
o E
vent
Type of event
Do you 
think 
that…will 
happen in 
the next 5 
years?
Do you 
think 
that…will 
happen 
between 
1 Jan and 
31 Des 
2010
How often, 
do you 
think…will 
occur 
between 1 
Jan and 31 
Des 2010 ?
if ..occurs 
in the next 
12 month, 
estimate 
impact on 
your 
income
if ..occurs in 
the next 12 
month, 
estimate 
impact on your 
asset
Do you do 
anything to 
prevent...from 
happening or 
mitigate its 
impact ? 
What do you 
do to prevent it 
or mitigates its 
impact ? The 
main strategy 
(do not ask if 
Q21 no)
D D E A A D F Rp 000
general
1 illness 
2 accident
3 Death of head of household
4 Death of household member
5 birth or person joint to HH
6 money spend for ceremony
7 house damage or renovation
8 theft in home
natural disaster
9 earthquake
10 drought
11 flood
12 erotion
Oil palm related shock
13 the fall of  FFB price
14 strong pest attack
15 the scarcity of fertilizer
16 the lack of water supply 
17 fire in oil palm
18 the damage of infrastructure due to 
unusual heavy rain
19 violance due to social/ land conflict
Concerning…approximat
ely how much does it 
cost you  per year to 
prevent/ mitigate? (incl 
for gone income)  (do 
not ask if Q21 no)
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Sub Section 3.2. Potential Risk
CODE F CODE D
1 Nothing 1 yes
Saving and Investment 2 No
2 Saving in the cooperative 97 don’t know
3 Saving account in the commercial bank 98 no answer
4 Saving account in the microfinance institution (BPR) CODE E
5 Saving in gold 1 almost none
6 membership in the rotating saving 2 rare
Income source 3 moderately
7 switch to more secure income source 4 often
8 Crop or livestock diversification
9 income source diversification
Collective action CODE A
10 collective action for improving infrastucture 1 low impact
11 managing common property of natural resource 2 medium
12 take part in village security system 3 high
13 demonstration/ insist 4 very high impact
agricultural treatment 98 no answer
14 veterinery treatment
15 using natural/ biologist enemy
16 using manual/ fog method for pest
17 using chemical material as pestisides
18 make or drill well
19 make organic traditional fertilizer
20 using appropriate anorganic fertilizer composition 
Health
21 sport
22 take a rest and decreasing work hours
23 therapy and routine treatment
Security
24 pay security fee
25 invest security devices
90 others
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2 3 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
No Type of event
Do you 
think 
that…will 
happen in 
the next 5 
years?
Do you 
think 
that…will 
happen 
between 
1 Jan and 
31 Des 
2010
How often, 
do you 
think…will 
occur 
between 1 
Jan and 31 
Des 2010 ?
if ..occurs 
in the next 
12 month, 
estimate 
impact on 
your 
income
if ..occurs in 
the next 12 
month, 
estimate 
impact on your 
asset
Do you do 
anything to 
prevent...from 
happening or 
mitigate its 
impact ? 
What do you 
do to prevent it 
or mitigates its 
impact ? The 
main strategy 
(do not ask if 
Q32 no)
A A D E Rp 000
20 fruit theft
21 the diminishing of productivity
other economic shocks
22 job loss in agriculture
23 job loss in non agriculture
24 deases of livestock
25 collapse of business
26 strong increase of interest loan
90 others,….
Note of Interviewer
Concerning…approximat
ely how much does it 
cost you  per year to 
prevent/ mitigate? (incl 
for gone income)  (do 
not ask if Q32 no)
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Sub Section 3.2. Potential Risk
CODE F CODE D
1 Nothing 1 yes
Saving and Investment 2 No
2 Saving in the cooperative 97 don’t know
3 Saving account in the commercial bank 98 no answer
4 Saving account in the microfinance institution (BPR) CODE E
5 Saving in gold 1 almost none
6 membership in the rotating saving 2 rare
Income source 3 moderately
7 switch to more secure income source 4 often
8 Crop or livestock diversification
9 income source diversification
Collective action CODE A
10 collective action for improving infrastucture 1 low impact
11 managing common property of natural resource 2 medium
12 take part in village security system 3 high
13 demonstration/ insist 4 very high impact
agricultural treatment 98 no answer
14 veterinery treatment
15 using natural/ biologist enemy
16 using manual/ fog method for pest
17 using chemical material as pestisides
18 make or drill well
19 make organic traditional fertilizer
20 using appropriate anorganic fertilizer composition 
Health
21 sport
22 take a rest and decreasing work hours
23 therapy and routine treatment
Security
24 pay security fee
25 invest security devices
90 others
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4 Land
4,1 Land
Please report the household's land and the area used for agriculture since 1 Jan 2009 separately for each parcel. Please start with the homeste
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Land use
(Ha)
A B C D E year Rp million Rp 000 F in Km Rp 000 in Km in Km
1 homestead 1
when did 
you obtain 
the land?
Transport 
cost from 
home per 
trip
Tenure 
statusParcel N
o
Distance 
from the 
nucleus mill 
(only ask if 
Q3, A=2)
Land 
area
what is the 
current value 
if you sell the 
land now?
Distance from 
the nearest 
other mill (only 
ask if Q3, A=2)
Rental rate 
per year if 
rented out 
or rented in 
type of 
land 
docume
how was 
the land 
obtained?
what is 
land use 
status 
before?
land 
infrastructur
e Distance 
from 
home
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Sub Section 4.1. Land
CODE A CODE C
1 Homestead 1 Ownership certificate (SHM)
2 Oil palm plantation 2 Right to use construction certificate (HGB)
3 Other tree crops 3 Right to use for enterprising certificate (HGU)
4 food crops farm 4 Act of sell - buy
5 Animal farm 5 no document
6 Aquaculture 90 Others
7 Forest
8 Non agriculture business
9 Vacant land
10 Rented out CODE D CODE F
90 Others 1 primery forest 1 In the same village
2 secondary forest 2 in the same sub district
3 rubber plantation 3 In the same district
CODE B 4 oil palm plantation 4 in the same province (Jambi)
For row 1 5 other cultivated crops 4 in other provinces in Sumatera
1 house and homestead land owned 6 open land 6 In West Java
2 house and homestead rented 7 swamp 7 in Center Java / Yogjakarta
For next rows 8 peat land 8 In East Java
3 Contracted land 90 Others,… 9 In Jakarta
4 Independent owned land 10 in Kalimantan
5 Rented CODE E 11 in Sulawesi
6 Mortgagor 1 adopt contract scheme 12 in Papua
7 Mortgage 2 bought 90 Others
8 Rented from relative, no rent paid 3 inherited 97 Don’t know
9 Rented from non relarive, no rent paid 4 government allocated 98 No Answer
10 Sale redeem 5 obtained as present
11 Sale redeemer 6 collateral seized
12 customary land 7 land claimed
8 trade with another land
90 Others
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4,2 Crops
1 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
N
o K
a vlin g
N
o planting
harvest 
period
Total 
production 
1 Jan and 
31 Des 09
Crops varietas
Area 
planted
planting 
planted 
since
if Q21 =1, 
how much 
does initial 
investment?
yielding 
starting 
from..
who is 
develop or 
plant it?
Usage of production between Jan and Des 09Unit
A B ha year C Rp 000 year D E
1 1
N
o planting
varietas
seeds 
(reserved)
Consump-
tion
sales
animal 
feed 
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Sub Section 4.2. Crops
Code A Kode D
1 Oil palm 1 per year
2 rubber 2 per smester
3 cocoa 3 per quarter
4 coconut 4 per two months
5 sugar cane 5 per month
6 durian 6 three times a month
7 banana 7 twice a month
8 duku 8 per week
9 paddy 9 per day
10 corn 90 Others
11 vegetable
90 others
Code B Code E
For A=1 1 tonnes
1 Dura 2 kilogram
2 Psifera 3 kuintal (100 kilogram)
3 Tenera 4 bundle
97 don’t know
Code C
1 my self
2 by nucleus with contractual arrangement
Appendix: Household Questionnaire 151
5 Oil Palm Production and Sales
Please tell your production and sales between 1 Jan and 31 Des 2009?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Crops
No of 
sale
To whom do 
you usually sell 
your FFB? 
Why do you 
sell to..
What is type 
of payment?
Unit of sale
A B C D The highest Average the lowest E amount Rp 000
12 Do you sell oil palm fruit through the cooperative? F
if no, go to Q 20
taken price of oil palm fruit between 
1 Jan and 31 Des 2009 (Rp / kg)
Total sales between 1 Jan 
and 31 Des 2009
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Section 5. Production and Sales
CODE A CODE D
1 Oil palm 1 monthly
2 rubber 2 twice per month
3 cocoa 3 weekly
4 coconut 4 at the time
5 sugar cane 5 pay in advance
6 durian
7 banana
8 duku CODE E
9 paddy 1 kilogram
10 corn 2 butir
11 vegetable 3 bundle
12 rambutan 90 Others
90 others
CODE B
1 the nucleus CODE F
2 other mills 1 Yes
3 agents or middleman 2 No
CODE C
1 to seek the highest price
2 to meet the contractual arragement
3 to look for buyer who accept appropriate standard product
4 to get faster payment
5  the easiest way to sell my FFB
90 others
97 don’t know
98 No answer
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6 Oil Palm and other crops input
Please, tell your expenditure detail in agriculture between 1 jan and 31 Des 2009
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Type of crops
Agricultural Input B B B B
total area unit price/ unit total cost total cost total cost total cost total cost
(ha) quantity A Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000
2 Land preparation
3 Seedling 
4 Fertilizer
5 Pestisides
6 Others
7 Total input
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
No Hired Labor No of labor duration  unit ( C )
wage/ unit (Rp 
000)
times (1 jan 
to 31 Des 
2009)
total cost Rp 
000
total cost  (Rp 
000)
total cost  (Rp 
000)
total cost  (Rp 
000)
total cost  (Rp 
000)
7 Land preparation
8 Planting
9 maintenance
10 harvest
11 total labor
times (1 jan 
to 31 des 
2009)
Oil Palm plantation
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Section 6. Input of Oil Palm and Other Crops
CODE A CODE C
1 package 1 hour
2 kg 2 day
3 gram 3 week
4 liter 4 ton
5 seeds 5 kilogram
CODE B
1 Oil palm
2 rubber
3 cocoa
4 coconut
5 sugar cane
6 durian
7 banana
8 duku
9 paddy/ rice
10 corn
11 vegetable
90 others
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7 Livestock and Aquaculture
7,1 Stock
1 Did you keep any the stocks listed below between 1 Jan and 31 Des 2009? 1 Yes
2 No go to section 7.2
Please report your livestock since 1 Jan 2009
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
cash expenditure between 1 Jan - 31 Des 09)
Unit value unit unit value unit value unit value unit value unit value
A Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000
Stock at the 
beginning of the 
period (1 Jan 2009)
stock at the end 
of the period
for 
restocking
Animal 
species/ 
production 
activity
purchased or 
received in kind
addition
birth sale
Disposal
looses (death, 
thiefed) hired labor
home 
consumption othersveterinery 
threatment
feed
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Sub Section 7.1.  Stock
CODE A
1 dairy cattle
2 beef cattle
3 goat
4 chicken
5 duck
6 fish
7 shrimp
8 pig
90 others
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7,2 Live stock product
21 Did you produce livestock product between 1 Jan and 31 Des 2009? 1 Yes
2 No go to next section
23 24 25 27 31
Livestock product total production
amount unit
A B Rp 000 Rp 000 Ro 000 Rp 000
22 26
value
home consumption sale
value (IDR 000)unit
28 29 30
cash cost of input
amount packaging and 
storage
specification of 
other inputs other cash cost
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Sub Section 7.2. Livestock Products
CODE A
1 milk
2 yogurt
3 chicken egg
4 duck egg
5 honey
6 silk
CODE B
1 liter
2 pieces
3 kg
4 gram
90 lainnya
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8 Fishing, Collecting, hunting, Logging
1 1 Yes
2 No if no go to next session
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
A B C in Rp (000) From To  (days/ session) in Rp (000) in rp (000) in Rp (000) D E
1
2 15 16 17 18
Total yield Consummed
Other variable 
cost this year 
(2009)
payment for 
access in cash 
or kind/ year/ 
activity 
N
o ID
SoldN
o ID
type of activity Output 
unit
Price/ 
output unit 
(Rp/ unit)
Is your household involved in fishing, collecting, 
hunting, or logging activities between 1 Jan and 31 
How often do 
you conduct the 
activities during 
the session?
Type of produce 
extracted
what is the normal 
season for the 
activity from 1 jan 
to 31 Des 2009?
Where do 
you conduct 
any these 
activities?
who control 
access to this 
resource?
fuel cost which is 
used for these 
activities in a year
Hired labor in 
cash this year 
(2009)
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Section 8. Fishing, Collecting, Hunting, and Logging
CODE A CODE D CODE E
1 fishing 1 cat fish 1 Ton
2 collecting 2 river fish 2 kg
3 hunting 3 marine fish 3 m3
4 logging 4 shrimp 4 bundle
98 no answer 5 crab 5 gram
6 cuttlefish 6 piece
7 mollusk 7 m
8 mushroom 90 others, specify
CODE B 9 fire wood
1 lake 10 log
2 dam 11 deer
3 pond 12 wild pig
4 river 13 rabbit
5 forest 14 bird
6 canal 15 honey
7 vacant land 16 medicine plant
8 ocean 17 animal eggs
9 swamp 18 fruits
90 others 19 snake
98 no answer 20 lizard
21 insects
CODE C 22 bamboo
1 head of village 23 vegetable
2 adat or informal leader 90 others,…
3 private person 98 tidak menjawab
4 private corporation
5 government
6 community
7 no body
97 didn’t know
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9 Off Farm Emloyement
In this section and in the following section we would like to talk about all off-farm employment 
By off-farm employment we refer to all activities not related to agricultural production on your own farm.
we ask you about the wage-employed activities, for example: agricultural worker on other farms, factory worker, service worker ..).
1 Has any one of HH members worked as a wage labor between 1 jan to 31 Dec 2009? A if no, go to next section
2 How many members of your HH have worked as a wage labor beween 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2009?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
B year C D days weeks Rp 000 in KM in hour E I
1
estimate cost of 
one way trip 
how far is the place 
of work from the 
home?
At which 
company…is 
employed?
what is your 
type of 
contract?
How secure 
this job?
how many days in 
a week comuting 
from home village 
to work place ?
how many weeks in a 
year go to workplace from 
home?
H
H
 ID
 N
O
type of 
occupation
where is 
...working?
Since when 
..is working in 
this job?
Appendix: Household Questionnaire 162
Section 9. Off Farm Employement
CODE A CODE B CODE C CODE E
1 Yes Agriculture 1 the nucleus company 1 unlimited (written contract)
2 No 1 oil palm estate labor 2 other company 2 unlimited (verbal agreement)
2 rubber estate labor 3 individual smallholder 3 limited (written contract)
3 fisher 4 government 4 limited (verbal agreement)
Industry worker 5 cooperative 90 others
4 oil palm mills 98 no answer
5 wood product
6 rubber product
7 miner
8 food processing
services
9 construction worker CODE D CODE I
10 barber 1 In the same village 1 almost not secured
11 tailor 2 in the same sub district 2 less secure
12 car washer 3 In the same district 3 secure
13 servant 4 in the same province (Jambi) 4 very secure
14 driver 5 in other provinces in Sumatera
15 cleaner 6 In West Java
16 vendor/ salesman 7 in Center Java / Yogjakarta
17 carpenter 8 In East Java
18 mechanician 9 In Jakarta
19 electrician 10 in Kalimantan
20 shoemaker 11 in Sulawesi
21 waiter 12 in Papua
22 cooker 13 in Overseas
23 plumber 90 Others
Public sector 97 Don’t know
24 nurse 98 No Answer
25 doctor
26 teacher
27 policeman
28 soldier
29 government employee
90 others……….
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
between 1 Jan and 31 Dec 09
others
time unit
F Rp (000) G G Rp (000) H hour
How much 
was the 
agency fee?
which is the most important 
requirement
if you get 
irregular bonus, 
pls estimate it 
per year (Rp 
000)
cash income average 
number of 
days worked 
per month
average 
number of 
months 
worked in 
this year
how did you 
know about 
the job?
average number of 
hours worked per 
day
H
H
 ID
 N
O most 
important
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Section 9. Off Farm Employement
CODE F CODE H
1 from user or employer 1 hour
2 media (newspaper, radio, etc) 2 days
3 family or friends 3 month
4 private job agency 4 lump sum payment
5 public job agency 90 others
90 others
98 no answer
CODE G
1 job experience
2 gender
3 age
4 family and friends
5 primery school
6 junior high school
7 senior high school
8 university degree
9 technical/ computer skill
10 language skill
11 vocational skill
12 place of resident
13 good health
14 cooperative membership
90 others
98 no answer
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10 Off farm self employement (existing investment)
Off farm self employement include: (1) work for yourself without employee or (2) has own business and involve employees (family or non family members)
1 Has any one of HH members worked as self employement between 1 jan to 31 Des 2009? A if no, go to next section
2 How many members of your HH have  worked as self empolyement labor beween 1 Jan to 31 Des 2009?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18ID
 H
H
 (head of busine
N
o of business
amount of 
initial 
investment
monthly 
pay roll
no of 
cust
omer
main 
type 
cust
ome
r
sales per 
month
does 
your 
HH 
consum
e or 
use 
t f
Average 
monthly 
value self 
consumm
ed
monthly 
cost for 
input
monthly 
transport 
or other 
operation
al cost
No of 
month 
enganged 
in this 
business
depresiation 
per year
B Rp 000 family
non 
family Rp 000 B Rp 000 C Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000 Rp 000
1
2
number of 
employeme
nt
Type of 
business
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Section 10. Off Fam Self Employement
CODE A CODE C
1 Yes 1 person or household
2 No 2 trader or agent
3 manufacture or industry
CODE B 90 others
Production
1 Oil Palm mill
2 Rice mill
3 Food proccessing
4 souvenir
5 furniture 
agricultural services
6 transportation for agricultural commodities
7 Middleman/ agent of agricultural commodities
8 Agricultural input provider
trade and service
9 car rent
10 public transportation
11 car dealer show room
12 car/ motorcycle workshop
13 restaurant
14 Food stall
15 hotel/ guset house
16 Hair salon/ barber
17 tailor
18 car washing
19 retailer
20 construction material retail
21 civil contractor
22 fuel shop
23 nternet shop
24 general trading
25 doctor / nurse
90 Others
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11 Public transfer and other payment
Which public transfer and other payment did HH receive in 2009?
1 2 3 4
No Type of program Type of payment
A B (Rp 000)
Total value between 1 Jan 
and 31 Des 2009
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Section 11. Public Transfer and Other Payment
CODE A
Social assistance
1 Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT)
2 social relief for natural disaster
3 poverty alleviation project
4 allowance for war veterans and martyrs
Social security
5 allowance for transmigrant 
6 retirement pensions
7 sickness benefit
8 occupational accident
9 survivor benfit
10 scholarship
11 social allowance for children
12 gas fuel  subsidy
13 Food security program
14 other government programs
CODE B
1 in cash
2 in kind
3 in cash and in kind
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12 Asset
1 2 3 4 5 6 Section 12. Asset
No Asset
CODE A
(unit) Rp (000) years Rp (000) A 1 mostly for business use
1 house 2 mostly for private use
2 truck 3 business and private use
3 pick up 90 others, specify
4 car 98 no answer
5 motorbike
6 bike
7 diesel machine
8 tractor
9 water tank
10 water pump
11 pipe
12 other farm instruments
13 palm oil mill
14 rice mill
15 fishing net
16 floating thrawl
17 fishing trap
18 boat
19 manual saw
20 chain saw
21 TV
22 DVD
23 refrigerator
24 tape and radio
25 mobile phone
26 regular phone
27 water heater
28 gas stove
29 washing machine
30 personal computer
31 notebook computer
32 electric fun
33 iron
34 water dispenser
35 electric rice cooker
36 sound system
37 furniture
38 sofa set
39 jewellery
40 mattress
41 bed
42 vacuum cleaner
43 picture and other art things
44 Others
Total
Code B
7 Code B 1 much better off
2 better off
8 Code B 3 same
4 worse off
9 Rp (000) 5 much worse offWhat do you consider as an absolute minimum net 
income per month for a household such as yours?
what is the 
use of 
asset 
how many 
items does 
the HH 
own?
how well-off do you consider your HH in comparation to 
other residents in the village ?
how well off do you consider your HH in comparation to 
other residents in this country?
What was the value 
of the most recently 
obtained item at the 
time when you got it?
how old is 
the most 
recently 
obtained 
item?
how much would
you get if you 
sold all items 
todays?
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13 Expenditure and Saving
13 1 Expenditure
How much did you spend for following items monthly between 1 Jan and 31 Des 2009
1 2
No Items
1 Rice
2 Vegetable
3 fruit
4 Cooking oil
5 fish
6 beef
7 chicken
8 eggs
9 cigarretes
10 alcohol
11 processed food
12 salt and sugar
13 beverage (tea, coffee, milk)
13 other
Total food
14 electricity
15 water supply
16 liquid gas
17 kerosine
18 cloths, shoes
19 detergen/ washing powder
20 personal care supplies
21 rental fee
22 servant wage
23
Total non food
21 telecommunication credit
22 fuel for car and motorcycle
23 public transportation
24 maintenance for car and motorbike
25 insurance and tax for car and motorbike
26 other transportation
Total transport and communication
27 tuition fee
28 books fee
29 rental fee (dormitory etc)
30 students dress/ uniform
31 pocket money and lunch
32 school bus
33 other education
Total education
education
average amount per 
month (Rp 000 )
Food
N
on food
transport and com
m
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34 Medicine
35 Doctor fee
36 Other health
37
Total health
38 celebration
39 donation
40 recreation/ entertaintment
41 lottery
42 taxes
others
total social
13 2 Saving
3 Do you have any saving? Code A
If No, go to Q14
4 what is the form of your saving Code B
5 Code C
6 Code D
7 Code A
if No, directly go to Q11
8 At what institution do you have saving accounts? Code E
9 Where do you hold this saving ? Code F
10 how many account do your HH members have?
11 what is the current value of all these saving? Rp 000
12 how much totally  could be saved between 1 jan to 31 des 2009?
13 how much totally your withdrawl between 1 jan and Des 2009?
health
social
what for do you expect to use savings in the future ?
what are two most important sources of saving in 
2009?
Do you or your HH have any account in bank or other 
financial institution?
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Sub Section 13.2.  Saving
CODE A CODE E
1 Yes 1 the cooperative
2 No 2 BRI
3 BNI or other comercial bank
CODE B 4 BPR
1 cash money 5 Agent or middleman 
2 kind of account 6 money lender
3 gold or jewelry 7 relative in the village
4 livestock 8 relative outside village 
5 land 9 relative outside district
90 others 10 friends in the village
98 no answer 11 friends outside village
12 friends outside district
13 business partner
CODE C 14 rotating fund group
1 profit from oil palm 15 poverty reduction project
2 profit from rubber 16 student loan fund
3 profit from other crops 17 insurance company
4 profit from livestock 90 Others
5 profit from collecting, hunting, fishing
6 profit from other business
7 salary/ wages
8 money transfers from relatives
9 money transfers from families
10 public transfers CODE F
11 selling land 1 In the same village
12 selling other assets 2 in the same sub district
13 inheritence 3 In the same district
90 others, specify 4 in the same province (Jambi)
97 don’t know 5 in other provinces in Sumatera
98 no answer 6 In West Java
7 in Center Java / Yogjakarta
8 In East Java
Code D 9 In Jakarta
1 save for old age 10 in Kalimantan
2 leave bequest for children 11 in Sulawesi
3 save for replanting oil palm 12 in Papua
4 save for purchasing land/ oil palm plantation 13 in Overseas
5 buy input of oil palm 90 Others
5 save for other business investment 97 Don’t know
6 buy car or motorcycle 98 No Answer
7 buy mobil phone
8 buy electronic equipment
9 use for medical threatment
10 use for ceremony
11 study
12 live in case of emergency
13 do hajj, go to mecca
90 others
97 don’t know
98 No answer
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13 3 Insurance
14 Do you or your HH members take any insurance program? Code A if no Go to Q24
No Insurance program 1 2 3
15 Type of insurance Code H
16 who offer the insurance? Code I
17 Where did you get the insurance? Code J
18 Did you pay for the insurance? If no, go to Q22 Code A
19 What premium have you paid totally ? (Rp 000)
20 What premium do you pay in 2009? (Rp 000)
21 Amount compensation payment received during 2009 (Rp 000)
22 Would you keep and continue the insurance program? (A)
23 If no, why? (Code G)
24 If your HH members don’t have any insurance, why? Code G
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Sub Section 13.3. Insurance
CODE H CODE F
1 replanting insurance 1 In the same village
2 crops/ agriculture insurance 2 in the same sub district
3 health insurance 3 In the same district
4 life insurance 4 in the same province (Jambi)
5 education 5 in other provinces in Sumatera
6 occupation 6 In West Java
7 livestock 7 in Center Java / Yogjakarta
8 property 8 In East Java
9 pension fund 9 In Jakarta
10 in Kalimantan
90 others 11 in Sulawesi
98 no answer 12 in Papua
13 in Overseas
CODE I 90 Others
1 Bumipetera 97 Don’t know
2 Manulife 98 No Answer
3 Beringin life
90 lainnya
CODE J CODE A
1 There is no insurance offered here 1 Yes
2 I don’t need insurance 2 No
3 poor trust due to bad experience
4 too expensive
5 there is no adequate insurance for me
90 others
97 don’t know
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14 Loan and Lending
14,1 Loan
1 Did you ever borrow cash or goods (rice, fertilizer etc) or buy something by installment? A if no, go to Lending
2 Do you have any loans that are still owed or that have been completely repaid from 1 Jan to 31 Des 2009? A if no, go to Lending
Please record all loans that are still owed or loans that have been completely repaid in the period between 1 Jan and 31 Des 200
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
repayment as initially agreed 
Type of loan interest rate
Value (Rp 000) per month
B C D E month year on F B G
1
2
3
4
5
6
what was 
the type 
of shock?
What is the 
duration of loan?
did you 
borrow due 
to a shock? 
(A)
when did you 
receive the 
loan? repayment 
schedule
To whom did 
you borrow?
what for actually 
did the HH 
borrow money? type of 
payment
Loan frequency 
per year
What is the amount of loan 
that the HH borrowed?
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Sub Section 14.1. Loan
CODE A CODE D CODE E
1 Yes 1 Develop new oil palm (with contract scheme) general
2 No 2 Develop or buy new oil palm (without contract scheme) 1 illness 
3 buy oil palm input 2 accident
4 Other agricultural investment 3 Death of head of household
CODE B 5 Non agricultural business investment 4 Death of household member
1 credit 6 Medical treatment 5 birth or person joint to HH
2 cash 7 study 6 money spend for ceremony
3 agricultural input 8 ceremony 7 house damage
4 agricultural product 9 pay back other debt 8 theft in home
5 food 10 house renovation natural disaster and climatic change
6 jewellery/ gold 11 buy house or land 9 earthquake
90 others….. 12 relend to relatives or friends 10 drought
13 buy car or motorbike 11 flood
CODE C 14 buy electronic instrument 12 erotion
1 the cooperative 15 buy mobile phone Oil palm related shock
2 BRI 16 buy other durable goods 13 the fall of  FFB price
3 BNI or other comercial 90 others 14 strong pest attack
4 BPR or baitul maal 15 the scarcity of fertilizer
5 agent or middleman 16 the lack of water supply 
6 money lender 17 fire in oil palm
7 relative in the village CODE F 18 the damage of infrastructure due to heavy rain
8 relative outside village 1 year 19 violance due to social/ land conflict
9 relative outside district 2 month 20 fruit theft
10 friends in the village 3 week 21 the diminishing of productivity
11 friends outside village 4 day other economic shocks
12 friends outside district 22 job loss in agriculture
13 business partner/ nucleus 23 job loss in non agriculture
14 rotating fund group CODE G 24 deases of livestock
15 farmer group 1 pay fixed amount periodically 25 collapse of other business
16 car/ motorbike dealer 2 pay varied but specific amount at scheduled t 26 strong increase of interest loan
90 Others 3 pay whenever I have enough money 90 Others
98 no answer
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18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Total amount main second third
(Rp 000)
H I J K K K L
1
where is the 
lender 
located
other requirement
Loan
Actual repayment 
stream  from 1 to 12/09
no of 
payment (Rp 000)
what is the 
collateral for this 
loan?
what is the 
consequenc
e if Q22=2 
or 3
estimate value of 
the collateral
total 
repayment 
as of end 
12/09
remaining 
debt as of 
end 2009
repayment 
status
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CODE H CODE K
1 on schedule 1 credit group membership
2 default 2 must sell the product to the nucleus
3 paid late 3 transmigration program participant
4 local people
5 custom/ adat community
CODE I 6 saving account at the bank
1 none 7 membership in social or political group
2 not able to borrow from the lender 8 single guarantor
3 not able to borrow from this lender or others 9 multi guarantor
4 collateral was seized 10 currently enrolled in school or university
5 had to pay higher interest 11 salary/ wage
90 others,… 90 other, specify
98 No answer 98 No answer
CODE J CODE L
1 Land 1 In the same village
2 oil palm plantation 2 in the same sub district
3 other crops plantation 3 In the same district
4 house 4 in the same province (Jambi)
5 saving 5 in other provinces in Sumatera
6 other asset 6 In West Java
7 single guarantor 7 in Center Java / Yogjakarta
8 multi guarantor 8 In East Java
9 no collateral required 9 In Jakarta
10 salary/ wage 10 in Kalimantan
11 in Sulawesi
12 in Papua
13 in Overseas
90 Others
97 Don’t know
98 No Answer
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14,2 Lending
30 Did you ever lend out cash or goods (rice, fertilizer etc.) or sell by installments? A if no, go to next section
31 A if no, go to next section
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
repayment as initially agreed 
the amount interest rate
time unit per month
B (Rp 000) C D E month year on F B G
1
what was 
the type 
of shock?
What is the 
duration of loan?
when did you 
give the loan? 
Do you have any lendings that still own or that have been completely repaid to you 
between 1 Jan and 31 Des 2009?
Loan
what is the amount of loan the 
HH lend?
to whom you 
lend it?
what for the 
borrower 
need the 
loan?
did they 
borrow due to 
a shock 
related to oil 
palm? (A)
type of 
loan
type of 
payment
repayment 
schedule
frequency 
per year
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Sub Section 14.2. Lending
CODE A CODE D CODE E
1 Yes 1 Develop new oil palm (with contract scheme) general
2 No 2 Develop or buy new oil palm (without contract scheme) 1 illness 
3 buy oil palm input 2 accident
4 Other agricultural investment 3 Death of head of household
CODE B 5 Non agricultural business investment 4 Death of household member
1 credit 6 Medical treatment 5 birth or person joint to HH
2 cash 7 study 6 money spend for ceremony
3 agricultural input 8 ceremony 7 house damage
4 agricultural product 9 pay back other debt 8 theft in home
5 food 10 house renovation natural disaster and climatic change
6 jewellery/ gold 11 buy house or land 9 earthquake
90 others….. 12 relend to relatives or friends 10 drought
13 buy car or motorbike 11 flood
14 buy electronic instrument 12 erotion
15 buy mobile phone Oil palm related shock
16 buy other durable goods 13 the fall of  FFB price
90 others 14 strong pest attack
15 the scarcity of fertilizer
16 the lack of water supply 
17 fire in oil palm
CODE C CODE F 18 the damage of infrastructure due to heavy rain
1 relative 1 year 19 violance due to social/ land conflict
2 friend 2 month 20 fruit theft
3 not relative/ friend 3 week 21 the diminishing of productivity
4 day other economic shocks
22 job loss in agriculture
23 job loss in non agriculture
CODE G 24 deases of livestock
1 pay fixed amount periodically 25 collapse of other business
2 pay varied but specific amount at scheduled t 26 strong increase of interest loan
3 pay whenever I have enough money 90 Others
98 no answer
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Lending
47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58
Total amount main second third
(Rp 000)
(Rp 000) H I J K K K L
1
2
3
4
5
what is the 
consequenc
e if Q51=2 
or 3
what is the 
collateral for this 
loan?
estimate value of 
the collateralLoan
Actual repayment 
stream 1 to 12/09
total 
repayment 
as of end 
12/09 (Rp 
000)
remaining 
debt as of 
end 2009no of 
payment
payment 
status
other requirement where is the 
borrower 
located
(Rp 000)
Appendix: Household Questionnaire 182
CODE H CODE K
1 on schedule 1 credit group membership
2 default 2 must sell the product to the nucleus
3 paid late 3 transmigration program participant
4 local people
5 custom/ adat community
CODE I 6 saving account at the bank
1 none 7 membership in social or political group
2 not able to borrow from the lender 8 single guarantor
3 not able to borrow from this lender or others 9 multi guarantor
4 collateral was seized 10 currently enrolled in school or university
5 had to pay higher interest 11 salary/ wage
90 others,… 90 other, specify
98 No answer 98 No answer
CODE J CODE L
1 Land 1 In the same village
2 oil palm plantation 2 in the same sub district
3 other crops plantation 3 In the same district
4 house 4 in the same province (Jambi)
5 saving 5 in other provinces in Sumatera
6 other asset 6 In West Java
7 single guarantor 7 in Center Java / Yogjakarta
8 multi guarantor 8 In East Java
9 no collateral required 9 In Jakarta
10 salary/ wage 10 in Kalimantan
11 in Sulawesi
12 in Papua
13 in Overseas
90 Others
97 Don’t know
98 No Answer
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15 Perception of Change Over 5 Years
1 2
No Several items that may change
household
1 your HH wealth generally? C
2 your income? C
3 your HH assets? C
4 your HH members health A
5 your HH loan? C
6 your style of expenditure B
7 your saving behaviour A
village
8 environment safety A
9 water availability A
10 food crops availability A
11 poverty C
12 public infrastructure A
13 growth of new oil palm plantation C
14 deforestation C
15 social conflict on land tenure C
relation between the nucleus and smallholders
16 conflict resolution A
17 transperency A
18 technical support for smallholders A
19 trust A
Considering your experience in past 5 years, 
20 D
21 Do you want to convert a part or all your oil palm into other crop? E
22 Do you want to sell your oil palm plantation? E
23 Do you want to buy other oil palm area? E
24 when was the best year for oil palm business? year
25 E
Next 5 years, 
compare to 
now
Please compare the following items at now and 5 years ago, and 
please estimate them compare to now
If you are oil palm contracted smallholder, what do you want to do 
with the contract? If you are not, go to Q 25
Do you want that your son/ daughter become oil palm smallholders 
like you?
Now, 
compare to 5 
years ago
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Section 15. Perception of Changes Over 5 years
CODE A
1 Much worse off
2 worse off
3 same
4 better off
5 much better off
CODE B
1 much more consumptive
2 more consumptive
3 same
4 less consumptive
5 much less consumptive
CODE C
1 much lower
2 lower
3 same
4 higher
5 much higher
CODE D
1 continue and commit to implement all those contract
2 drop contract arangement
3 just do a part of contract arrangement
90 others
CODE E
1 Yes
2 No
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16 Investment and Future Plan
1 A
if no go to 
Q11
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ID
N
o of invest plan
Type of 
business
required initial 
amount 
investment 
what is your 
plan to 
finance it?
Do you have 
enough 
experience 
in…before?
What is your 
main 
consideration 
to choose it?
please 
estimate, how 
long times do 
you need to 
achieve break 
event? 
compare to oil 
palm, please 
estimate how 
profitable is it 
in the future?
B Rp 000 C A D year E
1 1
2
3
11  F
Suppose you had received gift or money around Rp 100 million, 
12 what would you do in the first priority?  G
13  What percentage would you allocate to make a business investment? %
14 With that amount (Q13), in what type of business would you invest? A
Suppose you had received 2.0 ha additional land from the government for agricultur
15 what would you plant in the land? H
if H=1 go to Q18
16 what percentage of the area that you would plant non oil palm crops? %
17 What kind of non oil palm crops would you plant in the area? I
18 only ask if you plan to grow oil palm, what will you do to work it? P
Do you or your HH members have any plans to invest your 
money in any interesting business?
Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to 
avoid taking risk? (Please choose a number on a scale  1 to 6)
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Section 16. Investment and Future Plan
CODE A CODE D
1 Yes 1 It doesn’t require high skill/ experience
2 No 2 it allows low capital
3 it will be prospective (produce high profit)
CODE B 4 it produce more stable income
Agriculture 5 it is my passion
1 Oil palm 6 I am very expert and experienced on it
2 Rubber 90 others…
3 Other crops
4 Livestock and aquaculture
5 Logging CODE E
90 Others,….. 1 much more profitable 
Processing and production 2 more profitable
6 Oil palm mill 3 same
7 rice mill 4 less profitable
8 food processing 5 much less profitable
9 handicrafts/ carver 97 don’t know
10 meuble/ furniture
Service in agriculture
11 transport for agricultural product CODE F
12 agent / middleman 1 2 3 4 5 6
13 agri input n equipment provider Avoid risks fully prepared to take risks
Trade and Service
14 car rent
15 public transporation CODE G CODE I
16 automotive dealer 1 make a business investment 1 rubber
17 workshop/ repair shop 2 buy new car or motorbike 2 cocoa
18 restaurant 3 buy new house 3 coconut
19 food stall 4 buy electronic equipment 4 sugar cane
20 hotel/ guest house 5 renovate house 5 durian
21 Hair salon / barber 6 married again 6 banana
22 Tailor 7 do hajj, go to mecca 7 duku
23 Car washing 8 sent child to university 8 paddy/ rice
24 retail shop 9 move to urban area in Sumatra 9 corn
25 construction material shop 10 move to java 10 vegetable
26 civil contractor 90 Others……. 90 Others
27 gasoline station/ sell fuel
28 internet shop CODE H
29 general trading 1 Oil palm in all area
30 doctor or nurse clinic 2 Other crops in all area
90 lainnya 3 Combine oil palm and other crops in the area
4 Oil palm 
CODE C 90 others
1 Use my saving 97 don’t know
2 borrow from the bank or other financial institutions
3 borrow from relatives/ friends
4 sell my asset CODE P
5 mortgage my asset 1 participate in a contract scheme
90 Others 2 work it independently
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Replanting Plan
19 What is the most important thing that make you worry about future? J
20 1 Yes
2 No
21 Please estimate cost for technical aspect in replanting
1 2 3 4
cost component area cost/ha total cost
(ha) Rp 000 Rp 000
1 land clearing
2 seed
3 planting
4 fertilizer
5 pesticides
6 others
Total
22 Have you made a preparation and planning for replanting? C
if no, go to Q28
23 What do you do now to face replanting period in the future? K
Tell maximum three main actions that you do 1
2
3
24 What do you plan the replanting implementation? L
25 Have you save your money regularly to prepare replanting? C
if C=2, go to Q28
26 How much do you allocate to save for replanting regularly? Rp 000
27 What time basis do you use for it? M
28 Why you do not save particularly for replanting? N
29 Have you think about alternative source of income during the period? C
if C=2, go to next section
30 What alternative income do you think that can equally substitute oil palm? A
Please tell max three main alternative incomes 1
2
3
31 What kind of livelihood would you really take in the period? A
32 What is your main consideration to choose it (Q30)? D
Imagine that you are in replanting period which may take 4
years. During the period you can not receive income from oil 
palm area which is replanted.
Do you aware that you should replant your oil palm 
after it has been 25 years?
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Sub Section 16.2. Replanting
CODE J CODE A
1 my oil palm will become too old and less yield 1 Yes
2 my income will be drop if the price of oil palm is going down 2 No
3 natural disaster such as earthquake will break all
4 all agricultural input will be very expansive
5 all daily needs becomes more expansive and can not be met
6 policy changes in oil palm
7 violance and social conflict
90 others
CODE B
CODE K Agriculture
1 Develop new oil palm plantation 1 Oil palm
2 Saving 2 Rubber
3 make an investment in other crops 3 Other crops
4 make an investment in non agricultural business 4 Livestock and aquaculture
5 take insurance for agriculture 5 Logging
6 ask other HH members to work in non oil palm sector 90 Others,…..
7 Substitute part of oil palm with other crops Processing and production
90 Others 6 Oil palm mill
7 rice mill
8 food processing
CODE L 9 handicrafts/ carver
1 by nucleus/ contract 10 meuble/ furniture
2 by my self Service in agriculture
11 transport for agricultural product
12 agent / middleman
CODE M 13 agri input n equipment provider
1 per week Trade and Service
2 per month 14 car rent
3 per quarter 15 public transporation
4 per smeseter 16 automotive dealer
5 per year 17 workshop/ repair shop
6 not routine 18 restaurant
19 food stall
20 hotel/ guest house
CODE D 21 Hair salon / barber 
1 It doesn’t require high skill/ experience 22 Tailor 
2 it allows low capital 23 Car washing
3 it will be prospective (produce high profit) 24 retail shop
4 it produce more stable income 25 construction material shop
5 it is my passion 26 civil contractor
6 I have high expertise or experience on it 27 gasoline station/ sell fuel
90 others 28 internet shop
29 general trading
30 doctor or nurse clinic
CODE N 90 Others,…..
1 I don’t have enough money to save
2 It is still too far. I still have a long time
3 I don’t want to continue oil palm business
4 my income is very fluctuative so that I can not allocate regularly saving
90 others
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17 Oil Palm Contract Participation
Experience 
1 How many years experience in farming do you have before growing oil palm? year
2 How many years your experience in growing oil palm? year
3 Do you have experience in other tree crops? If no go to Q5 A
4 What are two major kind of other tree crops ? B
B
Transaction of Oil Palm Plantation among Smallholders
5 Did you ever sell your oil palm plantation to others? If no go to Q7 A
6 Why did you sell the oil palm plantation? C
7 Have you bought any contracted oil palm area from contracted smallholders? A
8 Have you bought other oil palm plantation from independent smallholders? A
9 if Q 7 or Q 8 yes, Why did you buy the oil palm area ? D
10 Do you have other land where you have cultivated other crops? If no go to Q 14 A
11 Did you convert your other land to be oil palm plantation? If no go to Q13 A
12 If Yes, Why? D
13 Why did you not convert other land to be oil palm plantation? E
Relied on your position as contracted, independent or mix oil palm smallholders:
U
14 Please rank five main constrains/ problems that you have still faced for past 5 years 1
2
3
4
5
15 Please predict and rank five main constrains that you will face for next 5 years 1
2
3
4
5
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Section 17. Contract Participation
CODE A CODE E
1 Yes 1  I don’t have enough money to do planting which costly
2 No 2 To minimize risk due to monoculture
98 no answer 3 Other crops may have higher profit
4 we still need other food crops to fulfill daily need
CODE B 90 Others
1 Rubber 98 No Answer
2 Cacao
3 Soybean CODE U
4 Corn 1 Delayed payment
5 Sugar cane 2 high cost of input
90 others 3 limited information
98 no answer 4 market access
5 scarcity of fertilizer
6 difficulties to meet the nucleus quality standard
CODE C 7 fluctuated price of product
1 I need a big cash at the time to pay something urgent 8 scarcity of water for irrigation
2 I didn’t have enough ability to work in oil palm farm 9 lack of seed quality
3 I saw that there are too much risk and uncertainty in this business 10 lack of credit for input
4 That was my strategy to invest my money in a better business choice 11 too high investment
5 I found that the size of area is not enough efficient for profitable business 12 cheating by agent/ middleman
90 Others 13 too high transaction cost
98 no answer 14 It is not efficient enough due to small area
15 scarcity of labor during peak period
CODE D 16 less transperency of the nucleus 
1 to make my oil palm business more efficient 17 conflict of land tenure status
2 profitable investment due to promising prospect 18 lack of experience in oil palm
3 just follow other smallholders 19 the diminishing of productivity due to too old plant
90 others 20 less income due to not already yielded oil palm
98 no answer 21 pest attack
22 oil palm credit installment is too high
23 Not suitable land condition
90 others
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16 Are you contracted smallholder or adopt at least one contract scheme? A if no, go to Q 49
17 Do you adopt more than one contract scheme? A if no, please just fill Scheme 1
1 2
If you are contracted smallholders Scheme 1 Scheme 2
18 What is type of contract schemes that you adopted? F
19 What is the main requirement to be involved in the contract scheme? G
20 When did you join the contract scheme (was approved to be contracted smallholder) ? year
21 What was land tenure status of contracted land before? H
22 Have you received officially the ownership of the contracted land? If No, go to Q 24 A
23 When did contracted area covert into yourown officially? year
24 When will the contracted area be converted to your own? year
years
25 What is the status of credit repayment? I
26 What was your main reason to take part in the contract scheme? K
27 Who  offered you the opportunity to be involved in the contract scheme? J
28 Was there some pressure from someone for you to join the scheme? If no, go to Q30 A
29 Who did force you? J
Contractual arrangement
30 How was the contract made and signed? L
31 Do you have a  writen contract with the nucleus company? If no go to Q 33 A
32 Do you think the writen contract is detail enough and clear for both parties? A
33 Do you think the contract is fair for both parties? Go to Q46 A
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Section 17. Contract Participation
CODE A CODE J
1 Yes 1 Head of village
2 No 2 local government
3 central government
CODE F 4 the nucleus company
1 PIR 5 informal leader
2 PIR TRANS 6 Other smallholders
3 KKPA 7 Cooperative manager
4 operator scheme 20:80 8 Head of farmer group
5 PIR TRANS LOCAL 90 Others
CODE G CODE K
1 transmigration program participant 1 Did not see another option to get more income 
2 originaly local people 2 to get market access
3 indegenous people 3 to minimize cost and risk
4 have land certificate 4 to get more technical advice and infrastructure support
90 Others 5 It will be more easy to get credit and input
6 To get more approriate price
CODE H 7 To keep relationship with government or informal leader in the village
1 HGU 8 Just follow other farmers
2 Custom/ adat land 9 Did not have other option (top down policy) 
3 individual ownership 90 others
97 don’t know 98 no answer
98 no answer
CODE I CODE L
1 fully paid 1 The nucleus and I made and signed it directly
2 above 80 percent paid 2 It was made by the nucleus and the cooperative
3 30 - 80 percent 3 I don’t have the writen contract
4 below 30 percent paid 97 don’t know
98 No answer
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If you are pure independent smallholders
34 Why did you not take part in the contract scheme? Q
35 If a similar contract scheme is offered to you now, what will you do? R
36 Have you get opportuniy to become contracted smallhloder offered by the nucleus? A
37 What did you do to develop your oil palm at the time? V
38 What was your source of funding to develop it? W
Considering your position as contracted, mix, or independent smallholder,…
39 What is your main learning source to work in your oil palm plantation? S
40 How do you get learning from the source? T
41 Do you get technical advice from the nucleus? A
42 What do you think about the technical advice from the nucleus? P
43 Who is really do agronomy treatment or maintain your oil palm? M
44 Who is really do harvesting activities in your oil palm? M
45 who is transport your oil palm fruit from plantation ? M
How do you get the input materials such as
46 Fertilizer, herbisides, and pesticides N
47 Seedling N
Note of Interviewer
48
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Section 17. Contract Participation
CODE Q CODE S
1 contracted land has been sold 1 Technical advice from the nucleus
2 Did not get opportunity to become contracted smallholder 2 regular meeting in farmer group
3 I can seek a higher profit in free market 3 experience sharing with other smallholders
4 I don’t believe with commitment and transperency of nucleus company 4 learning by doing
5 I prefer to sell my fruit to the agent due to a faster and flexible payment 5 reading books and other media
6 I don’t like restricted rule by nucleus 6 previous experience
90 others 90 Others
CODE R CODE T
1 I will adopt the contract scheme 1 regulerly
2 I will consider several factors before making a decision 2 often, but not regular
3 I will reject the offered contract 3 rare
90 Others 4 almost never
97 don’t know
CODE P
1 It is very helpful and useful
CODE A 2 It is useful but I have known it, so it is no so important for me
1 Yes 3 It is not useful
2 No 97 don’t know
98 No answer
CODE V CODE M
1 I worked it by myself 1 the nucleus company do the activities and will account it as discount factor of the price
2 I involved family labor to help me 2 I do the activities by myself
3 I paid wage labor 3 I involve the members of household to help me
4 I pay several labors or service providers to do the activities 
5 the activities are coordinated and done under supervise of the cooperative
CODE W 6 agent or middleman
1 Took credit from bank 90 others
2 Used household saving
3 Supported by relatives or friends CODE N
1 The nucleus provides the input and it will be accounted in the end
2 The nucleus  sell directly the input with subdsidized price
3 The input procurement is coordinated by the cooperative
4 The nucleus recommends it and I buy it in free market by myself
5 I buy it without considering the nucleus recommendation
90 Others
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